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Abstract
A product line design problem studies the optimal product line and corre-
sponding quality and price for each product. This problem is critical for the
success of businesses in both manufacturing and service sectors, and has been
an important research focus for decades in both areas of marketing and oper-
ations management. To contribute in this line of discussion, this dissertation
comprises of three essays in which we investigate how product line design
problem interacts with such operations issues as capacity, remanufacturing,
and reverse logistics, and examine how the results of these interactions af-
fect the environment. Throughout this dissertation, we focus on the design of
product quality, a single dimensional vertical differentiation which represents
all more-is-better attributes of a product.
In the first essay, we investigate how “back-end” capacity constraint inter-
acts with “front-end” pricing decisions. Specifically, we assume capacity is
consumed in both fixed (depends on the length of a product line) and variable
(depends on product quality) ways. A product design model for segmented
market is used to derive and analyze the optimal product line strategy. We
find that lower capacity introduces operations cannibalization which reduces
the length of the optimal product line. We also show that if longer product
line consumes more fixed capacity (e.g., for changeover or setup), then the
resulting economy of scale could make offering a standard product optimal,
which completely contradicts the classic product line design results.
In the second essay, we study remanufacturing and its environmental con-
sequences within the context of product design. In particular, production
costs and consumer valuations are considered as functions of quality and are
differentiated based on whether the product is non-remanufacturable, reman-
ufacturable, or remanufactured. Given this, the firm maximizes its profit by
determining whether or not to remanufacture and, if so, how much to re-
manufacture. Correspondingly, we examine the environmental consequences
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of these optimal remanufacturing decisions using a quality-dependent mea-
sure which focuses on resource extraction and waste disposal. We show that
true “green” consumers should not only value remanufacturable products but
also value remanufactured products. We also find that consumers’ higher
willingness-to-pay and the firm’s low production cost can potentially lead to
worse environmental consequences in addition to higher profit.
In the final essay, we extend the model in the second essay by incorporat-
ing an exogenous collection rate and by considering social and environmental
welfare in the decision making process. Examining the collection rate, we con-
firm that an increase in the collection rate generally benefits both the firm
and the environment. We also find that there exists a threshold of collection
rate above which collecting more units yields no effect on either profitability
or environmental friendliness. Examining social and environmental welfare,
we find that considering environmental welfare benefits the environment due
to both lower quality and a smaller sales volume. In contrast, considering
consumer welfare hurts the environment due to a much larger sales volume.
This once again underscores that it is consumption that hurts the environ-
ment.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Problem Overview
Product design is critical to a manufacturer’s success. A well designed prod-
uct will facilitate a firm implementing its strategy, while an ill designed prod-
uct might force a firm to bankruptcy. For example, Apple Inc. launched its
first iPod on October 23, 2001. Now about ten years later, Apple Inc. has
developed a full product line that includes Classic iPod, the touchscreen
iPod Touch, the video-capable iPod Nano, and the compact iPod Shuﬄe.
Inspired by its success with iPod, Apple further developed two new product
lines, namely iPhone in January 2007 and iPad in April 2010. The successful
introduction of these product lines has not only saved the company but also
significantly increased its stock price. As of January 03, 2011, Apple Inc.
was worth more than $300 billion, the second most valuable company in the
world (Praetorius 2011). For this reason, among many others, product line
design problems have been one of the focal interests in marketing, operations
management, and engineering design.
Recent years, especially the last decade, have witnessed the booming of
reverse supply chain management. Product return, the “cost center” of a
firm’s operation, has been gradually turned into a new “revenue center”
(Guide and Van Wassenhove 2009). On the one hand, top management has
changed their view on the reverse supply chain. More systematic theories
and tools are applied to managing product returns. Instead of sitting in
the warehouse, returned products are collected, sorted, remanufactured, and
then sold to consumers through marketing endeavors. On the other hand,
consumers and the society as a whole are becoming increasingly aware of the
environmental consequences of product production and consumption. More
consumers are willing to buy “greener” products, even at a price premium
(Cremer and Thisse 1999, Sengupta 2011). As a result, the remanufacturing
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industry increased to $63 billion business by 2005.
Indeed, this surging “green wave” has presented enormous opportunities
for the 21st century. Whether firms can seize these opportunities is critical
to their success. Also important is how firms take on the inherent challenges
from legal, technological and marketing perspectives. On the legal side, a
number of legislations have been introduced in Europe, North America, and
Japan in the last two decades. These laws and regulations mandate man-
ufacturers to reduce waste and take responsibilities for the entire life-cycle
of their products (Webster and Mitra 2007). On the technological side, to
take advantage of the cost savings, manufacturers must design and produce
new remanufacturable products which would require more costly materials
and more efficient technology (Lee and Bony 2007). Finally, on the market-
ing side, remanufactured products may not be well received by consumers
because these products have been used (Guide and Li 2010). Also, selling
remanufactured products could cause significant cannibalization to the new
products, hence impeding the profitability (Atasu et al. 2008). Therefore, to
ride this green wave, firms need to systematically incorporate remanufactur-
ing and the reverse supply chain in their decision-making processes.
Many researches have shown that remanufacturing generally leads to higher
profitability. However, does this necessarily translate into environmental
friendliness, one of the most important benefits of remanufacturing? This
question is difficult to answer. To make things worse, remanufacturing could
potentially have negative environmental implications. For example, in ship
remanufacturing, unprocessed scrap metals are oftentimes abandoned on the
beach (CNN.com, 2008). In fact, firms proliferated across many industries
are guilty of greenwashing in the sense that they ride the “green wave” of
environmental consumerism without necessarily considering whether or not
their actions actually benefit the environment (Orange 2010). Indeed, the
implicit presumption that remanufacturing benefits the firm as well as the
environment warrants more rigorous examination.
1.2 The Objective and the Plan
This dissertation consists of three essays, each of which models a product
design problem within a specific operations management context. The first
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essay (Chapter 2) addresses the question of how a capacity constraint af-
fects a monopoly firm’s optimal product line decisions. The second essay
(Chapter 3) studies the interaction between remanufacturing and product
design. In this setting, it also examines the environmental consequences of
remanufacturing by comparing the environmental damage associated with
optimal remanufacturing solutions to the damage associated with optimal
non-remanufacturing solutions. Building on the second essay, the third essay
(Chapter 4) extends the model of Chapter 3 by investigating the impact of
collection rate on the profitability and environmental friendliness of reman-
ufacturing.
In Chapter 2, we study the interaction between product line design and lim-
ited capacity in a monopolistic setting. Classic product line design literature
(i.e. Moorthy 1984, Kim and Chhajed 2000) has discussed this problem ex-
tensively by studying cannibalization and its implications. Here we consider
an operations constraint, limited capacity, which introduces to the product
line design problem a new trade-off between quality and quantity. On the
one hand, offering high quality can extract more surplus with each product
but lead to small quantity. On the other hand, offering low quality can boost
the sales volume but significantly reduce the profit margin of each product.
Hence, we consider this new trade-off in the product line design problem,
and ask how does limited capacity affect the optimal product line decisions?
Specifically, how does limited capacity interact with market cannibalization
and affect the optimal quality and price decisions?
To address these questions, we consider a monopoly firm serving a market
with two consumer segments that differ in size and valuation of quality. The
firm faces resource constraints in the form of limited capacity. Its production
technology dictates that capacity is consumed during changeovers or setups
as well as during actual production. Specifically, setup capacity (capacity
consumption per setup) depends on the length (number of product types)
of the product line, with longer product lines consuming more capacity for
setups. In contrast, variable capacity (capacity consumption per product)
increases linearly in product quality to reflect that it consumes more capacity
to manufacture a product with higher quality than it is to manufacture one
with lower quality. In our paper, capacity consumption depends on both
quality and quantity (as in Yayla-Ku¨llu¨ et al. 2011), whereas in existing
literature capacity consumption depends only on quantity (as in Dobson and
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Yano 2002, Tang and Yin 2010).
In Chapter 3, we study remanufacturing and its environmental conse-
quences in the context of product design. A firm has the option to design
a non-remanufacturable product or a remanufacturable one and to specify a
corresponding quality. These design choices affect both the production costs
and the consumer valuations associated with the product. On the cost side,
remanufacturable products cost more to produce originally, but less to reman-
ufacture, than non-remanufacturable products cost to produce. Analogously,
on the consumer side, remanufacturable products are valued more, but re-
manufactured products are valued less, than non-remanufacturable products
are valued. Given this, we investigate the environmental consequences of
remanufacturing by first defining a measure of environmental damage that,
ultimately, is a function of what is produced and how much is produced, and
then applying that measure to assess the environmental damage associated
with the firm’s optimal strategy relative to the environmental damage asso-
ciated with the firm’s otherwise optimal strategy if a non-remanufacturable
product were designed and produced. In doing so, we bridge the gap between
profit maximization and environmental friendliness to ascertain the extent to
which the two are complementary and to identify key factors of compatibility
when they are not complementary.
To operationalize the firm’s design for remanufacturing problem with a par-
simonious model that captures remanufacturing fundamentals, we follow the
lead of Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006) and Atasu et al. (2008) by formulat-
ing a two-stage analytic framework. We consider a firm serving a continuous
market. At the beginning of stage 1, the firm first determines whether to
design a remanufacturable product or a non-remanufacturable one and, cor-
respondingly, establishes the quality of the chosen product. Then the firm
sets the selling price for the product and sells an amount accordingly, as
dictated by the specified consumer market’s heterogeneity. Finally, to con-
clude stage 1, consumers who purchase the product extract its consumption
value and then either discard the remains (which is the case if the product
was designed to be non-remanufacturable) or return the remains (which is
the case if the product was designed to be remanufacturable). The returned
amount, if applicable, thus establishes a supply constraint on the number of
units that can be remanufactured for resale. Given that, at the beginning
of stage 2, the firm’s decision is to set its optimal product portfolio, that
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is, to determine how many units of new versus remanufactured products to
produce and what associated prices to set accordingly for each product type
in stage 2.
In Chapter 4, we extend the model of Chapter 3 to explore the effect
of collection rates on a monopolist’s optimal design for remanufacturability.
In particular, we investigate the conditions under which the firm makes its
products remanufacturable when only a certain fraction of used products is
returned at the end of each period. In that context, we ask, how does the
optimal product mix between new and remanufactured products and optimal
product quality change according to the collection rate? And, how do these
decisions affect the environment? Moreover, we compare and contrast the
manufacturer’s optimal design for remanufacturability to the design that
would maximize social and environmental welfare.
In contrast to our model in Chapter 3, we operationalize the design for
remanufacturability problem in Chapter 4 with an infinite-horizon model.
There are two key distinctions: 1) no initial period, which means that can-
nibalization between new and remanufactured products explicitly exists in
each period; and 2) no ending period, which means that each new product
can potentially be remanufactured. At the beginning of the planning hori-
zon, the decision maker determines whether to design a remanufacturable
product or a non-remanufacturable one, and establishes the corresponding
quality. Given this product design, at the beginning of each period, the deci-
sion maker sets its optimal product portfolio, that is, determines how many
units of new versus remanufactured products to produce and what associated
prices to set accordingly in each period. Then, consumers make purchasing
decisions and determine whether to discard or to return the remains after
consumption. Finally, to conclude each period, the firm’s reverse logistics
collects a certain fraction of used products, which establishes a supply con-
straint on the number of units that can be remanufactured for resale.
5
Chapter 2
Product Line Design With
Capacity Constraint
2.1 Introduction
The product line design problem involves the study of the optimal product
variety, and corresponding quality and price for each product in the product
line. This problem is critical for success of business in both manufacturing
and service organizations. Thus, it has been an important research focus
for more than four decades by scholars in both marketing and operations
management. Marketing literature establishes that higher product variety
can result in higher market share and revenue because it allows a firm to
better meet the special needs of consumers. However, the potential gain from
greater product variety must be balanced against the lower unit cost with
fewer variants (Lancaster 1990). The operations literature has studied this
tradeoff between revenue and cost, and has offered some prescriptions under
such settings as competition (Alptekinogˇlu and Corbett 2008, Villas-Boas
2009, Tang and Yin 2010), lead time and congestion (Dobson and Yano 2002,
Chayet et al. 2011, Alptekinogˇlu and Corbett 2010), and higher overhead and
administrative costs (Netessine and Taylor 2007). In this chapter, however,
we study capacity as yet another important factor in determining the optimal
product variety.
Indeed, firms are always operating under operational constraints such as
time, labor, equipment, space, and inventory (Goldratt and Cox 1992). These
resource constraints can lead to competition among multiple products as
manifested in many industries. For example, in the manufacturing sector,
the constraint could be the total machine time which is limited by the total
working hours and the number of assembly lines. Products which require
different amount of processing time and serve different consumer segments
share the same assembly line, and hence compete against each other for ma-
chine time (Dobson and Yano 2002, Chayet et al. 2011). Consequently, a
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firm has to optimally allocate its limited machine time among competing
products to maximize its profits. Other examples include customer service
centers which serve both premium and general customers, and aircraft ac-
commodating seats for different classes (Yayla-Ku¨llu¨ et al. 2011).
When making product line design decisions, a firm faces challenges posed
by capacity constraint on both the revenue and cost sides of the problem.
On one hand, offering higher variety enables the firm to extract more surplus
from consumers by better matching products with consumer preferences. But
limited capacity may prevent the firm from reaching out to every consumer
or from offering the best quality. On the other hand, offering lower variety
reduces unit production cost due to economies of scale in the production
process. But lack of differentiation prevents the firm from extracting more
surplus from consumers with higher willingness to pay. Some research has
addressed the trade-off between high revenue and low cost (e.g., Chayet et al.
2011, Tang and Yin 2010, Yayla-Ku¨llu¨ et al. 2011).
In this chapter, we aim to study the product line design problem of a
monopoly firm who serves a segmented market under limited capacity. Specif-
ically, we investigate the effect of capacity on the firm’s optimal product line
strategy, and identify conditions under which this optimal strategy deviates
from the corresponding classic prescription under unconstrained capacity.
We also examine the manifestation of capacity in quality and price, as well
as in consumer welfare and profitability.
To address these questions, we consider a segmented market with two
consumer segments that differ in size and valuation of quality. Serving this
market is a monopoly firm who has limited capacity and whose production
technology dictates that capacity is consumed during changeovers or setups
as well as during actual production. On one hand, setup capacity (capacity
consumption per setup) depends on the length of the product line, with
longer product line consuming more capacity for setups. On the other hand,
variable capacity (capacity consumption per product) increases linearly in
product quality, representing the notion that it consumes more capacity to
manufacture a product with higher quality than to manufacture one with
lower quality. Therefore, in this chapter, capacity consumption depends on
both quality and quantity (as in Yayla-Ku¨llu¨ et al. 2011), whereas in many
existing literature capacity consumption depends only on quantity (as in
Dobson and Yano 2002, Tang and Yin 2010).
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Our model considers product quality as an endogenous design decision.
This enables us to explicitly formulate capacity consumption with regards
to quality. This modeling construct allows richer dynamics between quality
and capacity, and is potentially more realistic for production scenarios where
products with different quality demands different amount of capacity. Con-
sequently, our modeling framework allows us to derive more insights into the
trade-off between operations and marketing prescriptions. The main results
of this chapter are summarized as follows:
• Capacity introduces cannibalization from the operations side as op-
posed to cannibalization from the market side which manifests because
of consumer differentiation. These two types of cannibalization exhibit
similar yet different effects on the firm’s optimal product line decisions.
First, an increase in cannibalization reduces the “length” of a product
line (product variety) regardless of the sources of cannibalization. How-
ever, lower capacity increases cannibalization because of reductions in
capacity for the high-quality products, while larger consumer differen-
tiation increases cannibalization because of the firm’s inability to im-
plement price discrimination. Secondly, operations cannibalization im-
pacts the qualities of both products while market cannibalization only
affects the quality of the low-end product when offering two products is
optimal. Moreover, capacity restriction does not affect the “width” of a
product line (quality differentiation between two products). Therefore,
the quality differentiation between products should remain the same
even if the firm experiences changes in capacity due to any reason,
whether it is downsizing, acquisition, or outsourcing.
• Offering a standard product for the whole market could be optimal
when capacity is limited, although such a strategy is never optimal
when capacity is abundant. When the two consumer segments are
close in their valuation and capacity is moderate, offering a standard
product for both segments is better than customizing only for the high-
end segment due to a larger sale volume of the standard product, and
it is also better than offering two products due to savings in setup ca-
pacity. Hence, capacity constraint offers another explanation of why
offering a standard product is still practiced in many industries. Note
that the differentiation in valuation between the two segments is the
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fundamental driver in determining whether or not offering a standard
product is optimal. If the two segments are sufficiently apart, for ex-
ample, then this strategy is never optimal. Instead, the firm offers two
products when capacity is high and offers a niche product for the high
segment only when capacity is low.
• In addition, limited capacity also exhibits strong influence over the
firm’s operational decisions, such as capacity utilization. For example,
the firm may choose to idle some capacity when there is a large setup
capacity associated with offering two products. This occurs when ca-
pacity is moderate, in which case the firm has enough capacity to offer
the targeted segment with its efficient quality. But, large setup capac-
ity makes it unattractive to offer two products because the remaining
capacity after setup is not sufficient to offer high enough qualities to
attract consumers.
• Intuitively, limited capacity generally leads to lower quality and price
for consumers as compared to the unconstrained capacity case. How-
ever, this is not necessarily true. In fact, limited capacity may lead
to higher quality, price and consumer welfare for certain segment(s).
For example, as opposed to offering two differentiated products, when
offering a standard product for the whole market is optimal, the low
segment may receive higher quality and hence higher price. This con-
sequently translates to higher consumer welfare for the high segment.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In §2.2, we review rele-
vant literatures. Then in §2.3, we lay out the model assumptions for both
consumers and the firm, and we develop and solve models for each product
line design strategy. In §2.4, we discuss the impact of capacity on the firm’s
optimal product line decisions such as capacity utilization, quality, price,
consumer welfare as well as the firm’s profit. And we conclude in §2.5.
2.2 Literature Review
Our research is related to two streams of literature. One stream is the lit-
erature on product line design. It started with Mussa and Rosen (1978)’s
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seminal research on vertical product differentiation in quality, which was fur-
ther developed by Moorthy (1984) to tailor for segmented market. These
marketing research emphasize “front-end” issues, that is to extract maxi-
mum surplus from heterogeneous consumers. They demonstrate the effects
of market cannibalization in a product line with multiple products. Given
cannibalization, this model is further developed to study a variety of issues,
such as consumers’ patience about time-to-market (Moorthy and Png 1992),
distribution channel structure (Villas-Boas 1998), competition and horizon-
tal consumer taste (Desai 2001), multiple quality-type attributes (Kim and
Chhajed 2002), consumer evaluation cost (Villas-Boas 2009), and consumer
variety seeking behavior (Sajeesh and Raju 2010). These works generally
consider no explicit operational cost but assume a convex relationship be-
tween quality and corresponding variable cost. The results suggest that
cannibalization leads to quality distortion to the lower-valuation segment.
As cannibalization increases, the low segment should be dropped altogether.
Moreover, a single standard product for all would never be optimal in this
setting.
Also building on the stylized product line design model of Mussa and Rosen
(1978) are many research papers on the operations and marketing interface.
These works emphasize on the “back-end” issues, that lead to lower oper-
ational cost. For example, Desai et al. (2001), Kim and Chhajed (2002),
and Heese and Swaminathan (2006) study the implications of product com-
monality and resulting cost saving effect on product line decisions. Krishnan
and Zhu (2006) investigate impact of development cost in addition to vari-
able cost. Shao (2007) studies system flexibility in a competition setting
and learns that first-mover with flexibility may suffer from low profitability
when the level of flexility is public information to its competitor. Netes-
sine and Taylor (2007) examine the production technology with the classic
economic order quantity model representing the make-to-stock cost. Chayet
et al. (2011) study the effect of congestion in the form of queuing models.
The second stream of literature of interest to us is on resource constraint.
This literature generally assumes exogenous product design and demand, and
focuses on satisfying consumer demand with limited resources. For example,
Cohen et al. (1988), Zhang (1997) and Mirchandani and Mishra (2002) pro-
pose that limited resources should be prioritized according to products or
consumer classes. In particular, the product with higher profitability or con-
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sumer class with higher willingness to pay should be assigned with higher
priority. Dobson and Yano (2002), Tang and Yin (2010), and Yayla-Ku¨llu¨
et al. (2011) study the effect of capacity with exogenous product design but
endogenous pricing scheme which determines the demand of each type of
product. Dobson and Yano (2002) assume that each product serves inde-
pendent market which allows the authors to focus on the effect of capacity
sharing in the absence of cannibalization. In contrast, Tang and Yin (2010)
and Yayla-Ku¨llu¨ et al. (2011) study capacity with cannibalization such that
multiple products serve the same uniformly distributed market. Tang and
Yin (2010) consider product differentiation only in consumer valuation, while
Yayla-Ku¨llu¨ et al. (2011) consider products differentiation in both quality
and variable capacity consumption. Nevertheless, their results show that
with limited capacity, a firm chooses its product line strategy by balancing
marginal profitability against marginal capacity consumption.
In this chapter, we continue this line of discussion on the impact of ca-
pacity in product line design. The questions we ask are closely related to
those in Tang and Yin (2010) and Yayla-Ku¨llu¨ et al. (2011). However, our
model differs from these two papers in that we consider endogenous qual-
ity and model capacity consumption that depends on quality. Firstly, we
assume segmented market which allow us to examine the rich dynamics be-
tween quality, quantity and capacity. Secondly, capacity is consumed in both
fixed and variable fashion. In particular, the fixed setup capacity depends
on product types, while the variable capacity requirement per product de-
pends on the quality of the product. Here, our interpretation of capacity
as a quality-dependant resource constraint is not only more realistic than
the quantity interpretation in Tang and Yin (2010), but also enables us to
explicitly capture the trade-off between quality and quantity. Moreover, a
longer product line requires more capacity to setup than a short product line
does, which differentiate this chapter from Yayla-Ku¨llu¨ et al. (2011). This
assumption captures the notion of economy of scale in the sense that lower
product variety means smaller setup capacity requirement and hence more
effective capacity for production.
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2.3 The Model
In this section, we first introduce and discuss our assumptions for the con-
sumers and the firm. Then, we formulate and solve the decision models for
each product strategy. Finally, we compare these strategies to develop the
optimal strategy.
2.3.1 Modeling Assumptions
Consumers. We consider a market with two vertically differentiated con-
sumer segments which differ in size and valuation of quality. Within each
segment, consumers are homogenous. We use subscripts h and l to denote the
high- and low-valuation consumer segments, respectively. The high-valuation
segment is characterized with size nh and valuation of quality vh, whereas,
the low-valuation segment is characterized with size nl and valuation of qual-
ity vl. Consumers purchase a product to maximize their non-negative surplus
defined by the difference between consumer’s utility and product price. For
a product of quality q and price p, a customer with valuation v will derive
a surplus of vq − p. If only one product is offered to the market, then con-
sumers will purchase this product if the resulting surplus is non-negative
(i.e., vq − p ≥ 0). If two products are offered to the market, then consumers
will choose the product which provides them with higher non-negative sur-
plus. If purchasing either product yields the same surplus, then consumers
will choose the product that is designed for them (i.e., high segment chooses
high-quality product, while low segment chooses low-quality product).
We allow partial coverage of a consumer segment if the total number of
products offered is smaller than the size of the targeted segment. In this
case, some consumers in this segment purchase the product while others do
not purchase because of limited supply of products. Which specific consumer
in a segment purchases the product is not important because of consumer
homogeneity within each segment1.
Firm. We consider a monopoly firm seeking to maximize its profit by of-
fering the market with one or two products. Each product is differentiated
by a single dimension “quality”, denoted by q, which captures all more-is-
better features (e.g., Moorthy 1984, Kim and Chhajed 2000). Generally, a
1For the same reason, we do not consider strategic consumers in this chapter.
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production process involves multiple steps and each step requires different in-
puts. The intricate relationships between various inputs and quality lead to
increasing marginal cost in quality. Consistent with the extant product line
design literature (e.g., Moorthy 1984, Kim and Chhajed 2000, Netessine and
Taylor 2007), we use cq2 to model the variable cost per unit to manufacture
a product with quality q, where c > 0 is the cost coefficient.
The firm has a limited capacity, denoted by K. Its production technol-
ogy requires both fixed and variable consumption of capacity. First, a fixed
capacity is required for each product type for set-up activities such as cali-
brating machines and preparing materials. By definition, this setup capacity
depends only on the number of product types. Accordingly, we denote this
setup capacity with bm, where m = 1, 2 is the number of product types.
Without loss of generality, we normalize bm such that b1 = 0 and b2 = b > 0.
Here, b is the extra setup capacity for offering two products, hence represents
the cost of product variety. Second, a quality dependent variable capacity is
required for each product. And we use aq to model the variable capacity per
unit required for manufacturing a product with quality q, where coefficient a
denotes the variable capacity required to offer unit quality. In the context of
this chapter, a > 0 captures the notion that high quality implies finer work-
manship or more features, thus warranting more capacity (Krishnan and Zhu
2006).
In our modeling context, we follow the convention of Alptekinogˇlu and
Corbett (2008) by assuming that variable capacity requirement depends lin-
early on quality. This assumption can also be justified from the bottleneck
perspective in operations management. Generally, a production process in-
volves multiple steps and each step requires different inputs. But the capacity
of a process is solely determined by the bottleneck step which is character-
ized by the lowest output rate. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the
variable capacity required at this step increases at a constant rate in quality
represented by a linear function. Take the bottling industry for example. In
this industry, quality can be represented by the volume of a bottle, whereas
the capacity can be represented by the total machine time. Given that the
machine has a constant filling rate, the time required to fill up a bottle is de-
termined by the volume of the bottle, a relationship that can be represented
by a linear function.
We summarize all the notation in Table 2.1. Consistent with the prod-
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Table 2.1: Summary of Notation
Symbol Definition
vi, ni Valuation of quality and size for segment i = h, l
a, Marginal capacity for each unit of quality
b Setup capacity for a product line
R Market cannibalization factor, R = nh/nl(vh/vl − 1)
xi Quantity of the i = h, l-quality products (decision variables)
qi Quality levels for product i = h, l(decision variables)
pi Price levels for product i = h, l (decision variables)
uct design literature (Moorthy and Png 1992, Krishnan and Zhu 2006),
we denote qeh = vh/2c and q
e
l = vl/2c as the “efficient” quality for the
high and low segment2, respectively. Similarly, we denote quh = vh/2c and
qul = vl/2c(1−nh(vh−vl)/(nlvl)) as the unconstrained quality when two prod-
ucts are offered Moorthy and Png (1992), respectively. Note that qeh = q
u
h
while qel > q
u
l indicating that cannibalization leads to a lower quality for the
low segment. Consequently, to serve the market with unconstrained quality
requires a minimum capacity of b+ a(nh+nl)vl
2c
, in which b represents the set-up
capacity, and a(nh+nl)vl
2c
represents the capacity required to manufacture nh
products of quality quh and nl products of quality q
u
l . We define this capacity
threshold as the unconstrained capacity K¯. When K ≥ K¯, our problem is
unconstrained and is equivalent to that in Moorthy (1984). Hence in this
chapter, we focus on the case where K < K¯.
Facing capacity constraint, the firm may choose to offer different number of
products catering to different segments. Specifically, the firm can customize
one product for the high segment only, which we refer to as the Niche strategy
(N); or offer a standard product targeted at both segments, which we refer
to as the Standard strategy (S); or customize one product for each segment,
which we refer to as the Product-line strategy (L). We use superscripts N , S,
L to represent the Niche, Standard and Product-Line strategy, respectively.
In the remainder of this section, we develop and solve the profit-maximizing
model for each strategy.
2Here, efficient quality for a segment is defined as the optimal quality if a single product
is offered to the segment.
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2.3.2 Single Product Strategies
A single product strategy represents the case when the firm offers one product
to the market. If the Niche strategy is implemented, then the firm designs
a single product so that it appeals only to consumers in the high segment.
Correspondingly, the firm faces the following problem
max
x,p,q
ΠN = x(p− cq2) (2.1)
s.t. vhq − p ≥ 0 (2.2)
x− nh ≤ 0 (2.3)
axq −K ≤ 0 (2.4)
And all decision variables xh, qh, ph ≥ 0. Constraint (2.2) is the participation
(or incentive) constraint which ensures that customers in the high segment
derive non-negative surplus from purchasing the niche product3. Inequality
(2.3) and (2.4) are the quantity and capacity constraints for the Niche strat-
egy. Accordingly, the incentive constraint (2.2) is binding because nothing
prevents the firm from setting a price which extracts all the surplus from
consumers in the high segment. That is, p(q) = vhq.
Similarly, if the Standard strategy is implemented, then the firm designs
a single product and targets it at both segments. Correspondingly, the firm
faces the following problem
max
x,p,q
ΠS = x(p− cq2)
s.t. vlq − p ≥ 0 (2.5)
x− (nh + nl) ≤ 0 (2.6)
axq −K ≤ 0
And again all decision variables x, q, p ≥ 0. The Standard strategy problem
resembles the Niche strategy problem except for the participation constraint
and quantity constraint. Specifically, (2.5) is the incentive constraint which
ensures that customers in the low segment derive non-negative surplus from
3Consumers in the high segment will derive from the niche product zero surplus which
is always higher than the surplus derived by consumers in the low segment from the same
product. Hence this niche product does not appeal to the low segment.
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purchasing the standard product4. And (2.6) is the quantity constraint to
ensure that the total quantity of standard product should be no more than
the total size of the two segments.
Lemma 2.1. For a single product strategy problem defined in §2.3.2,
(i) quantity constraint (2.3) and (2.6) are always binding;
(ii) capacity constraint (2.4) is binding when capacity is low, i.e., K ≤ KN
for the Niche strategy or K ≤ KS for the Standard strategy.
where KN = anhvh/(2c) and K
S = a(nh + nl)vl/(2c).
Lemma 2.1 establishes that the quantity and capacity constraint will be
tight for a single product strategy. Accordingly, we can write the profit as
a function of q, i.e., ΠN(q) = nh(vhq − cq2) for the Niche strategy, which is
concave in q. Optimizing this profit over q, we obtain the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 2.1. Let xi∗, qi∗, pi∗,Πi∗ denote the conditionally optimal quan-
tity, quality and price decisions as well as the associated profits for strategy
i = N,S. If a single product strategy is implemented, then
xi∗ qi∗ pi∗ Πi∗
Niche nh vh2c (1− (1− KKN )+) vhqN∗ nhv
2
h
4c (1− ((1− KKN )+)2)
Standard nh + nl vl2c (1− (1− KKS )+) vlqS∗ (nh+nl)v
2
l
4c (1− ((1− KKS )+)2)
Proposition 2.1 summarizes the optimal quantities, qualities, prices and
the corresponding profits for both the Niche and Standard strategies. Note
again thatKN andKS represent the corresponding thresholds capacity below
which the firm following a single product strategy will exhaust all capacity
while above which the firm will offer the corresponding efficient quality level
and idle any extra capacity more than these thresholds.
Examining first the optimal quantities, and from Lemma 2.1 (i), we find
that the firm should always completely cover the targeted segment(s). As
capacity increases, the firm can obtain non-negative increase in profit by
either increasing quantity or increasing quality. The marginal return on
capacity is higher if this unit of capacity is utilized to increase quantity than
4Consumers in the high segment always buy as they derive more surplus from the
standard product than consumers in the low segment do.
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if it is utilized to improve quality as long as the intended segment(s) is not
fully covered. As a case in point, consider the Niche strategy. For given
quantity x < nh,
∂ΠN(x(K), q)
∂K
=
vh − cq
a
>
vh − 2cq
a
≥ vh
a
− 2cK
a2x
=
∂ΠN(x, q(K))
∂K
≥ 0
holds where the second inequality follows because K ≥ axq. In other words,
the firm is better served by increasing quantity first before improving qual-
ity when capacity is not enough to cover the intended segment(s) with the
corresponding efficient quality. Examining the optimal profits, we find that
there exists a maximum profit which is obtained when capacity is sufficiently
high (specifically, K ≥ K i for the strategy i = N,S). When capacity is lower
than the corresponding capacity threshold, the firm obtains a lower profit,
which reduces quadratically in the difference between available capacity K
and the corresponding threshold. The bigger is this difference, the lower is
the firm’s profit.
2.3.3 Product Line Strategy
In the Product-Line strategy, the firm customizes one product for each seg-
ment. Correspondingly, the firm faces the following problem,
max
xi,pi,qi
ΠL =
∑
i=h,l
[
xi(pi − cq2i )
]
(2.7)
s.t. viqi − pi ≥ 0, i = h, l (2.8)
vhqh − ph ≥ vhql − pl (2.9)
vlql − pl ≥ vlqh − ph (2.10)
xh − nh ≤ 0, (2.11)
xh + xl ≤ nh + nl (2.12)
b+ a
∑
i=h,l
xiqi −K ≤ 0. (2.13)
Again (2.8) is the incentive constraint for segment i = h, l, (2.11) and (2.12)
are the corresponding quantity constraints, while (2.13) is the the capacity
constraint, and (2.9) and (2.10) are self-selection constraints. These self-
selection constraints ensures that consumers in the high segment always de-
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rive positive utility from either product. In our modeling context, this means
that consumers in the high segment seek for the high-quality product first
and for the low-quality product later if the high-quality product is not avail-
able. Thus, these conditions do not rule out the possibility that a fraction of
the high segment buys the high-quality product while another fraction buys
the low-quality product.
The participation constraint (2.8) will be binding for the low segment as
nothing prevents the firm from extracting all the rent from consumers in
the low segment, or pl = vlql. Also, the self-selection constraint (2.9) is
binding, indicating that the firm can extract surplus from the high segment
up to a point where the high segment is indifferent between either product,
or ph = vhqh − (vh − vl)ql. Replacing the prices for high- and low-quality
products in (2.7), the profit function can thus be written as
ΠL(xh, xl, qh, ql) = xh(qhvh − cq2h − ql(vh − vl)) + xl(vlql − cq2l ) (2.14)
subject to constraints (2.11), (2.12), and (2.13). Similar to Lemma 2.1 for
the Niche strategy, we have the following lemma for the Product-line strategy
which follows directly from the corresponding Lagrange model.
Lemma 2.2. For the Product-line problem defined in §2.3.3, i) quantity con-
straints (2.11), (2.12) are always binding; ii) capacity constraints (2.13) is
always binding.
The intuition behind Lemma 2.2 is as follows. First, both segments should
be completely covered under the Product-Line strategy. Offering every cus-
tomer in the high segment with high-quality product gives the firm higher
marginal profit. While, offering every customer in the low segment with low-
quality products gives the firm lower marginal cost. Second, the firm should
exhaust available capacity under the Product-Line strategy. If the limited
capacity is not exhausted, then utilizing one more unit of capacity can in-
crease product quality, which leads to higher price and higher profit margin.
Consequently, we can solve (2.14) and arrive at the following result.
Proposition 2.2. If the Product-Line strategy is implemented, a firm facing
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limited capacity (K < K¯) designs its product qualities, such that
qLh =
(K − b)
a(nh + nl)
+
(vh − vl)
2c
qLl =
(K − b)
a(nh + nl)
− nh(vh − vl)
2cnl
, (2.15)
and the corresponding profit ΠL(K) =
nhv
2
h
4c
+
nlv
2
l
4c
(1− R)− c(K¯−K)2
a2(nh+nl)
. KL ≤
K < K¯ and R ≤ 1, where KL = K¯ − a(nh+nl)vl
2c
(1−R).
Proposition 2.2 characterizes the optimal product line quality with regards
to K. These results can be interpreted as follows. First, effective capacity
after setup is evenly allocated resulting in a base quality of K−b
a(nh+nl)
for each
product. Then to differentiate the two products, anh(vh−vl)
2c
amount of capac-
ity intended for producing low-end products is reallocated to producing the
high-end product. As a result, quality of the low-end product is reduced by
nh(vh−vl)
2cnl
, while that of the high-end product is increased by (vh−vl)
2c
. Second,
with unlimited capacity, the two products should have qualities of quh and q
u
l ,
respectively. Because of limited capacity, quality of each product is reduced
by
quh − q∗h = qul − q∗l =
K¯ −K
a(nh + nl)
,
so that the firm can offer enough volume to cover each segment.
One interesting result is that the “width” of the product line (defined
by the differentiation in quality between the products and represented by
∆q = qh−ql) remains the same whether or not capacity is limited, i.e., ∆q∗ =
∆qu = (nh+nl)(vh−vl)
2cnl
. This illustrates the effects of market cannibalization.
That is, in order to implement price discrimination through consumer self-
selection, the firm must differentiate the qualities of its two products by
increasing the quality of the high-end product and reducing the quality of
the low-end product.
In contrast, the second perspective demonstrates the effects of limited ca-
pacity on the quality differentiation. Due to limited capacity, the firm cannot
offer the same product qualities as the unconstrained case. Instead, it re-
duces the qualities for both products by the same level. And this level of
reduction is proportional to the difference between available capacity and
the unconstrained capacity. The lower available capacity the firm has, the
bigger is the quality reduction. When available capacity approaches the un-
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constrained level, the reduction in quality becomes zero. When available
capacity approaches KL, the reduction in quality is the largest, at a value of
vl
2c
− nh(vh−vl)
2cnl
, in which case the quality of the low-end product approaches
zero. Thus, the available capacity should be more than KL for offering two
products to be feasible.
2.3.4 Optimal Product Line Strategy
Let Kns denote the capacity threshold where the firm is indifferent between
the Niche strategy and the Standard strategy, and is obtained by setting
ΠN(K) = ΠS(K). Similarly, let Ksl and Knl denote the corresponding ca-
pacity threshold where the firm is indifferent between the Standard and the
Product-Line strategies, and between the Niche and the Product-Line strate-
gies, respectively. By comparing the conditionally optimal profits for all three
strategies, we have the following proposition about the optimal product line
strategy.
Proposition 2.3. The optimal product line strategy for a firm facing limited
capacity is as follows:
(i) If max[Ksl, Knl] ≤ K and vh < vl(nh+nl)/nh, then the firm implements
the Product-Line strategy;
(ii) If Kns ≤ K < Ksl, then the firm implements the Standard strategy;
(iii) If 0 < K < min[Kns, Knl] and vh < vl(nh + nl)/nh, or if vh ≥ vl(nh +
nl)/nh, then the firm implements the Niche strategy.
Proposition 2.3 characterizes the optimal strategy for given capacity and
consumer valuation. To better understand the results in Proposition 2.3, we
graphically represent the optimal strategy space in Figure 2.1. We set the
parameters at vl = 1, nh/nl = .6, b = .1, and a = c = 1 for all figures in
this chapter unless otherwise stated. Notice that it is the ratios of vh/vl and
nh/nl as well as a/c that determine the structure of the optimal strategy.
When capacity is not constrained, we know from (Moorthy 1984, Moorthy
and Png 1992) that a firm offers a product line if market cannibalization
is weak (i.e., vh < vl(nh + nl)/nh as in region (iv)) and offers only a high-
quality product for the high segment if market cannibalization is strong (i.e.,
vh ≥ vl(nh+nl)/nh as in region (v)), which corresponds to the area of Figure
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Figure 2.1: Optimal Strategy in Capacity and Consumer Valuation
2.1 in which K ≥ K¯. When capacity is constrained, this classic result can
be challenged depending on the level of capacity and consumer valuation.
On the one hand, if capacity is close to the unconstrained level (as in region
(i)), then offering two products is optimal as it helps the firm to segment the
market and to benefit from a large demand. On the other hand, if capacity
is sufficiently lower than the unconstrained level, then segmenting strategy is
no longer optimal due to corresponding low qualities. Instead, the firm finds
it more profitable to offer a single product so as to avoid the extra setup
capacity associated with offering two products. Specifically, the firm offers a
standard product for both segments (as in region (ii)) if the two consumer
segments are close to each other in valuation; and it offers a niche product
for the high segment (as in region (iii)) if the two consumer segments are far
apart.
Figure 2.1 suggests that there are certain threshold values of capacity and
valuation for a strategy to be viable. The following proposition formalizes
these existential results.
Proposition 2.4. There exist v̂h, K̂, and b̂ such that
i) Offering a standard product to both segments is never optimal when con-
sumer segments are sufficiently apart in valuation (i.e., vh ≥ v̂h), re-
gardless of capacity level;
ii) Offering two products is never optimal when capacity is low (i.e., K <
K̂) regardless of consumer valuations.
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where b̂ = KS
(
√
nl(nl+nh)−nl)
2nh+nl
, K̂ = Kns(v̂h), and
v̂h =

vl +
2bvl
KS
(−1 +
√
1 + nl
4nh
(1 + 2K
S
b
)), b ≤ b̂
vl +
bvl
KS
√
nl
(nh+nl)
(−1 +
√
nl
nh
(−1 + 2KS
b
√
(nh+nl)
nl
)), b > b̂
The first part of Proposition 2.4 demonstrates that offering a standard
product is never optimal if consumer segments are sufficiently apart from
each in valuation (i.e., vh > v̂h where v̂h = arg[K
sl(vh) = K
ns(vh)]). We
know that, on the upside, offering a standard product can be optimal be-
cause it benefits from a larger sales volume (compared to offering a niche
product) as well as no setup capacity (compared to offering two products).
On the downside, offering a standard product does not implement price dis-
crimination, the loss of which hinges on the level of cannibalization. When
vh < v̂h, weak cannibalization reduces the need to differentiate quality which
renders offering a standard product optimal. When vh ≥ v̂h, however, rela-
tive strong cannibalization dictates quality differentiation between products.
In particular, if the capacity is relatively low, then the firm achieves this qual-
ity differentiation by customizing only for the high segment so as to avoid
setup capacity requirement. If the capacity is relatively high, then the firm
customizes for both segments. Notice that v̂h <
√
nh+nl
nh
vl, where the latter
represents the threshold valuation for the high segment above which offering
a standard product is always dominated by offering a niche product.
The second part of Proposition 2.4 demonstrates that lower capacity re-
duces product variety. More interestingly, we find that offering two products
is never optimal when capacity is below a certain threshold K̂. We know
from Proposition 2.2 that the firm reduces the qualities of both products as
capacity decreases from the unconstrained level. This reduces the benefit of
market segmentation due to lower profit margins. When K ≥ K̂, the firm
still benefits from implementing segmentation because the resulting qualities
and profit margins are sufficiently high (i.e., region (i)). When K < K̂,
however, this benefit becomes trivial. The firm is better off offering a sin-
gle product to avoid the extra setup capacity, specifically, offering a standard
product if consumer valuations are close (i.e., region (ii)) and offering a niche
product if consumer valuations are apart (i.e., region (iii)).
Note that when the setup capacity b = 0, we have v̂h = vl and K̂ = 0. The
22
implications of b is discussed in the next section.
2.3.5 Operations Cannibalization and Cost of Variety
Our discussion about the optimal strategy indicates that limited capacity
introduces operations cannibalization because offering low-quality products
cannibalizes the capacity that could be used to offer high-quality products.
This is different from market cannibalization introduced by asymmetric in-
formation about consumer valuation. Specifically, operations cannibaliza-
tion introduced by limited capacity intensifies as capacity decreases. And
the effects of stronger operations cannibalization on the optimal strategy can
be illustrated in two ways. First, operations cannibalization decreases the
qualities for both segments when offering either a standard product or two
products is optimal. This is different from market cannibalization which only
distorts the quality of the low-quality product.
Second, strong operations cannibalization reduces the length of a product
line to obtain higher profit margin from the high segment, as is similar to
the effect of market cannibalization. However, a shorter product line asso-
ciated with strong operations cannibalization can also be attributed to the
setup capacity b, which recall from §2.3.1, represents the extra setup capac-
ity required for offering two products relative to offering a single product.
In particular, larger b favors shorter product line and smaller b favors longer
product line. Obviously, for single product strategies, a decrease in b yields
no effect on the firm’s decisions. For the Product-Line strategy, however,
a decrease in b means that less capacity is required for setup hence more
capacity is available for actual production. In other words, decreases in b
translate to higher qualities for both products which, in turn, translate into
more benefit from customizing for both segments. Specifically, we have the
following result on the setup capacity b.
Proposition 2.5. Large setup capacity decreases product variety. Offering a
standard product is optimal only when the setup capacity is sufficiently large,
i.e. b > β1, where
β1 =

KS(1− 2R)
(√
1 + nlR
2
nh(1−2R)2 − 1
)
vh ≤ 2(nh+nl)vl(2nh+nl)
KS
√
nl√
(nh+nl)
(
1−R−
√
1−R (vh+vl)
vl
)
2(nh+nl)vl
(2nh+nl)
< vh ≤
√
(nh+nl)
nh
vl
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Recall that the extra setup capacity b represents the cost of product vari-
ety. In this context, β1 denotes the minimum level of setup capacity above
which the cost of variety is sufficiently high (i.e., b > β1) such that offer-
ing a standard product could be optimal. Note that β1 increases in vh and
limvh→vl β1 = 0. This indicates that for given b > 0, there exists a corre-
sponding v̂h such that if vh < v̂h, then b > β1 is true. In other words, as
long as offering two products requires extra setup capacity, the correspond-
ing cost of variety could render offering a standard product optimal for small
consumer differentiation. Graphically, this result means that region (ii) in
Figure 2.1 always exists for positive values of b. In contrast, if b = 0, then
there is no cost of variety. Hence offering a standard product is never opti-
mal regardless of capacity and consumer valuation. However, the effects of
operations cannibalization remain the same as the firm offers a niche product
when capacity is low (i.e., K < Knl) and offer two products when capacity
is sufficiently high (i.e., K ≥ Knl).
2.4 Discussion of Results
In this section, we investigate how the dynamics between limited capacity
and cannibalization affect capacity utilization and correspondingly, product
variety, quantity, as well as qualities. In particular, we illustrate how these
decisions change in capacity for a given set of market and production pa-
rameters, and compare these decisions to those with unconstrained capacity
(Moorthy 1984).
2.4.1 Capacity Utilization
Recall from §2.3 that when capacity is limited, an increase in capacity allows
a firm to achieve higher profit by increasing either product quality or quantity.
Thus, as a natural extension, we explore in this section whether a firm would
necessarily exhaust all available capacity when following the optimal product
line strategy. This is answered by the following proposition.
Proposition 2.6. A firm facing limited capacity may not necessarily exhaust
all capacity. For given vh, the firm may idle some of its capacity as follows:
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(i) If 2(nh+nl)vl
(2nh+nl)
< vh and b > β2, idle K −KN units of capacity for KN <
K < min[Kns, Knl]
(ii) If vh <
√
(nh+nl)
nh
vl and b > β3, idle K − KS units of capacity for
KS < K < Ksl;
where β2 =
anlvl(
√
(nh+nl)/nl−1)
2c
(1−R), and β3 = KSR
√
nl
nh
.
Proposition 2.6 presents some interesting circumstances in which a firm
with limited capacity chooses not to use all available capacity. This capacity
idling behavior only occurs when a single product strategy is optimal5. In
these cases, increases in capacity do not affect product quality because the
quadratic cost function dictates that it is never optimal to offer a consumer
segment with a quality higher than the corresponding efficient level. In the
meantime, neither do increases in capacity affect the firm’s optimal strategy
because the resulting qualities will be too low to justify higher product variety
(e.g., switching from the Niche or Standard strategy to the Product-Line
strategy) or higher quantity (e.g., switching from the Niche to the Standard
strategy). Hence, the firm is better-off to idle any capacity that is more than
the capacity thresholds KN (for the Niche strategy) or KS (for the Standard
strategy).
From Proposition 2.6, we find that both consumer valuations and setup
capacity play critical roles in the firm’s capacity idling behavior. In partic-
ular, capacity idling occurs when consumer segments are neither too close
(i.e., Proposition 2.6 (i)) nor too far apart (i.e., Proposition 2.6 (ii)). If con-
sumer segments are close to each other in valuation (i.e., if vh <
2(nh+nl)vl
(2nh+nl)
,
violating the condition of Proposition 2.6 (i)), then the marginal return of
additional capacity increases faster when producing for both segments than
it does when customizing only for the high segment. As a result, the firm
switches its optimal strategy from offering a niche product to offering a stan-
dard product before the capacity is sufficient to offer the high segment with
its efficient quality. On the other hand, if consumer segment are far apart
(i.e., if vh >
√
(nh+nl)
nh
vl, violating the condition of Proposition 2.6 (ii)), then
the marginal return of additional capacity is always higher when customizing
for only the high segment than it is when producing a standard product for
both segments.
5Recall from Lemma 2.2 that the Product-Line strategy always exhausts all capacity
for K ≤ K¯.
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Figure 2.2: Impact of Setup Capacity b with vh = 1.5
Proposition 2.6 also establishes setup capacity b as another driver for the
firm’s capacity idling decision. To better illustrate the impact of b, we provide
a variant representation of the optimal strategy in Figure 2.2 in which the
horizontal axis now represents the setup capacity b instead of the valuation
for the higher segment as in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.2 demonstrates that capac-
ity idling occurs only when the setup capacity is sufficiently large (regions
(A),(B),(C)). Recall that setup capacity represents the additional capacity
required to set up for two products as compared to the capacity required to
set up for a single product. By definition, b only affects the Product-Line
strategy but not the single product strategies. Hence, one would expect that
the larger b is, the more reluctant the firm would be to switch to offering two
products, hence the more likely capacity idling would occur.
Now comparing the size of idled capacity to setup capacity b, we have the
following result.
Proposition 2.7. A firm facing limited capacity never idles more than b
units of capacity.
Proposition 2.7 demonstrates an important characteristic of capacity idling,
i.e., the firm never idles more than the setup capacity. Recall that capacity
idling occurs only when the firm has sufficient capacity to offer efficient qual-
ity to the intended segment. Given the conditions specified in Proposition
2.6, if the firm acquires b more units of capacity, then it should offer two
products rather than a single product (e.g., regions (B) and (C)), or offer a
standard product rather than a niche product (e.g., region (A)). Note that
if the firm offers a single product and exhausts its capacity, then acquiring b
more units of capacity does not guarantee switch to a new strategy.
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2.4.2 Product Variety and Quantity
When capacity is not constrained, we know from (i.e., Moorthy 1984) that
consumer valuation is the only driver for a firm’s choice of product variety
and quantity. Specifically, larger differentiation in valuation between the
two consumer segments (e.g., high cannibalization) leads to lower product
variety and quantity, in which case the firm is better-off serving only the high
segment. When capacity is limited, however, we find that lower capacity is
another driver for lower product variety and quantity. In particular, the firm
reduces its product variety and quantity when capacity is limited. As we
have discussed in §2.3, higher variety requires extra setup capacity which
translates to lower effective capacity for the production and lower quality for
each product. In contrast, lower variety can avoid this setup capacity and
hence leave more effective capacity for production. In a similar vein, larger
quantity means capacity is shared among more products hence each product
consumes less capacity which again translates to lower quality. But smaller
quantity means that each product can consume relatively more capacity and
consequently, have higher quality and profit margin.
Moreover, we find that reductions in product variety and quantity do not
necessarily happen simultaneously. For example, when consumer segments
are close to each other in valuation (i.e., in the case when vh < v̂h as illus-
trated in Figure 2.1), lower capacity makes it profitable for the firm to reduce
its product variety so as to avoid setup capacity, but lower capacity does not
affect the total quantity because the firm is better-off serving both segments.
Only when capacity is significantly low does the firm reduce product quantity
so as to have higher quality for one segment.
2.4.3 Product Quality and Price
In this section we investigate the optimal quality and price for each consumer
segment. Specifically, we ask two questions: (i) How do they change in ca-
pacity? and (ii) how do they compare with the corresponding unconstrained
levels. Here, we answer the questions for product quality. First, we know
from §2.3 that product qualities are non-decreasing in capacity for a given
strategy. However, qualities may decrease at the capacity thresholds where
the firm’s optimal strategy switches. If the firm switches from offering a niche
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Figure 2.3: The Impact of Capacity on Product Qualities
product to offering a standard product, the high segment receives lower qual-
ity while the low segment receives higher quality (from 0 to positive quality)
because the firm reallocates some capacity from serving the high segment to
serving both segments. In contrast, if the firm switches from offering a stan-
dard product to offering two products, then the high segment receives higher
quality while the low segment receives lower quality because, conversely, the
firm reallocates some capacity from serving the low segment to increasing
the quality for the high segment.
Comparing the optimal product quality for each segment under limited ca-
pacity to the corresponding unconstrained qualities quh and q
u
l , we find that
both the high and low segment generally receive lower-than-unconstrained
quality when capacity is limited. However, the low segment may receive
higher quality when capacity is limited than it does when capacity is un-
constrained. This occurs when offering a standard product is optimal and
capacity is moderate, as summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.8. Under limited capacity, consumer segments generally re-
ceive lower qualities than they do under unconstrained capacity. However, the
low segment receives higher quality under limited capacity, if KS(1 − R) <
K ≤ Ksl.
Note that the range of capacity in Proposition 2.8 exists when consumer
segments are relatively close in valuation and setup capacity is relatively
large. In this case, close consumer valuations make it profitable for the
firm to serve the low segment, while large setup capacity prevents the firm
from offering two products. More interestingly, the low segment may even
receive its corresponding efficient quality qel . Figure 2.3 graphically illustrates
these results about product quality by depicting the quality received by each
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Figure 2.4: The Impact of Capacity on Product Prices
segment as a function of K. In this figure, N, S, and L, respectively, refer to
the zones where Niche, Standard, and Product Line strategies are optimal.
Note that vh = 1.5 and b = 0.4 which corresponds to the case b > β1.
Next, we investigate the price for each consumer segment and find similar
results as for qualities. Specifically, the prices for both segments generally
increase in capacity but may increase or decrease when the firm’s optimal
strategy switches. These changes are due to the corresponding changes in
quality. If the firm switches from offering a niche product to offering either
a standard product or two products, then the high (low) segment gets lower
(higher) price due to lower (higher) quality. If the firm switches from offering
a standard product to offering two products, then the high (low) segment gets
higher (lower) price due to higher (lower) quality.
Now we compare the prices with the corresponding prices in the uncon-
strained capacity case puh and p
u
l , and find similar results as we did for qual-
ities. That is, both consumer segments generally pay lower prices than the
corresponding unconstrained prices due to lower quality. However, we also
find that limited capacity can lead to higher prices for both high and low
segments, as summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.9. Under limited capacity, consumer segments generally re-
ceive lower prices than they do under unconstrained capacity. However,
(i) The high segment receives higher price under limited capacity, if (nlK
SR2+
nhK
N) vl
nhvh
< K ≤ max[Kns, Knl];
(ii) The low segment receives higher price under limited capacity, if KS(1−
R) < K < Ksl.
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Note that the reasons behind the higher prices are different across different
consumer segments. In particular, the high segment gets higher price under
limited capacity due to the lack of cannibalization. This occurs when offering
a niche product for only the high segment is optimal. In this case, the firm can
implement first-degree price discrimination and extract all the surplus from
the high segment without violating the self-selection constraints. In contrast,
the low segment gets higher price under limited capacity mainly due to higher
quality. Figure 2.4 graphically illustrates these results by depicting the price
received by each segment as a function of K.
2.4.4 Consumer Welfare
In this section, we investigate the impact of limited capacity on consumer
welfare which is defined by the difference between consumer utility and price
of the product. In the context of product line design for segmented market,
Moorthy (1984) and Moorthy and Png (1992) conclude that when capacity
is not constrained, the firm’s pricing mechanism extracts all the surplus from
the low segment but leaves a surplus of CW uh = (vh − vl)qul to the high
segment. When capacity is limited, we find that the low segment still gets
no surplus while the high segment can enjoy a surplus of CWh = (vh−vl)q∗l as
long as the low segment is served (e.g., the firm either offers a standard or two
products). In fact, the high segment enjoys a higher surplus when capacity
is limited than it does when capacity is not limited as long as q∗l > q
u
l , as the
following proposition shows.
Proposition 2.10. The high segment enjoys a higher surplus under limited
capacity than it does under unconstrained capacity, if vh < vl+
2bc(
√
1+nl/nh−1)
a(nh+nl)
and KS(1−R) < K < Ksl.
From Proposition 2.10, we know that the high segment can enjoy a higher
surplus when capacity is limited if consumer segments are relatively close
and capacity is relatively high. In this case, the firm is better served by
offering a standard product rather than customizing for the high segment.
To illustrate the impact of capacity on consumer welfare, we depict the ratio
of CWh/CW
u
h in Figure 2.5 for vh = 1.2 and vh = 1.6. From Figure 2.5,
we find that the surplus for the high segment generally is non-decreasing in
capacity unless the optimal strategy switches. Moreover, the high segment is
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Table 2.2: The Percentage of Naive Profit and Optimal Profit
vh
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
.2 28% 26% 24% 23% 23%
K .4 52% 55% 49% 46% 45%
.6 72% 72% 70% 69% 67%
.8 89% 89% 88% 88% 88%
better-off (i.e., CWh/CW
u
h > 1 as shown in Figure 2.5) when the Standard
strategy is implemented and ql > q
u
l .
2.4.5 Profit Loss for a Naive Firm
In this section, we want to examine the price of not considering capacity
constraint in the decision-making process. Specifically, we examine a naive
firm who ignores the impact of capacity and keeps the same product line
design as in the unconstrained case. That is, the firm sets the quality at
the unconstrained quality qui where i = h, l. We assume that it serves each
segment in the market with quantity proportional to their sizes. Therefore,
the profit for a naive firm is ΠI =
(K−b)(nh(vh−vl)2+nlv2l )
2anlvl
, where superscript
I represents the naive firm. To see the implication of deviating from the
optimal behavior, we calculate the profit ratio ΠI/Π∗. While analytical ex-
pressions are complicated, Table 2.2 is used to show the the results. Here,
we set parameters such that a = 1, b = .1, c = 1, nh = .6, nl = 1, and vl = 1.
Also, we choose five levels of capacity K = .1, .2, .4, .6, .8 and five levels of
valuation vh = 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2.0.
From the Table, we notice as expected that being ignorant would always
result in a loss in profit. For given market, this loss increases as capacity
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decreases. For example, when K = 0.8 (the capacity is very close to the
unconstrained capacity K¯ = .9), the profit of a naive firm is around 90%
of corresponding optimal profit which indicates a 10% loss. As capacity
decreases, the ignorant firm performs much worse. In particular, when K =
0.2, the resulted loss is more than 70%. More importantly, the rate of change
for this ratio increases as capacity decreases. That is, for lower capacity,
changing capacity would results in much more change in this ratio. Take
vh = 1.2 for example. When capacity decreases fromK = 0.8 toK = 0.1, the
rate of change in profit loss increases from 17% each 0.2 units of capacity to
28% each 0.1 unit of capacity. Therefore, managers should pay more attention
to the product design decisions when the firm’s capacity is relatively low.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we consider the effect of limited capacity on a monopoly
firm’s optimal product line design decisions. The firm operates in a market
characterized by two consumer segments that differ in valuation and size. To
serve this segmented market, the firm optimally designs its product line and
correspondingly qualities, given limited capacity. Furthermore, its product
line design affects both production cost and capacity consumption. On the
cost side, product quality quadratically increases variable cost indicating an
increasing cost to quality (Moorthy and Png 1992, Desai 2001). On the ca-
pacity side, the length of product line determines the fixed setup capacity
such that offering two products requires b more units of capacity to setup
than offering a single product does. Meanwhile, quality linearly increases
variable capacity requirement, indicating a constant capacity to quality ra-
tio. In this modeling context, we first conditionally solve the firm’s design
problem for each strategy and then we compare the corresponding profits
to identify and characterize conditions on which insights from extant litera-
ture are challenged or even reversed. Then we discuss the impact of limited
capacity on the firm’s decisions.
Our analysis and discussion suggest that limited capacity can introduce
operations cannibalization which intensifies as capacity decreases. This is in
contrast to the market cannibalization introduced by differentiation in con-
sumer valuations. While cannibalization always reduces the length of a prod-
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uct line (i.e., the number of product types), the exact source of cannibaliza-
tion exhibits quite different effects on the firm’s product line design decisions.
For example, market cannibalization distorts the quality of the low-quality
product. In contrast, operations cannibalization reduces the quality of each
product. If two products are offered, then it reduces the qualities of both
products at the same rate which leads to a constant width of product line
(i.e., the differentiation in quality between two products).
We also find that offering a standard product for the whole market could
be optimal when capacity is moderate and consumer segments are close in
valuation. In this case, the firm prefers a shorter product line due to oper-
ations cannibalization, and it also prefers a larger sales volume because of
weak market cannibalization. To a certain extent, operations constraint can
be interpreted as an additional term in the objective function which rep-
resents the corresponding cost of certain resources. These operations cost
generally introduces economy of scale because of lower unit cost. For ex-
ample, Netessine and Taylor (2007) consider the cost of inventory and find
offering a standard product is optimal when the corresponding cost param-
eter is relatively large and consumer valuations are close. In this chapter,
we consider capacity and find similar results when capacity is relatively low.
This is because the marginal return of capacity decreases in capacity, or in
other words, lower capacity indicates higher shadow price for capacity.
Like any other model, our results rely on the modeling assumptions made.
The most noteworthy with respect to capacity is that the firm consumes
capacity in both fixed and variable way. We have shown that offering a
standard product is never optimal when the setup capacity b < β1. Note
that when vh → vl, β1 → 0. Hence, what’s essential to this result is the
assumption that b > 0. In other words, as long as a longer product line
requires extra capacity to setup, then offering a standard product could be
optimal when consumer segments are close to each other (i.e., vh ≤ v̂h).
However, a positive setup capacity is not required for us to understand the
impact of limited capacity as an additional source of cannibalization. If b = 0,
for example, then lower capacity favors a shorter product line with a niche
product for the high segment only.
Also fundamental to our results is the assumption that variable capacity
increases linearly in both quality and quantity. Given this modeling con-
struct, our results show that the firm always prioritizes quantity over quality.
33
Consequently, the operations cannibalization introduced by limited capacity
reduces the qualities of both products but does not affect the quantity of
each product unless optimal product line strategy switches. We make this
assumption for traceability and insights, but our insights are applicable to
more general cases.
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Chapter 3
Is Remanufacturing
Environmentally Friendly?
3.1 Introduction
Remanufacturing is generally considered to be both profitable due to lower
production cost (Caterpillar Press Release 2005) and environmentally ben-
eficial due to reduced virgin material and waste (Guide 2000). Neverthe-
less, remanufacturing and its financial and environmental implications are
complex. From the profitability perspective, for example, remanufacturing
introduces a trade-off between current and future profits. Compared to a
non-remanufacturer, a remanufacturer may increase sales of new products
by reducing prices, sometimes even lower than marginal cost, so that more
used products are available for remanufacturing. But, because not all cus-
tomers are willing to pay as much for a remanufactured product as for a new
one, the resulting cost saving associated with remanufacturing may not be
enough to justify the reduced profit in the previous period.
Similarly, from the environmental perspective, remanufacturing can po-
tentially have negative environmental consequences. This is true, for exam-
ple, in ship remanufacturing where unprocessed scrap metals are oftentimes
abandoned on the beach (CNN.com, 2008). Indeed, firms proliferated across
many industries are guilty of greenwashing in the sense that they ride the
“green wave” of environmental consumerism without necessarily consider-
ing whether or not their actions actually benefit the environment (Orange
2010). And exacerbating this effect, environmentally friendly products often
entice consumers to increase their total consumption. As a March 2010 Time
Magazine article titled Less is Actually More observes(Walsh 2010):
. . . studies indicate that people who install more-energy-efficient
lights lose 5% to 12% of the expected savings by leaving them
on longer . . .
This suggests that consumption habits may compromise, if not totally offset,
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direct environmental benefits resulting from remanufacturing. Thus, the im-
plicit presumption that remanufacturing benefits the environment warrants
more rigorous examination.
In this chapter, we study a firm’s design for remanufacturing problem
and, perhaps more importantly, we examine the environmental consequences
when remanufacturing is the optimal strategy. In particular, we investigate
the conditions under which a firm makes its products remanufacturable. Ac-
cordingly, we develop a model to characterize the firm’s optimal product
portfolio of new and remanufactured products, and establish the correspond-
ing optimal product design decisions. Then, we assess the environmental
impact of these results. Consequently, we bridge the gap between profitabil-
ity and environmental friendliness to ascertain whether or not the two are
complementary, and in doing so, we identify key drivers that would make
remanufacturing practices more environmentally friendly.
We approach these issues by modeling a firm’s product design and reman-
ufacturing decisions when serving a market with heterogenous consumers.
On the product design front, the firm must choose to design either a non-
remanufacturable product or to design a remanufacturable product; and the
firm must also specify the corresponding quality. On the remanufacturing
front, the firm must choose whether or not to remanufacture a given product
if the product is designed to be remanufacturable. These choices impact both
the manufacturer’s cost structure and consumers’ valuation. On the cost side,
a remanufacturable product costs more to produce originally, but less to re-
manufacture, as compared to the cost of producing a non-remanufacturable
product. On the consumer side, a remanufacturable product is valued more
by consumers, but a remanufactured one is valued less, as compared to the
valuation of a non-remanufacturable product. The firm thus must consider
these trade-offs and optimally choose the design and corresponding quality
and price.
To operationalize the firm’s design for remanufacturing problem with a
parsimonious model that captures remanufacturing fundamentals, we follow
the lead of Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006) and Atasu et al. (2008) by for-
mulating a two-stage analytic framework. At the beginning of stage 1, the
firm first determines whether to design a remanufacturable product or a
non-remanufacturable product and, correspondingly, establishes the quality
of the chosen product. Then the firm sets the selling price for the product
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and sells an amount accordingly, as dictated by the specified consumer mar-
ket’s heterogeneity. Finally, to conclude stage 1, consumers who purchase the
product extract its consumption value and then either discard the remains
(which is the case if the product was designed to be non-remanufacturable)
or recycle the remains (which is the case if the product was designed to be
remanufacturable). The recycled amount, if applicable, thus establishes a
supply constraint on the number of units that can be remanufactured for
resale. Given that, at the beginning of stage 2, the firm’s decision is to set
its optimal product portfolio, that is, to determine how many units of new
versus remanufactured products to produce and what associated prices to set
accordingly for sale of each product type in stage 2.
This chapter specifically studies remanufacturing and its environmental
consequences through a product design lens. Our modeling framework thus
extends beyond the domain of product pricing into the domain of product
design and pricing. Moreover, it sets the stage for assessing the environmen-
tal friendliness of profitable product design and pricing, and for exploring
the consequences accordingly. As such, our model offers two benefits that
constitute its primary contribution. The first benefit of our model is the in-
corporation of quality as an endogenous variable. Specifically, we formulate
our model by explicitly building the firm’s cost structure and consumers’
valuation preferences on quality, which allows us to map the firm’s optimal
remanufacturing decisions onto quality space. As a result, we find that, ev-
erything else being equal, the firm would couple increased remanufacturing
with higher quality. In addition, we find that quality significantly enriches
the modeling interactions by providing a lever for manipulating the product
mix of new versus remanufactured products offered in stage 2. For exam-
ple, if quality were exogenous, then the firm could reap the cost benefits
associated with remanufacturing in stage 2 only if it increased sales of new
products in stage 1 by lowering price. However, with endogenous quality, the
firm has the added opportunity of increasing product quality and extracting
more profit from each product. Accordingly, we find that if the cost saving
associated with remanufacturing is relatively low, the firm increases both re-
manufacturing and product quality and reduces the sales of new products in
both stages so as to charge a higher margin. In contrast, however, if this cost
saving associated with remanufacturing is relatively high and all returned
products are remanufactured, the firm would increase quality by decreasing
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sales of both new and remanufactured products.
The second benefit of our model is the introduction of the notion of envi-
ronmental damage, a quality-dependent analytical measure to quantitatively
capture the environmental consequences of design for remanufacturing. This
environmental measure provides a mechanism to assess the ecological foot-
print of product design in a remanufacturing context. Specifically, our mea-
sure focuses on the environmental impact associated with the extraction of
virgin material and the discard of waste, but it can be extended to include the
impact associated with transportation and consumption stages of a product
life cycle as well. Moreover, this measure is robust in the sense that differ-
ent weights can be assigned to the different stages of the product life cycle
without altering the insights.
Perhaps most notable among these insights is that, in the context of our
model, we find that environmental damage significantly increases when con-
sumers are more environmentally conscious, that is, when consumers value
the idea that a product can be remanufactured rather than the fact that
the product has been remanufactured. This can be particularly detrimen-
tal to the environment if consumers value remanufacturable products on the
one hand, but significantly devalue remanufactured products on the other
hand. Intuitively, if consumers value the idea that a product can be reman-
ufactured but not necessarily value remanufactured products, then the firm
becomes reluctant to actually remanufacture any recycled units. Instead,
it simply takes advantage of consumers’ environmental consciousness by de-
signing for remanufacturability, but avoids the potential cannibalization by
not remanufacturing. This somewhat counterintuitive result reinforces the
idea that consumption rather than production, per se, is the enemy of the
environment. Thus, to paraphrase Orange (2010), the first step to a better
environment is to reduce, not to recycle or to reuse.
In a similar vein, we also find that more cost efficient production technology
(i.e., a lower production cost or a higher cost saving from remanufacturing)
may not necessarily benefit the environment, despite increasing profit for the
firm. In particular, the environment is worse off if production cost is suffi-
ciently low. Intuitively, a lower production cost means a higher profit margin
for new products, which in turn attracts the firm to provide a higher volume
of new products, which thereby consumes more virgin resources and results
in more discarded waste. Similarly, a higher cost saving from remanufactur-
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ing attracts the firm to design higher quality, which again ultimately results
in more damage to the environment. Therefore, somewhat surprisingly, it is
in the interest of the environment for production technologies not to be too
efficient.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In §3.2, we review
the literature and position this chapter accordingly. In §3.3, we specify and
discuss our model primitives, and we formulate and solve the firm’s result-
ing profit maximization problem by mapping out and cataloging different
product design and remanufacturing strategies. Then in §3.4, we compare
the different strategies to determine the firm’s optimal decisions, and we ex-
plore implications accordingly. Section 3.5 defines the environmental damage
measure that we use as an index to evaluate the impact on the environment
resulting from the firm’s optimal strategy. We discuss the scope and appli-
cability of our model in §3.6, and we conclude the chapter in §3.7. Detailed
proofs appear in Appendix.
3.2 Relation to Literature
Our research relates to two streams of literature. One stream is the liter-
ature on remanufacturing. Within this realm, there are two different foci.
One focus is defined primarily by operational issues and thereby takes a cost-
minimization approach to determine optimal system design. This approach
assumes price, demand, and remanufacturability to be exogenous, and gen-
erally applies to issues such as logistics, production planning, and inventory
control (Fleischmann et al. 1997, Toktay et al. 2000). The other focus is
defined primarily by pricing issues and thereby takes a profit-maximization
approach to addresses such issues as market segmentation (Debo et al. 2005,
Ferrer and Swaminathan 2006, Atasu et al. 2008) and competition (Ma-
jumder and Groenevelt 2001, Ferrer and Swaminathan 2006, Ferguson and
Toktay 2006). This profit-maximization approach captures richer interac-
tions between price and quantity trade-offs. In particular, on the one hand,
the firm has incentive to lower the first-stage new product price to boost sales
in order to achieve cost savings realized by selling remanufactured products in
the second stage. However, on the other hand, such remanufacturing would
cannibalize new product sales in the second stage, thus creating a disincentive
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for remanufacturing. Considering these trade-offs, Majumder and Groenevelt
(2001) analyze competition between an OEM and a local firm. They find that
a social planner should provide incentives to the OEM to increase remanu-
facturing. Debo et al. (2005) study segmentation and remanufacturability in
an infinite-horizon setting and find that both fixed and variable costs affect
remanufacturing in a negative way. Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006, 2010)
study both finite-horizon and infinite-horizon problems in a competition set-
ting and conclude that remanufacturing decisions become stable after initial
states. Ferguson and Toktay (2006) investigate remanufacturing as a strat-
egy to deter market entry. Common to these models is the assumption that
both new and remanufactured products are indistinguishable or that reman-
ufactured products are discounted relative to new products. None of these
models, however, define quality as endogenous. In contrast, our model, while
similar to this second focus of remanufacturing literature, includes product
quality as a decision in addition to price and quantity.
The second stream of related literature is that on product design, which we
trace to Mussa and Rosen (1978) and to Moorthy (1984). This stream studies
the optimal quality and pricing decisions of a product line that is differen-
tiated by quality when serving consumers heterogenous in their willingness
to pay. Results indicate that a low-quality product cannibalizes the sales
of a high-quality product and, as a result, the firm responds by increasing
the differentiation between the high- and low-quality products. Our problem
is similar to this product line problem in that the new and remanufactured
products in our model can be considered as the high- and low-quality prod-
ucts in the product line problem. However, our problem is different from the
product line problem in two respects. The first difference is the remanufactur-
ing supply constraint that restricts the number of remanufactured products
to be no greater than the number of recycled products available. The second
difference is consumer perception of quality. In our remanufacturing setting,
both products have the same quality level. Thus, differentiation between
products is due to the fact that consumers discount their valuation of re-
manufactured products because these products were used previous to being
remanufactured.
Relative to these literatures, our framework underscores the fundamental
interactions between three remanufacturing related factors, namely, supply
constraint, cost saving, and cannibalization. The supply constraint exists
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because, in our remanufacturing setting, there is a natural upper limit on
the number of recycled products that are available to remanufacture. With-
out this constraint, the second stage problem would resemble a product line
problem. Cost saving is a direct driver of remanufacturing. To achieve cost
saving in stage 2, the firm needs to incur higher variable cost in stage 1
to make its new product remanufacturable. Finally, remanufacturing intro-
duces cannibalization into the second stage when both products are offered
to the same market. Because remanufactured products are less expensive
substitutes to the new products, they have the potential to reduce the firm’s
ability to extract surplus from consumers with high willingness to pay.
3.3 The Model
We specify the modeling assumptions that define the firm, the heterogenous
consumers, and the decision making framework in §3.3.1. Then we develop
and conditionally solve the firm’s design for remanufacturing problem based
first on the stipulation that the firm does not remanufacture any products
in stage 2 (§3.3.2) and subsequently on the stipulation that the firm does
remanufacture products in stage 2 (§3.3.3).
3.3.1 Modeling Assumptions
The Firm. We define the firm as a profit maximizer that can both manu-
facture new products and remanufacture used ones depending on its product
design choices. These design choices include product quality and remanu-
facturability. We model product quality, denoted by q, as a one-dimensional
measure representing all the components/attributes that consumers prefer.
We model remanufacturability, denoted by k, such that k = 0 represents
a non-remanufacturable product and k = 1 represents a remanufacturable
product1. Once determined, the product design cannot be changed. More-
over, a remanufacturable product can be remanufactured at most once.
Given product quality q and remanufacturability k, the firm incurs a vari-
able cost for each unit of its product produced2. Consistent with the product
1We will investigate the implications of relaxing this assumption so that k ∈ [0, 1] is a
continuous variable in Section 6.
2Although in some remanufacturing models the firm incurs a fixed cost associated with
developing and choosing production technology, for tractability, we adopt the convention
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design literature, the variable cost of production is quadratic in quality, but
the magnitude of this variable cost depends on whether the unit produced
is a new non-remanufacturable product, a new remanufacturable product,
or a remanufactured product. Specifically, we use q2 to model the variable
cost per unit to produce a new non-remanufacturable product of quality q,
we use (1 + c1)q
2 to model the per unit variable cost to produce a new
remanufacturable product (i.e., we use c1q
2 to denote the cost premium as-
sociated with producing a new remanufacturable unit over producing a new
non-remanufacturable unit), and we use (1−c2)q2 to model the per unit vari-
able cost to produce a remanufactured product (i.e., we use c2q
2 to denote
the cost savings associated with remanufacturing a recycled unit over pro-
ducing a new non-remanufacturable unit). Note that c1 ≥ 0, which means
that producing a new product that can be remanufactured is more expen-
sive than producing a new product that cannot be remanufactured, and that
0 < c2 ≤ 1, which means that remanufacturing a recycled product is less
expensive than manufacturing a new product. Our assumptions are consis-
tent with Debo et al. (2005) in that our new product unit cost increases in k.
Given this construct, to facilitate our presentation, we denote gn(k) = 1+c1k
for k = 0, 1 as the production cost coefficient associated with a new product,
which depends on whether or not the new product is remanufacturable, and
we denote gr = 1 − c2 as the remanufacturing cost coefficient which is valid
only when k = 1.
Consumers. Consumers differ vertically in their willingness to pay, and
they differentiate whether a product is new and non-remanufacturable, new
and remanufacturable, or used but remanufactured. Specifically, we model
consumers’ valuation for a new non-remanufacturable product of quality q
as vq, where v follows a uniform distribution along [0, 1]3. Comparatively,
we model consumers’ valuation for a new remanufacturable product of qual-
ity q as (1 + θ)vq (i.e., we use θvq to denote consumers’ valuation premium
associated with purchasing a new remanufacturable product over a new non-
of Atasu et al. (2008) and normalize this fixed cost to zero. However, incorporating a fixed
cost such as this in our model is straightforward.
3In this chapter, we assume a uniform distribution for consumer valuation of quality
for several reasons: 1) it allows us to focus on the cannibalization between new and
remanufactured products; 2) it enables us to derive closed form results; 3) it is a widely
adopted assumption in remanufacturing literatures. Hence this assumption allows us to
compare and contrast our results to those of others.
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Figure 3.1: Heterogenous Consumers
remanufacturable one), and we model consumers’ valuation for a reman-
ufactured product as (1 − α)vq (i.e., we use αvq to denote the valuation
discount associated with purchasing a remanufactured product over a new
non-remanufacturable one). Note that θ ≥ 0, which means that consumers
value a new product that can be remanufactured more than one that cannot
be remanufactured, and that α ≥ 0, which means that consumers value a
used product that has been remanufactured less than a new one that has not
been remanufactured. Analogous to gn(k) and gr, we denote fn(k) = 1 + θk
for k = 0, 1 and fr = 1− α to facilitate our presentation.
Consumers purchase to maximize their non-negative surplus, which is de-
fined by the difference between valuation and price paid. Let pn and pr be
the price of a new and a remanufactured product, respectively. The surplus
derived by a consumer of type v from buying a new and a remanufactured
product characterized by q and k is fn(k)vq−pn and frvq−pr, respectively. If
only new products are available, then consumers choose to purchase the new
product if fn(k)vq − pn ≥ 0. If both new and remanufactured products are
available, then consumers choose the new product over the remanufactured
one if fn(k)vq−pn ≥ frvq−pr and vice versa, but if consumers cannot derive
nonnegative surplus from either product then they will remain inactive (i.e.,
they will purchase neither product), which occurs for consumers with low
valuation as shown in Figure 3.1.
In the first stage, only new products can be sold regardless of product
design. Thus the demand for new products in the first stage, dn1, is
dn1 = 1− pn1
fn(k)q
(3.1)
where pn1 is the new product price in the first stage, q is the quality, and
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k = 0, 1 is the remanufacturability. If the product is designed to be non-
remanufacturable (i.e., if k = 0), then in the second stage, again only new
products can be sold. In this case, the corresponding second stage demand is
similar to (3.1): dn2 = 1− pn2fn(k)q , where pn2 is the second stage new-product
price. If the product is designed to be remanufacturable (i.e., if k = 1),
then in the second stage the firm must choose whether or not to remanufac-
ture. If the firm chooses not to remanufacture any units in the second stage,
then only new products can be sold and the corresponding demand is again
similar to (3.1). In contrast, if the firm chooses to remanufacture, then a
fraction of consumers purchase new products, a fraction of consumers pur-
chase remanufactured products, and the remainder of consumers purchase
no products4. In this case, the corresponding second stage demands for new
and remanufactured products, dn2 and dr2, respectively, are
dn2 = 1− pn2 − pr2
(fn(1)− fr)q , and
dr2 =
pn2 − pr2
(fn(1)− fr)q −
pr2
frq
(3.2)
where pr2 is the remanufactured product price in the second stage.
The Decision Framework. Consistent with the related remanufacturing
literature (Majumder and Groenevelt 2001, Ferrer and Swaminathan 2006,
Ray et al. 2005, Atasu et al. 2008), we use a two-stage model to formulate
the firm’s design for remanufacturing problem. At the beginning of stage 1,
the firm first chooses its product quality and remanufacturability. Then the
firm sets a corresponding selling price and produces only new products. At
the end of stage 1, these units either are discarded (which is the case if k = 0)
or are collected through recycling (which is the case if k = 1)5. Finally, in
stage 2, the firm sets the prices for new and (or) remanufactured products
and produces the corresponding quantities subject to the remanufacturing
supply constraint imposed by the new product sales in the first stage.
4Given that α ≥ 0 by assumption, consumers value remanufactured products less than
they value new products. Thus, consumers who buy new products have higher v than
those who buy remanufactured ones. This is depicted in Figure 3.1, which illustrates that
dn2 is to the right of dr2.
5Throughout our analysis, we assume 100% collection rate for the remanufacturable
products at the end of stage 1. Similar to Atasu et al. (2008), we assume that the collection
cost is linear in the quantity collected and is included in the remanufacturing cost grq2.
For the case in which the collection rate is less than 100%, our results are not significantly
altered as long as the collection rate is not too small.
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Given this, we next develop and solve the firm’s profit maximization prob-
lem for given quality q to establish a strategy space for product design that
depends on whether or not remanufacturing takes place. We first investigate
the case in which there is no remanufacturing (i.e., the case in which dr2 = 0).
We refer to this case as the Non-Green strategy. Then we study the case in
which there is remanufacturing (i.e., the case in which dr2 > 0). We refer to
this case as the Green strategy6. Later, in Section 4, we compare the profit
of the optimal Green strategy to that of the optimal Non-Green strategy to
establish conditions indicating when remanufacturing is optimal.
3.3.2 Non-Green Strategy
We define the Non-Green strategy as one in which only new products are
sold in each period. In other words, by definition of this strategy, dr2 = 0.
Nevertheless, at the design stage, two substrategies exist: either design the
product to be non-remanufacturable (k = 0), which we refer to as the Tradi-
tional substrategy (T); or design the product to be remanufacturable (k = 1),
which we refer to as the Premium substrategy (M). In either substrategy, the
demand function is the same for both stage 1 and stage 2 and is given by
(3.1). Accordingly, if the firm implements the Non-Green strategy, then
pn1 = pn2 = p and the total profit for the two stages is
ΠNG(p, q, k) = 2
(
1− p
fn(k)q
)
(p− gn(k)q2), (3.3)
which is concave in p for given quality q and remanufacturability k. Op-
timizing (3.3) over p for given q and k, we have p(q, k) = (fn(k)+gn(k)q)q
2
.
Substituting this for p in (3.3), the resulting profit written as a function of q
and k, is
ΠNG(q, k) =
q(fn(k)− gn(k)q)2
2fn(k)
. (3.4)
Let qNG(k) denote the optimal product quality as a function of k given that
the Non-Green strategy is implemented. Then, optimizing (3.4) over q yields
6Notice that in this chapter, our notion of “greenness” is defined by whether or not prod-
ucts are remanufactured as opposed to whether or not they are merely remanufacturable.
In other words, we define “green” to mean not only that k = 1 but also that dr2 > 0.
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qNG(k) = fn(k)
3gn(k)
for k = 0, 1. This, from (3.4), implies that
ΠNG(k) ≡ ΠNG(qNG(k), k) = 2fn(k)
2
27gn(k)
=
{
2
27
, if k = 0;
2(1+θ)2
27(1+c1)
, if k = 1.
(3.5)
Given (3.5), let ΠT ≡ ΠNG(k = 0) denote the firm’s profit if the Traditional
substrategy is implemented, and let ΠM ≡ ΠNG(k = 1) denote the firm’s
profit if the Premium substrategy is implemented. Then, comparing ΠT to
ΠM leads directly to the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 (Optimal Non-Green Strategy). Let (kNG∗, qNG∗, pNG∗)
denote the optimal design and pricing decisions, given that dr2 = 0; and
let dNG∗ and ΠNG∗ denote the associated two-stage total demand and profit,
respectively. Then, the Premium substrategy is optimal (i.e., kNG∗ = 1) if
and only if 1 + c1 < (1 + θ)
2. Accordingly,
kNG∗ qNG∗ pNG∗ dNG∗ ΠNG∗
1 + c1 < (1 + θ)
2 1 qM = (1+θ)
3(1+c1)
2(1+θ)2
9(1+c1)
2
3
ΠM = 2(1+θ)
2
27(1+c1)
1 + c1 ≥ (1 + θ)2 0 qT = 13 29 23 ΠT = 227
Recall that 1 + θ represents a consumer’s valuation coefficient for a re-
manufacturable product and that 1 + c1 represents the corresponding cost
coefficient for the remanufacturable product. Thus, in essence, Proposition
3.1 indicates that if the marginal valuation for a remanufacturable product
justifies the marginal cost of producing the product, then designing for re-
manufacturing is justified even though no units are actually remanufactured
subsequently. In other words, even under the intention not to remanufac-
ture, it still would be in the firm’s best interest to design a remanufacturable
product under the right circumstances. This indicates that the valuation pre-
mium θ is more representative of environmental consciousness, or the idea of
a green world, more than it is representative of actual greenness, per se. In
this sense, θ is akin to consumers “talking a green talk”, but it is not indica-
tive of whether or not consumers are willing to follow through by actually
“walking the green walk”.
Intuitively, because profit margin is quadratic in consumer valuation and
linear in variable production cost, if (1 + θ)2 > 1 + c1, then the valuation
premium has a stronger positive effect on profit than the production cost has
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a negative effect. Thus, the increased production cost associated with re-
manufacturable products is justified. Interestingly, however, demand is not
affected by remanufacturability. Instead, the market effects of remanufac-
turability are realized through an increased product quality coupled with a
correspondingly increased price, which ultimately results in a higher profit
margin but not a higher demand volume.
3.3.3 Green Strategy
We define the Green strategy as one in which remanufactured products are
sold in the second stage. In other words, by definition of this strategy, dr2 > 0.
Accordingly, given this strategy, the firm designs the new product to be re-
manufacturable (i.e., k = 1). In stage 2, then, the firm optimally determines
the product portfolio of new and remanufactured products knowing that the
remanufactured products will cannibalize the demand for new products. We
therefore categorize the Green strategy into two substrategies depending on
the firm’s level of remanufacturing in stage 2. If all recycled products are
remanufactured (i.e., if dn1 = dr2 > 0), then we say the firm implements the
Complete Remanufacturing substrategy (CR). In contrast, if fewer than all
recycled products are remanufactured (i.e., if dn1 > dr2 > 0), then we say
the firm implements the Partial Remanufacturing substrategy (PR).
In either of these substrategies, the demand functions for stage 1 and
stage 2 are given by (3.1) and (3.2), respectively. Accordingly, if the firm
implements the Green strategy, then k = 1. Thus, to simplify notation, let
fn ≡ fn(1) = 1 + θ and gn ≡ gn(1) = 1 + c1. Then, the total profit for the
two stages is
ΠG(pn1, pn2, pr2, q) = dn1(pn1 − gnq2)
+ dn2(pn2 − gnq2) + dr2(pr2 − grq2) (3.6)
Given (3.6), note that the Green strategy would be implemented only if
gr/fr < gn/fn because, otherwise, the Green strategy would be dominated
by the Non-Green strategy of Section 3.2. (Please see Lemma 1 in Appendix
for details.) Accordingly, in mapping out the Green strategy, we implicitly as-
sume that gr/fr < gn/fn to ensure that dr2 > 0. Optimizing (3.6) for given q,
subject to the supply constraint dr2 ≤ dn1, thus yields Lemma B.2, which also
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is provided in Appendix. Lemma B.2 characterizes (pGn1(q), p
G
n2(q), p
G
r2(q)), the
optimal two-stage pricing decisions as functions of q, given that the Green
strategy is implemented, as well as (dGn1(q), d
G
n2(q), d
G
r2(q)), the corresponding
optimal demands. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. If the Green strategy is implemented, then the optimal
two-stage prices and demands, as functions of q, are such that:
i)
∂pGn2(q)
∂q
>
∂pGn1(q)
∂q
≥ ∂pGr2(q)
∂q
> 0;
ii)
∂dGn2(q)
∂q
<
∂dGn1(q)
∂q
< 0, whereas
∂dGr2(q)
∂q
> 0 for q < q1 but
∂dGr2(q)
∂q
< 0 for
q > q1,
where q1 =
fnfr(fn−fr)
f2n(gn−gr)−(fn−fr)2gn denotes the quality threshold above which
dGr2(q) = d
G
n1(q), but below which d
G
r2(q) < d
G
n1(q).
According to Proposition 3.2, the prices for both new and remanufactured
products increase as quality increases, given that the Green strategy is im-
plemented. Moreover, the stage 2 new product price increases faster than
the stage 1 new product price, which increases faster than the stage 2 re-
manufactured product price. To understand this, consider that three factors
— new product cost, cannibalization, and remanufacturing cost saving —
influence prices. While new product cost positively influences all prices, the
other two factors affect prices differently depending on the product type and
the stage. In particular, the stage 2 new product price is positively affected
by cannibalization, the stage 1 new product price is negatively affected by
remanufacturing cost saving, and the stage 2 remanufactured product price
is negatively affected by both cannibalization and remanufacturing cost sav-
ing. Therefore, intuitively, the firm has more incentive to increase its new
product price in stage 2 than in stage 1 due to the cannibalization from the
remanufactured products in stage 2.
As Proposition 3.2 also illustrates, if the Green strategy is implemented,
then the sales volume of new products in both stage 1 and stage 2 decreases
as quality increases. In contrast, the corresponding sales volume of reman-
ufactured products first increases and then decreases in q. Intuitively, when
quality is sufficiently low (specifically, when q < q1), the firm does not re-
manufacture all recycled products from stage 1. In that case, an increase
in quality means larger cost savings from remanufacturing, hence the firm
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remanufactures more. However, when quality is sufficiently high (specifically,
when q > q1), the firm remanufactures all recycled products from stage 1. In
that case, an increase in quality not only affects the profit of remanufactured
products in stage 2, but also that of new products in stage 1. And because
the marginal value of remanufacturing a unit is smaller than the marginal
loss of producing a unit of new product, the firm remanufactures less.
Given (3.6), let ΠG(q) = ΠG(pGn1(q), p
G
n2(q), p
G
r2(q), q) denote the profit as-
sociated with the Green strategy, reduced to a function of q only. Lemma
B.3, also provided in Appendix, establishes that ΠG(q) is continuous and
unimodal in q. Maximizing ΠG(q) accordingly leads to the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 3.3 (Optimal Green Strategy). Let (qG∗, pG∗n1 , p
G∗
n2 , p
G∗
r2 ) denote
the optimal design and pricing decisions given that dr2 > 0; and let d
G∗ and
ΠG∗ denote the associated two-stage total demand and profit, respectively.
Then by definition kG∗ = 1, and
qG∗ =
qGS =
fn+fr
3(gn+gr)
, 0 ≤ gr ≤ grS;
qGC =
f2n(gn+gr)+gn(f
2
n−f2r )
3(fng2n+frg
2
r+(fn−fr)(gn+gr)2)
(
2−
√
1− 3(f2n+fnfr−f2r )(frgn−fngr)2
(f2n(gn+gr)+gn(f
2
n−f2r ))2
)
,
grS < gr ≤ grC
qGP =
2fnfr(fn−fr)gn
3((frgn−fngr)2+2fr(fn−fr)g2n)
(
2−
√
1− 3(frgn−fngr)2
2fr(fn−fr)g2n
)
,
grC < gr ≤ frgnfn ;
where grS =
frgn
fn
− (f2n−f2r )gn
fn(3fn−2fr) and grC =
frgn
fn
− 4frgn(fn−fr)
2f2n+3fnfr−3f2r . Accordingly,
for j = n1, n2, r2:
pG∗j d
G∗ ΠG∗
0 ≤ gr ≤ grS pGj (qGS ) 2dGn1(qGS ) ΠG(qGS )
grS < gr ≤ grC pGj (qGC ) 2dGn1(qGC ) + dGn2(qGC ) ΠG(qGC )
grC < gr ≤ frgnfn pGj (qGP ) dGn1(qGP ) + dGn2(qGP ) + dGr2(qGP ) ΠG(qGP )
Note that grS < grC <
frgn
fn
. Thus, Proposition 3.3 characterizes the opti-
mal green quality based on the remanufacturing cost gr, indicating that this
optimal quality increases as gr decreases, which is intuitive. Accordingly,
from Proposition 3.2, the prices increase, and, correspondingly, the sales vol-
umes of new products decrease while the sales volume of remanufactured
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products first increases and then decreases. Notice also from Proposition 3.3
that if the Green strategy is implemented, then grC establishes the critical
remanufacturing cost threshold below which the Complete Remanufacturing
substrategy is optimal (d∗r2 = d
∗
n1), and above which the Partial Remanufac-
turing substrategy is optimal (0 < d∗r2 < d
∗
n1). Similarly, grS establishes the
critical remanufacturing cost threshold below which it is optimal not only to
remanufacture all recycled products from stage 1 (d∗r2 = d
∗
n1), but also to sell
only remanufactured products in stage 2 (d∗n2 = 0).
3.4 Optimal Design for Remanufacturing
In this section, we compare the profit associated with the optimal Green
strategy (Proposition 3.3) to the profit associated with the optimal Non-
Green strategy (Proposition 3.1) to determine conditions for optimality. Specif-
ically, we apply Propositions 3.3 and 3.1 to answer three questions: When is
it optimal to go green? When is it optimal to go completely green? When is
it optimal to design for green but not to go green?
3.4.1 When is it Optimal to Go Green?
In the context of our model, going green means that dr2 > 0 in an opti-
mal solution. Thus, to answer this question, we directly compare the profit
associated with the optimal Green strategy from Proposition 3.3 to that as-
sociated with the optimal Non-Green strategy from Proposition 3.1. This
yields the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4 (Going Green). If gr/fr < gn/fn < fn, then it is optimal to
go green; that is, it is optimal not only to design a remanufacturable product
(k∗ = 1), but also to sell remanufactured products (d∗r2 > 0).
Proposition 3.4 provides a sufficient condition indicating when the Green
strategy in Proposition 3.3 is optimal. Notice that this condition is two-
fold: First, for remanufacturing (i.e., the Green strategy) to be optimal, it
must be worthwhile to produce a remanufacturable product in the first place
(re: gn < f
2
n). But that is not enough. Second, for remanufacturing to be
optimal, it must also be worthwhile to actually remanufacture the reman-
ufacturable products (re: gr/fr < gn/fn). The first half of this sufficient
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condition (gn < f
2
n) is equivalent to that in Proposition 3.1, thus indicating
when it is worthwhile to design for remanufacturability regardless of whether
or not remanufacturing will actually occur. For insight into the second half
of the sufficient condition, we note that the ratio gi/fi can be interpreted as
a market cost efficiency ratio in the following sense: Consider a consumer
of type v. If that consumer were to purchase a new product with quality q,
which would cost gnq
2 to produce, then the corresponding consumer valua-
tion would be fnvq. Thus, the cost per unit valuation of this new product
is gnq
2/(fnvq) = gnq/(fnv). Likewise, the cost per unit valuation of the cor-
responding remanufactured product is grq/(frv). Therefore, Proposition 3.4
essentially indicates that it is optimal to go green if it is more cost efficient,
as measured against market valuation, to remanufacture a remanufacturable
unit of quality q than it is to manufacture a remanufacturable unit of quality
q (i.e., if grq/(frv) < gnq/(fnv) or gr/fr < gn/fn). Note that this condition is
consistent with those in Atasu et al. (2008) and in Ferrer and Swaminathan
(2010), both of which consider models of exogenous quality for the special
case in which fn = gn = 1. Thus, Proposition 3.4 extends their results to
our case of endogenous quality.
3.4.2 When is it Optimal to Go Completely Green?
In the context of our model, going completely green means that 0 < dr2 = dn1
in an optimal solution. Thus, to answer this question, we again compare the
profit associated with the optimal Green strategy from Proposition 3.3 to
that associated with the optimal Non-Green strategy from Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.5 (Going Completely Green). If gn < f
2
n and gr ≤ grC <
gnfr/fn, then it is optimal to go completely green; that is, it is optimal not
only to sell remanufactured products (d∗r2 > 0), but also to exhaust all avail-
able supply of recycled products in doing so (d∗r2 = d
∗
n1).
Proposition 3.5 provides a sufficient condition indicating when remanu-
facturing all available supply of recycled products is optimal. Notice that,
again, this condition is two-fold. Consistent with Proposition 3.4, for com-
plete remanufacturing to be optimal, not only must it be worthwhile to first
produce remanufacturable products and then to sell remanufactured prod-
ucts (re: gn < f
2
n and gr < gnfr/fn), but also it must be worthwhile to
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remanufacture all of the recycled products (re: gr ≤ grC). Intuitively, for
complete remanufacturing to be optimal, the market cost efficiency ratio of a
remanufactured product must be sufficiently lower than that of a new prod-
uct, namely gr/fr ≤ grC/fr = gn/fn − 4gn(fn−fr)2f2n+3fnfr−3f2r < gn/fn. If the market
cost efficiency ratio of a remanufactured product were to exceed this thresh-
old, then the potential cannibalization of new product sales would dominate
the potential benefits of selling a marginal unit of the remanufactured prod-
ucts, in which case the firm would be better served by not going completely
green.
3.4.3 When is it Optimal to Design for Green but
Not to Go Green?
In the context of our model, designing for green but not going green means
that k = 1 but dr2 = 0 in an optimal solution. Thus, to answer this question,
first recall from Lemma B.1 (in Appendix) that d∗r2 = 0 if and only if gn/fn ≤
gr/fr. Combining this with Proposition 3.1 then leads to the following.
Proposition 3.6 (Designing for Green but Not Going Green). If and only
if gn/fn ≤ min[fn, gr/fr], then it is optimal to design for green but not to go
green; that is, it is optimal to design a remanufacturable product (k∗ = 1),
but not to sell remanufactured products (d∗r2 = 0).
Thus, consistent with Proposition 3.4, Proposition 3.6 indicates that, if
the market cost efficiency ratio of a new remanufacturable product is lower
than that of a remanufactured product (i.e., if gn/fn ≤ gr/fr), then it is not
worthwhile to remanufacture any units even though it is worthwhile to design
remanufacturable products to begin with (i.e., even though gn/fn < fn).
Basically, under these conditions, optimality dictates cashing in on high profit
margins in stage 1 by designing for green, but then avoiding cannibalization
by not going green after all.
3.4.4 Discussion on the Optimal Quality and Demand
Note that, by combining Proposition 3.1 with Propositions 3.4–3.6, we can
write the optimal quality (denoted by q∗), given the condition that gn/fn ≤
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fn, as follows:
q∗ =
{
qG∗, if gr/fr < gn/fn;
qM = fn
3gn
, if gr/fr ≥ gn/fn.
(3.7)
Thus, as a stepping stone to better understand the impact of endogenous
quality in the context of our model, particularly with regard to its effect on
the optimal remanufacturability (k∗), we graphically compare the optimal
quality from (3.7) to qT = 1/3, which from Proposition 3.1, denotes the
quality that corresponds to the Traditional substrategy and, as such, rep-
resents the conditionally optimal quality given that k = 0. Specifically, in
Figure 3.2, we graph the ratio q∗/qT as a function of gr. In a similar vein,
we also graph in Figure 3.2 the ratio of the corresponding total demands
(d∗n1 + d
∗
n2 + d
∗
r2)/d
T as well as the ratios of the corresponding new product
demands (d∗n1 + d
∗
n2)/d
T and remanufactured product demands d∗r2/d
T . In
producing these graphs, we set fn = 1.2, fr = 0.9, and gn = 1.1. These
parameters serve as our illustrative and representative case for Figure 3.2, as
well as for the figures that follow unless otherwise stated.
Examining first the graph of q∗/qT , we find that, as the remanufacturing
cost gr increases, the optimal quality decreases until it reaches the minimal
level at gr = gnfr/fn. At this point, q
∗/qT = fn/gn; thus, q∗ > qT is assured
if fn/gn > 1. Examining second the graphs of (d
∗
n1 + d
∗
n2)/d
T , d∗r2/d
T and
(d∗n1+ d
∗
n2+ d
∗
r2)/d
T , we find that a smaller volume of new products are sold
when an optimal strategy is implemented than otherwise would be sold if
k = 0, which is intuitive. However, a larger total volume of products are sold
than otherwise would be sold if k = 0. This thus reflects the conventional
wisdom that a firm reaches a larger consumer base when implementing a
remanufacturing strategy.
3.5 Environmental Friendliness
In this section, we address the extent to which remanufacturable products
are environmentally friendly, given that they are optimal to produce. In
other words, we assess the environmental friendliness of k∗ = 1. To this end,
we first define an environmental measure that we refer to as environmental
damage. We then apply this measure to assess the environmental damage
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of Optimal Green Quality and Demand
associated with the optimal strategy (q∗), and we compare that to the envi-
ronmental damage associated with the Traditional substrategy (qT ), which
represents the conditionally optimal strategy given that k = 0. Specifically,
we make comparisons to answer two questions: Is it necessarily environmen-
tally friendly to design for green if the intention is not to go green? Is it even
necessarily environmentally friendly to go completely green?
3.5.1 Definition of Environmental Damage
Our definition of environmental damage derives from the notion of carbon
footprint. Carbon footprint refers to the total set of greenhouse gas emis-
sions produced by an organization, event or product. By analogy, we define
environmental damage as the total resources acquired from, and wastes dis-
carded to, the environment during a product’s life cycle. Specifically, we
assume that the environmental impact of extracting the resources for, and
disposing the remains of, a product of quality q is e1q and e2q, respectively,
where e1 and e2 represent environmental damage coefficients. Accordingly,
for given quality q and remanufacturability k, the environmental damage
associated with stage 1 of our model is
∆1 = dn1e1q + dn1(1− k)e2q,
where the first term dn1e1q denotes the damage caused by the extraction of
resources required to produce dn1 units of new product with quality q at the
start of stage 1, and the second term dn1(1−k)e2q denotes the environmental
damage caused by waste disposal at the end of stage 1 if the dn1 units are not
recycled (i.e., if k = 0). Analogously, the environmental damage associated
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with stage 2 of our model is
∆2 = dn2e1q + (dn1 − dr2)ke2q + (dn2 + dr2)e2q,
where the first term dn2e1q denotes the environmental damage caused by the
extraction of resources required to produce dn2 units of new product with
quality q at the start of stage 2, the second term (dn1 − dr2)ke2q denotes
the environmental damage caused by waste disposal at the start of stage
2 if used units are recycled at the end of stage 1 (i.e., if k = 1) but not
remanufactured in stage 2, and the third term (dn2 + dr2)e2q denotes the
environmental damage caused by waste disposal at the end of stage 2. Thus,
the total environmental damage for the two stages, which we denote ∆(q), is
∆(q) = ∆1 +∆2 = (dn1 + dn2)(e1 + e2)q (3.8)
where (3.8) reflects the fact that (1− k)dr2 = 0 because k = 0 requires that
dr2 = 0 by definition.
Notice therefore that the environmental damage measure reduces to a func-
tion that is independent of remanufacturing quantity dr2 and remanufac-
turability k. This is because, in the context of our model, remanufacturing
does not require the extraction of virgin resources beyond those originally
extracted to produce the units when they were new. Moreover, the waste re-
sulting from the disposal of remanufactured products in stage 2 is offset com-
pletely by the waste avoided by not having to dispose the remanufacturable
products recycled for remanufacturing in stage 1. Thus, as (3.8) illustrates,
what ultimately impacts the environment are two factors: (i) what is pro-
duced (which is represented by product quality q), and (ii) how much new
is produced (which is represented by new product demand dn1 + dn2). This
makes sense because, in essence, that is what is drawn from and eventually
returned back to the earth. Note that in this sense, the cannibalization of
new products by remanufactured products in stage 2 is a good thing from
the standpoint of environmental friendliness. Note also that we write envi-
ronmental damage ∆(q) as a function of q because (dn1 + dn2) ultimately is
a function of q as per Propositions 3.1 and 3.3.
Given this measure of environmental damage defined by (3.8), we are par-
ticularly interested in comparing ∆(q∗|k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = 0) to ∆(qT ) as well as
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comparing ∆(q∗|k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = d∗n1) to ∆(qT ). The first comparison assesses
the environmental damage associated with implementing an optimal strat-
egy, given that it is optimal to design a remanufacturable product but not
to remanufacture that product, relative to the environmental damage that
otherwise would result if k = 0. Accordingly, this comparison addresses our
first question of environmental friendliness: Is it environmentally friendly to
design for green if the intention is not to go green? Similarly, the second
comparison assesses the environmental damage associated with implement-
ing an optimal strategy given that it is optimal to remanufacture completely,
relative to the environmental damage that otherwise would result if k = 0.
Accordingly, this comparison addresses our second question of environmental
friendliness: Is it even necessarily environmentally friendly to go completely
green?
3.5.2 Is it Environmentally Friendly to Design for
Green but Not to Go Green?
Recall that, in the context of our model, designing for green but not going
green means that k = 1 but dr2 = 0 in an optimal solution. Thus, to answer
this question, we leverage Proposition 3.6 to obtain the following.
Proposition 3.7. If and only if fn/gn > max[1, fr/gr], the optimal strategy
is to design for green but not to go green (k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = 0), but this strategy
is not environmentally friendly (∆(q∗|k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = 0) > ∆(qT )).
Proposition 3.7 is interesting because it illustrates how the environment
ultimately pays the price when consumers overvalue the idea of remanufac-
turability (fn) relative to how much they value actual remanufacturing (fr).
In particular, Proposition 3.7 demonstrates a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion indicating when it is optimal for the firm to design a remanufacturable
product (k∗ = 1) that it has no intention of remanufacturing (d∗r2 = 0), al-
though the environment would be better served if the firm simply designed
a non-remanufacturable product instead (k = 0). In this case, the firm’s
decision not to remanufacture coupled with the increased quality associated
with a remanufacturable design results in increased environmental damage.
This result is an example of how good market intentions may produce un-
intentional outcomes. If environmentally conscious consumers express their
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concerns for the environment through a higher willingness to pay for prod-
ucts that can be remanufactured, then this preference attracts the firm to
design a remanufacturable product. However, that same consumer prefer-
ence will hurt the environment if it is coupled with a low willingness to pay
for products that have been remanufactured. Indeed, it is precisely this type
of inconsistency in consumers’ preferences that results in the unintended en-
vironmental consequences. This insight thus underscores a qualification for
consumers truly to be green. In particular, to be green, it is not sufficient for
consumers simply to value the idea of remanufacturing; they must also value
products that actually are remanufactured. In other words, it is not enough
to “talk green”; to be green, consumers must also “walk green”.
3.5.3 Is it Environmentally Friendly to Go
Completely Green?
In Section 5.2, we found that it is not necessarily environmentally friendly
to design for green if the intention is not actually to go green. But that begs
the question at the other extreme: What if it is optimal to go completely
green? Would even that necessarily be environmentally friendly? To address
this question, recall that, in the context of our model, going completely green
means that 0 < dr2 = dn1 in an optimal solution.
Proposition 3.8. If gr ≤ grC and gn/fn < 1 − f2r (3fn−fr)(2fn−fr)(fn+fr)2 < 1, then
the optimal strategy is to go completely green (k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = d
∗
n1), but that
strategy is not environmentally friendly (∆(q∗|k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = d∗n1) > ∆(qT )).
Proposition 3.8 demonstrates that, indeed, it is not necessarily environ-
mentally friendly to go green even if it means going completely green. Sur-
prisingly, but not entirely unexpectedly, this would be the case if the produc-
tion technology is especially cost efficient (in the sense that gn/fn is relatively
low). Intuitively, if the market cost efficiency ratio of a new remanufacturable
product is low (specifically, if gn/fn < 1−f 2r (3fn−fr)/((2fn−fr)(fn+fr)2)),
then it is optimal not only to remanufacture completely when gr ≤ grC , but
also to set quality relatively high. As a result, the associated environmental
damage ends up greater than it otherwise would if k = 0.
This suggests that cost efficiency potentially affects the environment dif-
ferently than it affects the firm. To the firm, cost efficiency translates into
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of Environmental Damage for Varying Production
Cost Parameters
increased profit. To the environment, however, cost efficiency translates into
higher quality which in turn leads to greater environmental damage. There-
fore, although it is in the best interest of the firm to pursue such efficiencies,
it is not particularly in the best interest of the environmentalist for the firm
to achieve such pursuits.
Proposition 3.7 and 3.8 illustrate that cost efficiency of new remanufac-
turable products can lead to worse environmental consequences. This effect
is manifested in higher product quality when remanufacturing cost gr is rel-
atively large in which case d∗r2 = 0 as in Proposition 3.7, or when gr is
relatively small in which case d∗r2 = d
∗
n1 as in Proposition 3.8. While the for-
mer requires moderate cost efficiency with production technology, the latter
demands much more higher cost efficiency. Hence, the latter is less likely to
happen than the former. In other words, to remanufacture is generally more
environmentally friendly than not to remanufacture given that the product
is remanufacturable.
3.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis for Environmentally
Friendliness
Next, in the form of a sensitivity analysis, we investigate the impact of pro-
duction costs (gn and gr) and consumer valuations (fn and fr) on the envi-
ronmental friendliness of an optimal policy. Specifically, we fix two of the
four parameters while varying the other two, and we compare ∆(q∗), the
environmental damage associated with the optimal strategy, to ∆(qT ), the
environmental damage associated with the conditionally optimally strategy
given that k = 0.
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Figure 3.4: Illustration of Environmental Damage for Representative
Valuation Parameters
Figure 3.3 shows graphs of ∆(q∗)/∆(qT ) as a function of remanufacturing
cost gr for three different new product production costs gn = 1.1, 1.2, 1.4.
Notice that a reduction in the remanufacturing cost yields a decrease in
environmental damage if gr is relatively high, but it yields an increase in
environmental damage if gr is relatively low. Intuitively, Figure 3.3 reflects
that complete remanufacturing is not optimal for relatively high gr but it
is optimal for relatively low gr. Hence, reducing the remanufacturing cost
when gr > grC increases the volume of remanufacturing, which increases
cannibalization of new products (smaller dn2), thus reducing the damage on
the environment. However, further reductions in gr, when gr is already low,
do not affect cannibalization because all available units already are being
remanufactured. Rather, such reductions in gr result in higher quality, thus
increasing the damage on the environment. In fact, this increase in envi-
ronmental damage could potentially render complete remanufacturing less
environmentally friendly.
Figure 3.3 also illustrates that environmental damage increases as gn de-
creases. This observation reflects two effects: First, a lower gn means a higher
profit margin for new remanufacturable products. Second, a lower gn also
means a smaller relative cost difference between new and remanufactured
products, gn − gr. These two effects thus combine to make remanufactur-
ing less attractive. Hence, the firm sells a larger volume of new products
and a smaller volume of remanufactured ones. As a result, cannibalization
decreases, thus increasing the damage on the environment.
In contrast, as illustrated by Figure 3.4, which provides graphs of ∆(q∗)/∆(qT )
as a function of gr for three values of fr (fr = 0.6, 0.8, 0.9) and for three val-
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ues of fn (fn = 1.1, 1.2, 1.4), environmental damage decreases as consumers’
willingness to pay for remanufactured products (fr) increases, but it increases
as consumers’ willingness to pay for new products (fn) increases. Intuitively,
as Figure 3.4 (a) reflects, the firm is more reluctant to remanufacture for
lower fr. Thus, reductions in fr decrease cannibalization, thus increasing the
damage on the environment. Similarly, as Figure 3.4 (b) reflects, a higher fn
translates not only into a greater reluctance to remanufacture but also into
a desire for higher quality. Hence, increases in fn decrease cannibalization
and increase quality, thus creating a reinforcing effect increasing the damage
on the environment.
These results once again support insights from Proposition 3.7 indicating
that inconsistency in consumers’ valuations between what can be remanufac-
tured relative to what has been remanufactured contributes to environmental
damage. Basically, the larger is the difference, (fn− fr), whether it is due to
increases in fn or to decreases in fr, the larger is the environmental damage
that results from an optimal solution. In other words, although valuing re-
manufactured products leads to smaller environmental damage, valuing only
the notion of remanufacturability leads to greater environmental damage.
This is indicative of the notion that consumption, as opposed to produc-
tion, is a primary driver of environmental damage. Accordingly, to para-
phrase Orange (2010), the key to green is first to reduce consumption, and
only then to recycle and to reuse that which has been consumed. This is
also indicative of firms not particularly operating in the interests of the envi-
ronment. Indeed, as theWall Street Journal article titled “The Case Against
Corporate Social Responsibility” argued in September 2010, “the concept of
Corporate Social Responsibility is flawed. Companies do good [socially] only
if they can do well [financially].” Restated in the language of our model, when
a product is remanufacturable, firms may not necessarily remanufacture, and
even if they do, they may not remanufacture completely.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied remanufacturing and its environmental con-
sequences through a product design lens. In this context, a firm has the
option to design a non-remanufacturable or a remanufacturable product and
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to specify a corresponding quality, and these design choices affect both the
production costs and the consumer valuations associated with the product.
On the cost side, remanufacturable products cost more to produce origi-
nally, but less to remanufacture, than non-remanufacturable products cost
to produce. Analogously, on the consumer side, remanufacturable products
are valued more, but remanufactured products are valued less, than non-
remanufacturable products are valued. Given this, we investigate the envi-
ronmental consequences of remanufacturing by first defining a measure of
environmental damage that, ultimately, is a function of what is produced
and how much is produced, and then applying that measure to assess the
environmental damage associated with the firm’s optimal strategy relative
to the environmental damage associated with the firm’s otherwise optimal
strategy if a non-remanufacturable product were designed and produced. In
doing so, we bridge the gap between profit maximization and environmental
friendliness to ascertain the extent to which the two are complementary and
to identify key factors of compatibility when they are not complementary.
Our results indicate that consumer preferences and production technology
potentially affect environmental friendliness differently than they affect profit
maximization. We find, for example, that consumer greenness and produc-
tion efficiency generally lead to a more profitable firm, which is consistent
with the remanufacturing literature (e.g., Debo et al. 2005), but they do not
necessarily translate to a more environmentally friendly firm. Specifically, we
find that if green consumers overvalue the idea that a product can be reman-
ufactured relative to how much they value a product that has been remanu-
factured, then the firm’s optimal mix of new versus remanufactured products
will not necessarily achieve the level of cannibalization required to benefit the
environment in the form of waste disposal reductions. Consequently, under
such circumstances, consumer greenness translates into increased damage on
the environment. In a related vein, we find that although production effi-
ciencies translate into healthier bottom lines, they also translate into higher
quality products that, in turn, translate into increased damage on the envi-
ronment.
Fundamental to our analysis is the modeling assumption that consumers
differentiate between remanufacturable products, non-remanufacturable prod-
ucts, and remanufactured products specifically such that they value reman-
ufactured products (weakly) less than non-remanufacturable products and
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they value non-remanufacturable products (weakly) less than remanufac-
turable products. In other words, fundamental to our modeling construct is
the stipulation that fr ≤ 1 ≤ fn. Nevertheless, whereas our stipulation that
consumers value remanufacturable products more than non-remanufacturable
products (fn ≥ 1) is essential to our analysis, at least to the extent that we
also assume remanufacturable products cost more than remanufacturable
products to produce, ceteris paribus, our companion stipulation that con-
sumers value remanufactured products less than non-remanufacturable prod-
ucts (fr ≤ 1) is, as it turns out, superfluous. We make this modeling assump-
tion to parallel our presumption that the cost to remanufacture is less than
the cost to produce originally, but in the end what drives our results is not
the condition fr ≤ 1 but rather the condition that fr ≤ fn. Thus, even if
consumers valued remanufactured products more than they valued new non-
remanufacturable products, our analysis would apply as long as they didn’t
value remanufactured products more than they valued new remanufacturable
products.
In contrast, if consumers were to value remanufactured products more than
they valued remanufacturable products, that is, if consumers were to view
new products as inferior substitutes for remanufactured products, then the
demand model of Figure 3.1 would change at its core because consumers with
higher valuation of quality would prefer remanufactured products and those
with lower valuation of quality would prefer new products. In other words,
if fr > fn, then the relative positions of dn2 and dr2 in Figure 3.1 would
reverse so that dr2 would be depicted to the right of dn2 rather than vice
versa. Ultimately, such a recharacterization would mean that remanufactured
products not only would benefit from lower production costs (in the sense
that gr/fr < gr/fn < gn/fn would be true) but also would benefit from higher
prices (in the sense that p∗r2 > p
∗
n2 would result). Under these circumstances,
the analysis therefore would imply simply that d∗n2 = 0 unconditionally.
Also fundamental to our analysis are the definitions of virgin resource ex-
traction and waste disposal as measures that are directly proportional to
quality. Nevertheless, similar to the specifications of consumer valuations,
this proportionality assumption is required only to the extent that environ-
mental damage is defined to be non-decreasing in quality and in quantity.
Because our assessments of environmental friendliness begin with the Pre-
mium substrategy, in which case it is optimal to design for green but not to go
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green, and because this substrategy results in the same sales volume as other-
wise would result in the Traditional substrategy (re: Proposition 3.1), which
serves as the benchmark for environmental friendliness, it is the comparison
between the optimal quality and the conditionally optimal quality given that
k = 0 that is fundamental to our results. Thus, if virgin resource extrac-
tion and waste disposal were defined more generally to be non-decreasing
functions of quality, then we would expect similar qualitative assessments of
environmental friendliness as those determined in §3.5 to result.
Note, however, that these qualitative assessments very well could be af-
fected if environmental damage were decreasing over some quality levels.
As an illustrative example of such a potential, consider Subramanian et al.
(2009) who develop a repeated purchase model in which environmental re-
sources are consumed not only during production (by the firm) but also
during use (by consumers). Thus, in this context, consumers face a trade-off
between a during-use cost, on the one hand, and a product replacement cost
on the other hand. If such a during-use environmental effect were incorpo-
rated into our modeling context, then an additional term would be required
to represent the amount of environmental damage incurred during use, which
potentially could be decreasing in quality. Therefore, exploration of such an
effect constitutes a viable direction for future research.
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Chapter 4
Environmental Friendliness:
Scope and Applicability
In §3, we have studied remanufacturing and its environmental consequences
through a product design lens. To this purpose, we developed a two-stage
model in which the manufacturer has the option to design a non-remanufacturable
or a remanufacturable product and to specify a corresponding quality. Our
results indicate that consumer preferences and production technology po-
tentially affect environmental friendliness differently than they affect profit
maximization. We find, for example, that consumer greenness and produc-
tion cost efficiency generally translate to a more profitable firm, but they do
not necessarily lead to a more environmentally friendly firm.
In this chapter, we further explore the scope and applicability of the model
and results in §3. Specifically, we consider several extensions to, and varia-
tions of, our modeling assumptions and settings, and we discuss their impli-
cations. In §4.1, we study the value of educating consumers. In §§4.2–4.3,
we explore the impact of a continuous remanufacturability and an exogenous
quality on the optimal decisions and on associated environmental impact. In
§4.4, we investigate the effect of an infinite-horizon model. Building on this
model, we discuss the effects of collection rate, as well as the perspectives of
both an environmental planner and a global planner in §§4.5–4.6.
4.1 The Value of Consumer Education
Recall from §3.5 that consumers who are environmentally conscious in the
sense that they value the idea that a product can be remanufactured, but are
not necessarily green in the sense that they do not particularly value a prod-
uct that has been remanufactured could lead to unintentional consequences
in the form of unwarranted environmental damage. Thus, as a natural exten-
sion, we explore in this section the potential value of educating consumers to
be less environmentally conscious, per se, and to be more green. Specifically,
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Table 4.1: Marginal Effect of Consumer Valuation on Environmental
Damage
θ
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
α
0.1 0.12, 0.08 0.07, 0.02 0.21, 0.19 0.15, 0.13 0.13, 0.08
0.2 0.08, 0.02 0.17, 0.14 0.13, 0.09 0.12, 0.07 0.11, 0.06
0.3 0.15, 0.11 0.13, 0.07 0.12, 0.06 0.11, 0.05 0.11, 0.04
0.4 0.12, 0.06 0.11, 0.05 0.11, 0.04 0.10, 0.04 0.09, (0.09)
0.5 0.12, 0.04 0.11, 0.04 0.09, 0.04 0.09, (0.09) 0.09, (0.09)
we focus on the question of what would be more environmentally beneficial, a
decrease in fn (i.e., a decrease in θ) or an increase in fr (i.e., a decrease in α).
To this end, we numerically evaluate changes to environmental damage rela-
tive to changes in θ and in α, given that the optimal policy is implemented.
Specifically, we set c1 = 0.2, c2 = 0.5, and e1+e2 = 1, and we compute
∂∆(q∗)
∂θ
and ∂∆(q
∗)
∂α
for values of θ and α such that (θ, α) ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}.
Table 4.1 provides a matrix of results where each entry presents (∂∆(q
∗)
∂θ
,
∂∆(q∗)
∂α
) for specified values of θ and α, with parenthesis indicating a negative
value. According to Table 4.1, increases in θ result in increases to environ-
mental damage regardless of the value of α. Similarly, increases in α result
in increases in environmental damage for most values of θ. However, in-
creases in α yield decreases to environmental damage if both θ and α are
large. Thus, as a general rule, there is value (to the environmentalist) in
educating consumers to be less environmentally conscious (smaller θ) and
more environmentally green (smaller α). In other words, it is in the envi-
ronment’s better interest to have consumers not necessarily value so highly
that which can be remanufactured, but rather to value highly that which has
been remanufactured. Moreover, notice that ∂∆(q
∗)
∂θ
> ∂∆(q
∗)
∂α
. Thus, if the
choice must be made between educating consumers against the ills of over-
valuing that which can be remanufactured and the ills of undervaluing that
which has been remanufactured, the environment would be better served by
investing in the former.
4.2 Remanufacturability
In §3, we defined remanufacturability (k) to be a binary variable. In this
section, we relax this stipulation and assume that k is a continuous variable
65
such that k ∈ [0, 1]. In this new context, however, the interpretation of k
requires refinement. If k ∈ [0, 1], then rather than representing whether or
not a product can be remanufactured (as it does in this chapter), k would
represent the fraction of a product that can be remanufactured. As such,
this concept is related to, but is different from, both the notion of collec-
tion rate (Majumder and Groenevelt 2001, Ferrer and Swaminathan 2006,
2010) and the notion of yield ratio (Ferguson and Toktay 2006, Ferguson and
Koenigsberg 2007). To illustrate this difference, consider a cell phone as an
example. If the cell phone were defined to have two components, a shell and
a battery, then the notion of collection rate would refer to the ratio of how
many used cell phones are recycled after use relative to how many are sold,
and the notion of core yield would refer to how many of the cell phones (as
complete units) that are recycled have enough residual value remaining to
justify remanufacturing. In contrast, a fractional k in our modeling context
would refer to how much of a given cell phone (just the shell, just the battery,
both, or neither) is remanufacturable.
If, indeed, k were redefined in our model such that k ∈ [0, 1], then most of
our analysis leading to Propositions 3.1 – 3.3 would remain unaltered, except
for the analysis to determine k∗. Because we found that analysis not to be
tractable analytically, we implemented a numerical procedure to establish
the optimal k for an extensive array of input parameters. From this analysis,
which is provided in Appendix C.2, we found that k∗ is a boundary point
solution such that k∗ = 0 or k∗ = 1 even if k is defined on [0, 1]. Thus we infer
that, qualitatively, the results and interpretations from Chapter 3 continue
to hold if k were defined as a continuous design variable.
4.3 Exogenous Quality
In §3.5.2, we established that the environmental damage associated with a
remanufacturable product, when such a design is optimal, could be larger
than that associated with a non-remanufacturable product, depending on
the circumstances. Moreover, under such circumstances, a primary reason
for the increased environmental damage is that a remanufacturable product
leads to a higher quality design than does a non-remanufacturable product.
Thus, in this section, to test the extent to which this result depends on the
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of Environmental Damage for Exogenous Quality
endogeneity of quality in our model, we revisit the comparison of environ-
mental damage behind Proposition 3.7 but this time we assume exogenous
quality instead. Accordingly, for the purpose of this section, let ∆∗(q) de-
note the environmental damage associated with the optimal two-stage pricing
and remanufacturability strategy for given q, and let ∆T (q) denote the envi-
ronmental damage associated with the conditionally optimal pricing policy,
given that k = 0, for given q.
Proposition 4.1. If gn/fn < 1 and gr > gn − (fn − fr)(1 − gn/fn), then
∆∗(q) > ∆T (q).
As Proposition 4.1 demonstrates, even for an exogenous quality, it is not
necessarily environmentally friendly to go green. In particular, going green
leads to larger environmental damage if the remanufacturing cost is suffi-
ciently high (specifically, if gr > gn − (fn − fr)(1 − gn/fn)). In this case,
Proposition 4.1 dictates that the firm design remanufacturable products but
not remanufacture enough of them to achieve the level of cannibalization
needed for the environment to benefit. In fact, under these circumstances,
the firm ends up selling a higher volume of new products than it otherwise
would had the product been non-remanufacturable.
To graphically illustrate the implications of exogenous quality, we plot, in
Figure 4.1, graphs of environmental damage for q = 1/3 (which corresponds
to the conditionally optimal quality when k = 0) and q = fn/3gn (which
corresponds to the conditionally optimal quality when k = 1 but dr2 = 0).
We find that higher quality generally results in higher environmental damage
if gr is either large or small. However, we also find that higher quality
leads to lower environmental damage if gr is moderate. Intuitively, if gr is
moderate, then higher quality means that the firm remanufactures a higher
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Figure 4.2: Infinite-horizon Model Specification
percentage of recycled units due to the correspondingly smaller volume of
new product sales. This increases cannibalization, thus decreasing damage
on the environment.
4.4 Infinite Horizon
In §3, a two-stage model is used to exemplify the cannibalization effect be-
tween new and remanufactured products. While a two-stage model is parsi-
monious and useful for developing insights into the problem context studied
in §3, an infinite horizon model would be equally parsimonious for developing
similar insights into the effects of longer problem horizons.
The Decision Framework. We use a infinite-horizon model as shown
in Figure 4.2 to formulate the firm’s profit-maximization problem. First,
at the design stage, stage 0, the firm determines product quality and the
level of remanufacturability. These two design dimensions remain unchanged
throughout the horizon. Then in the t-th stage where t ∈ R+, the firm
sets the prices for new and (or) remanufactured products and produces the
corresponding quantities. At the end of the period, used units are recycled
through reverse logistic network as in Figure 4.2. And this amount of recycled
product establishes the supply constraint for the t+ 1-th stage.
The key here is the interaction between the supply constraint imposed by
new products sales from the last period, and cannibalization arising from
selling both new and remanufactured products. Unlike a two-period model
which requires the firm to sell only new products in the first period and allows
the firm to sell only remanufactured products in the second, an infinite-
horizon model requires the firm to produce new products every period to
maintain a steady state. Moreover, (Ferrer and Swaminathan 2006, Ray
et al. 2005) shows that in an infinite-horizon model, it is optimal for the firm
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to set the same price and to sell the same volume of products in each period.
In other words, the pricing decision in an infinite-horizon model is one-time
(Atasu et al. 2008). Hence, we drop the subscript t in our model formulation.
Consumer Demand. Consumers purchase to maximize their non-negative
surplus, which is defined by the difference between valuation and price paid.
Let pn and pr be the price of a new and a remanufactured product, respec-
tively. Then the demand functions for new and remanufactured products are
similar to those in §3.3, but with different subscript. Specifically, if only new
products are available, then the corresponding demand for new products is
represented by (4.1).
dn = 1− pn
fn(k)q
(4.1)
If the product is designed to be remanufacturable (i.e., if k = 1), then the
demand for new and remanufactured products, dn and dr, respectively, are
dn = 1− pn − pr
(fn − fr)q , and dr =
pn − pr
(fn − fr)q −
pr
frq
(4.2)
Note that dn and dr represent the demand for new and remanufactured prod-
ucts in a stable state hence no subscript is used to represent the time period.
Profit. If the firm designs a non-remanufacturable product (i.e., if k = 0),
then it only sells new products in each period. Accordingly, the demand is
represented by (4.1) and the corresponding profit is
Π(pn, q, k) = dn(pn − gnq2) (4.3)
If the firm designs a remanufacturable product (i.e., if k = 1), then the
pricing decisions for new and remanufactured products would be stationary
over time (Atasu et al. 2008), the corresponding remanufacturing problem
boils down to
max
pn,pr
Π = dn(pn − gnq2) + dr(pr − gnq2) (4.4)
s.t. dr ≤ dn (4.5)
By applying the same solution procedure as in §3, we analogously solve (4.4).
(Detailed derivations are provided in Appendix C.2.)
Accordingly, Figure 4.3 shows the graphs of the optimal quality (qI∗), as
69
Idn
I*
+ dr
I*MdT Hdn2
*
+ dr2
* LdT
dn1
* dT
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
gr0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
(a)
qI* qT
q* qT
D
I* DTD
* DT
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
gr0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
(b)
Figure 4.3: Comparison between Two-Stage and Infinite-Horizon Quality,
Demand, and Environmental Damage
well as the corresponding total demand for a given period (dI∗n +d
I∗
r ) and the
associated environmental damage (∆I∗), all as functions of the remanufac-
turing cost gr. For comparison, we likewise graph in Figure 4.3 the optimal
quality from the two-stage formulation (q∗), as well as the corresponding
stage 1 demand (d∗n1), stage 2 demand (d
∗
n2 + d
∗
r2), and the associated en-
vironmental damage (∆∗). Note that the two-stage results are normalized
such that they represent the average values for a single stage.
As Figure 4.3(a) illustrates, the infinite-horizon model implies a greater
volume of products sold in each period than does the two-stage model in
stage 1 (i.e., dI∗n + d
I∗
r > d
∗
n1). This is because two types of products (new
and remanufactured) are sold in the infinite-horizon model compared to only
one type of product (only new) in stage 1 of the two-stage model. Similarly,
the infinite-horizon model implies a larger volume of products sold per period
than does stage 2 of the two-stage model (i.e., dI∗n + d
I∗
r > d
∗
n2 + d
∗
r2) if gr is
sufficiently small because two types of products (new and remanufactured)
are sold in the infinite-horizon model compared to only one type of prod-
uct (only remanufactured) in stage 2 of the two-stage model. However, the
infinite-horizon model implies a smaller volume of products sold per period
than does stage 2 of the two-stage model if gr is sufficiently large. This is
because, like in the infinite-horizon model, two types of products (new and re-
manufactured) are sold in stage 2 of the two-stage model, but comparatively,
there is less cannibalization of remanufactured products by new products due
to the fact that new products in stage 2 of the two-period model need not
be collected for later use.
As Figure 4.3(b) illustrates, an infinite-horizon model dictates a higher
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quality than does the two-stage model. This is because the new units in stage
2 of the two-stage model will not be remanufactured, thus the cost saving
potential of these units cannot be realized. Hence, the two-stage model yields
a lower quality so as to reduce this waste of cost saving potential. Figure
4.3(b) also shows that the infinite-horizon model does not fundamentally
alter the pattern in which environmental damage changes with regards to
remanufacturing cost. However, the infinite-horizon model does yield slightly
higher or lower environmental damage as does the two-stage model in §3.
If the remanufacturing cost is relatively small, on one hand, the infinite-
horizon model dictates a higher sales volume of new products as well as a
higher quality than does the two-stage model, leading to more environmental
damage. If the remanufacturing cost is relatively large, on the other hand, the
infinite-horizon model dictates a much smaller sales volume of new products
due to stronger cannibalization, as reduces the environmental damage. This
reduction in environmental damage outweighs the effect of a slightly higher
quality. Hence, the total environmental damage is smaller.
4.5 Collection Rate
Product return has been considered as a “dead weight” of a firm’s operation
rather than as a source of value creation. It was not until the last decades or
two that this situation started to change. Instead of passive handling return
after it happens, firms have started to consider the reverse supply chain
in their decision-making process. For example, end-of-use products can be
reintroduced as remanufactured products by recovering the residual value of
the functioning components from the returned products. In related literature
on product return, there are four types of product returns depending on
the nature: commercial, warranty, end-of-use, and end-of-life. Each type of
return can be treated so that it will create value for the firm.
As Guide et al. (2003) pointed out, the profitability of remanufacturing
depends critically on product acquisition management. One would expect
that the more used products are recycled, the more remanufactured products
can be sold. Thus increases in collection rate could potentially generate
more economic gains and causing less environmental damage. For example,
in September 2010, Chemistry & Industry features an article stating that
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the carbon footprint of recycling PET (a type of packaging plastics) is lower
than landfill when the recycling rate is higher than 45%. The economic and
environmental benefits of recycling more used units may remain true even
if the reverse logistics entails a fixed cost, and even more so if recycling
is mandatary due to related legislation as the case in many nations in the
European Union.
In this section, we focus on the end-of-use product returns, that is, prod-
ucts still contain significant amount of value and can be remanufactured to
original functionality. Geyer et al. (2007) study the impact of durability and
product life-cycle on the profitability of remanufacturing by minimizing the
total cost of collection, sorting, remanufacturing, and disposal. Guide et al.
(2003) recognize the variation of conditions in returned products and propose
a price-sensitive return framework to determine the optimal acquisition price
for each condition of used products. Both research assume that remanufac-
turing cost for each condition class is exogenous while the product return and
total demand depends on the acquisition and retail price respectively. They
find that decrease in acquisition price in one conation class would increase the
return from other condition class. Galbreth and Blackburn (2010) also con-
sider the variation of condition in returned products but consider demand
and the distribution of used products condition exogenous. They assume
that unit remanufacturing cost decreases as more returned products are ac-
quired and then trade-off the decreasing remanufacturing cost vs increasing
the collection and inspection cost. Savaskan et al (2004) and Savaskan and
Van Wassenhove (2006) study the different structure of reverse supply chain
and their impact on the optimal collection rate. Their results suggest that
in decentralized setting, collecting through retailer yields a higher collection
rate than collecting through manufacturer or a third-party. All these models
assume no differentiation between new and remanufactured products hence
no cannibalization. The collection rate mainly affects the operational side
of the question. Webster and Mitra (2007) and Mitra and Webster (2008)
investigate the impact of subsidy and take-back law on product returns and
consequently on the profitability of remanufacturing.
The objective in this section is to investigate the effect of collection rate on
a monopolist’s design for remanufacturing problem and examine its environ-
mental consequences. We study the interactions between product collection
rate and an endogenous quality, and study how these interactions would af-
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of Consumer Demands in Infinite-Horizon Model
fect the firm’s quality design and remanufacturing decision. In particular,
we study the conditions on which the firm makes its products remanufac-
turable given that only a certain fraction of used products is recycled at the
end of each period. If so, how do the optimal product quality and optimal
product mix between new and remanufactured products change according
to the collection rate? We also examine the effect of collection rate on the
environment and identify the key drivers that make remanufacturing more
environmentally friendly.
4.5.1 Model and Solution
Here, we first introduce some necessary assumptions and then define the
firm’s design for remanufacturing problems. Each problem is then solved
separately.
Collection Rate. At the end of each period, used products are collected
back to the firm through reverse supply chain. In this section, we model
the reverse logistics with an exogenous collection rate, denoted by γ, which
represents the percentage of used products that can be recycled at the end
of each period. This setting represents the scenario where the firm has no
control over the reverse logistics, and consumers randomly decide whether
to recycle a used product as shown in Figure 4.4. Consistent with §4.4, we
assume that the recycling of each used unit can only occur in the same period
as the purchase and consumption of the new product. Otherwise, the unit is
lost and will never be recycled.
Profit. The introduction of collection rate does not affect the expressions
for profit directly. If the firm designs a non-remanufacturable product (i.e.,
if k = 0), then the corresponding profit is (4.3). If the firm designs a reman-
ufacturable product (i.e., if k = 1), then the corresponding profit is (4.4).
73
The key distinction between the current section and §4.4 is that the supply
constraint (4.5) changes to
dr ≤ γdn. (4.6)
This difference has two effects. On one hand, recycling a fraction of used
products means the cost saving potential in those products that are not col-
lected can not be realized, which makes remanufacturing less attractive. On
the other hand, fewer remanufactured products in the market will lead to
weaker cannibalization between the two products, which makes remanufac-
turing more attractive.
Following the same solution procedure as in §4.4, we can solve the firm’s
remanufacturing problem under an exogenous collection rate. Due to the
fact that the non-remanufacturing problem is fundamentally the same with
or without collection rate, the solution to the Traditional strategy remains
the same in §3.3 and §4.4.
For the remanufacturing problem (4.4), Lemma C.1 in Appendix C.1 demon-
strates that for given q, the firm implements the Premium strategy if gn/fn ≤
gr/fr, and implements the Green strategy if gn/fn > gr/fr. Note that gi/fi
represents the cost efficiency of product i = n, r. Accordingly, the firm
chooses not to remanufacture if the new remanufacturable product is more
cost efficient, and vice versa. In the former case, dr = 0, hence (4.4) becomes
ΠM(q) = fnq(fn−gnq)
2
4fn
, which has the same structure as (4.3).
In the latter case, Lemma C.2 characterizes (pGn (q), p
G
r (q)), the optimal
pricing decisions as a function of q, as well as (dGn (q), d
G
r (q)), the correspond-
ing demands. We find that the firm remanufactures more recycled units as
product quality increases. As a result, the new product sales volume de-
creases in quality due to cannibalization from remanufactured products. A
closer look reveals that as quality increases, the firm sells fewer new prod-
ucts in each period to increase the price and thus marginal return of both
products. Let ΠG(q) = ΠG(pGn (q), p
G
r (q), q) denote the profit associated with
the Green strategy as a function of q. Then Lemma C.3, also provided in
Appendix C.1, establishes that ΠG(q) is continuous and unimodal in q. Max-
imizing ΠM(q) and ΠG(q) accordingly leads to the following Proposition.
Proposition 4.2 (Optimal Remanufacturing Strategy). Let qR∗ denote the
optimal quality if the Remanufacturing strategy is implemented. Then by
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definition, k = 1, and
qR∗ =

qGC =
fn+γfr
3(gn+γgr)
, 0 ≤ gr ≤ grC ;
qGP =
fr(fn−fr)gn
“
2−
√
1−3(frgn−fngr)2/[fr(fn−fr)g2n]
”
3(frgn(gn−gr)−gr(frgn−fngr)) , grC < gr ≤
frgn
fn
;
qM = fn
3gn
, frgn
fn
< gr ≤ 1.
where grC =
(1+γ)(fn+γfr)−3γ(fn−fr)
(fn+γfr)2+3γ2fr(fn−fr) frgn.
Proposition 4.2 characterizes the optimal product quality in the remanu-
facturing cost gr when the firm designs a remanufacturable product. A couple
of observations are worth mentioning. First, considering collection rate in the
design for remanufacturing problem does not fundamentally change the struc-
ture of the optimal product quality. That is, the optimal quality increases as
remanufacturing cost decreases. Second, collection rate only affects product
quality when complete remanufacturing is optimal. This is intuitive because
the supply constraint is not binding under partial or no remanufacturing.
4.5.2 Results and Discussion
In this subsection, we first compare the optimal profit when a non-remanufacturable
product is designed (i.e., k = 0) to the optimal profit when a remanufac-
turable product is designed (i.e., k = 1). This comparison helps us under-
stand the effect of collection rate on the profitability of remanufacturing.
Then, we compare the environmental damage associated with optimal deci-
sion.
Profitability
First, comparing the conditional optimal solution when k = 0 to that when
k = 1 yields the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3. Given that gr/fr < gn/fn < fn, then it is optimal for
the firm to remanufacture. Accordingly, the collection rate affects the firm’s
remanufacturing strategy such that
i) If γˆ < γ ≤ 1, then it is optimal to partially remanufacture;
ii) If γ ≤ min[γˆ, 1], then it is optimal to completely remanufacture.
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where
γˆ =
(fn − fr)
(
gn(1 +
√
1− 3(frgn−fngr)2
(fn−fr)frg2n )− 2gr
)
2(fn − fr)gr − (frgn − fngr) − 1
Proposition 4.3 summarizes the effects of an exogenous collection rate on
the firm’s optimal remanufacturing decisions. These results are two-folded.
First, collection rate has no effect on the firm’s optimal remanufacturability
decision. As we recall, whether or not to design a remanufacturable product
is independent from collection rate, and depends on the comparison of cost
efficiency between a non-remanufacturable product and a remanufacturable
one. In a similar vein, collection rate produces no effect on whether or not a
used product will be remanufactured. However, when the firm does remanu-
facture, collection rate may affect the firm’s optimal decision. In particular,
there exist a threshold collection rate, γˆ, such that when the collection rate
is higher than this threshold, the firm will partially remanufacture. If the
collection rate is lower than this threshold, then the quantity of used prod-
ucts collected is smaller than the amount of used products the firm would
like to remanufacture. As a result, the firm will remanufacture all available
used products.
Note that γˆ is a decreasing function in gr. When remanufacturing cost is
relatively low (i.e., gr ≤ (5fr−fn)gnfrf2n+(5f5−fr)fr ), we have γˆ ≥ 1, which means that the
firm will always remanufacture all used products. When remanufacturing
cost is relatively high (i.e., gr ≥ gnfr/fn), we have γˆ ≥ 0, which indicates
that the firm will remanufacture nothing.
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Figure 4.5 graphically represents the firm’s optimal remanufacturing deci-
sion as in Proposition 4.2. We set parameters at θ = 0.2, α = .2, c1 = .1
and keep the same values throughout this chapter unless otherwise stated.
When the remanufacturing cost is relatively high compared to new product
cost, as in region (i), it is not worthwhile to sell remanufactured products
as gr/fr > gn/fn. In this case, collection rate has no effect because the firm
designs a remanufacturable product with quality qM but does not remanu-
facture. As gr reduces, remanufactured product becomes more and more cost
efficient and the firm starts to sell remanufactured products to reap the ben-
efits of cost savings. Hence, the effect of collection rate starts to emerge. In
particular, the firm remanufacture a fraction of recycled units at higher col-
lection rate (as in region (ii)) and remanufactures all recycled units at lower
collection rate (as in region (iii)). In this case, the remanufactured products
are not sufficiently cost efficient, i.e., (5fr−fn)gn
f2n+(5f5−fr)fr < gr/fr < gn/fn. The
firm will not remanufacture more than γˆd∗n units of available recycled units
due to potential cannibalization. In this context, γˆ represents the percentage
threshold above which partial remanufacturing is optimal and below which
complete remanufacturing is optimal. As gr further decreases, the remanu-
factured products become sufficiently cost efficiency, i.e., gr/fr <
(5fr−fn)gn
f2n+(5f5−fr)fr
such that complete remanufacturing is always optimal.
We know from previous analysis, collection rate affects the firm’s remanu-
facturing decisions if low remanufacturing cost is coupled with low collection
rate. On one hand, low remanufacturing cost guarantees that remanufac-
tured products are more cost efficient than new products so that the firm
finds it worthwhile to sell remanufactured products. On the other hand,
low collection rate dictates that the firm cannot remanufacture more than
it would otherwise do if more recycled units were available. Given Proposi-
tion 4.2, we have the following results about the optimal product design and
product mix, as well as the associated environmental damage.
Proposition 4.4. Given that gn/fn < fn, then collection rate γ affects the
firm’s quality and quantity decisions only when gr ≤ grC(γ). Accordingly,
(i) ∂q
∗
∂γ
> 0;
(ii) ∂d
∗
n
∂γ
< 0, ∂d
∗
r
∂γ
> 0.
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Proposition 4.4 demonstrates that if remanufacturing cost is sufficiently
low (i.e., gr ≤ grC(γ)), then higher collection rate translates into higher opti-
mal quality and lower (higher) new (remanufactured) products sales volume.
In this case, the firm completely remanufactures all recycled units. When
collection rate increases, the firm can, ceteris paribus, realize more cost sav-
ing potential by doing two things. One is to increase product quality which
increases the cost saving potential for each product. The other is to re-
manufacture more used products. This increase in remanufacturing volume
intensifies cannibalization, hence the firm reduces new products sale volume
to raise the prices.
Environmentally Friendliness
Here, we compare the environmental damage associated with the optimal
profit when a non-remanufacturable product is designed (i.e., k = 0) to
that associated with the optimal profit when a remanufacturable product is
designed (i.e., k = 1). This yields the following proposition.
Proposition 4.5. Given that gr/fr < gn/fn < fn, then it is optimal for the
firm to remanufacture, and
i) ∂∆(q
∗(γ))
∂γ
< 0, if 0 ≤ γ ≤ min[γˆ, 1];
ii) ∂∆(q
∗(γ))
∂γ
= 0, otherwise.
Proposition 4.5 summarizes the effect of product collection rate on the
environmental damage. Increasing collection rate will decrease environmental
damage. This result is intuitive. We know from Proposition 4.4 that increases
in collection rate mean more bigger volume of remanufactured products and
smaller volume of new products. The corresponding strong cannibalization
reduces the environmental damage. However, this effect is true only when
collection rate is relatively low. In particular, if collection rate is higher
than the threshold γˆ, then increases in collection rate yields no effect on the
environment.
To better illustrate these results, Figure 4.6 shows the graphs of envi-
ronmental damage (∆(q∗)/∆(qT )) as a function of gr for collection rate
γ = 0.25, 0.5, 1. Notice that for a given remanufacturing cost, decreases
in γ increase the associated environmental damage, which is consistent with
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Proposition 4.4. However, we also notice that decreases in γ may have no
effect on the environment. This result occurs when remanufacturing cost is
relatively large in which case the firm would not remanufacture more than a
certain amount of recycled units regardless of the collection rate. Therefore,
it is not necessarily beneficial to the environment to collect more used units.
4.6 Environmental Design
In today’s world, more and more firms brand themselves as environmentally
friendly. They claim to be operating according to double or even triple
bottom line. Are these firms suppose to behave differently as opposed to
those who maximize profit? In this section, to provide a benchmark for
comparison, we consider the design for remanufacturing problem for two
additional types of decision makers — an environmental planner and a global
planner. In this context, we define an environmental planner’s objective to
be to maximize profit net of the associated environmental damage. That
is, we define the environmental planner as one who would adopt a double
bottom line (2BL) perspective by maximizing Φ = Π − β∆, where β > 0
is a cost coefficient to translate environmental damage into monetary terms.
Analogously, we define a global planner as one who would adopt a triple
bottom line (3BL) perspective by maximizing Θ = Π− β∆+ Ω, where Ω is
the corresponding consumer welfare. In a sense, we represent the interests of
three stakeholders: the money (Π), the people (Ω), as well as the environment
(−β∆).
Consistent with the §3, we represent the total environmental damage in
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each period with ∆ = (e1+e2)dnq, where coefficient e1 and e2 representing the
environmental impact of extracting raw materials and discarding waste. β >
0 is the coefficient that transform environmental impact to monetary term.
In a sense, βe1 and βe2 can be considered as the shadow price for extracting
raw material and discarding waste of unit quality. Let e = β(e1+ e2) denote
the corresponding marginal environmental cost in quality.
Decision makers differ from each other by assigning different weights to the
interest of each stakeholder in their objectives. In particular, the firm assigns
100% weight to profit; the environmental planner assigns equal weights (50%)
to profit and to environmental consequence; while the global planner assigns
equal weights (33%) to profit, to consumer welfare and to environmental
consequence. Here, our interests are limited to these three cases. However,
one can always explore the implications of different weights assignment. As
a case in point, a social planner assigns equal weights to profit and consumer
welfare.
In the rest of this section, we first define and then solve the design for
remanufacturing problem for the environmental planner and global planner,
respectively. Then, we compare and contrast these solutions with those of a
firm. These comparisons help us develop insights into the effects of consider-
ing multiple stakeholders on the optimal remanufacturing strategies and the
associated environmental impact.
4.6.1 Environmental Planner
If the environmental planner implements the Traditional strategy, then the
corresponding objective function is analogous to (4.3) and denoted by Φ(p, q, k) =
dn(pn−gnq2−eq), where dn is again represented by (4.1). Following the same
solution procedure as in §4.3, we obtain the corresponding the optimal qual-
ity denoted with superscript ′ is
qT ′ =
1− e
3
; dT ′n =
1− e
3
(4.7)
In order to make the Traditional strategy meaningful, namely qT ′ > 0, we
assume that e < 1, i.e., the cost of environmental damage should not be
too high. Notice that qT ′ < qT and dT ′n < d
T
n . In other other words, if a
non-remanufacturable product is designed, then the environmental planner
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always designs a lower quality and sells a smaller quantity than the firm
does. This is intuitive in the sense that environmental damage increases in
both quality and new product sales volume. Considering the environmental
damage in the objective function thus reduces the attractiveness of designing
a high quality or selling a high volume.
If the environmental planner designs a remanufacturable product, then the
corresponding profit function is analogous to (4.4) and denoted by
max
pn,pr
Φ(q) = dn(pn − gnq2 − eq) + dr(pr − grq2) (4.8)
where dn and dr are represented by (4.2). In equation (4.8), the first term
denotes the double-bottom-line contribution from selling new products and
the second term denotes the double-bottom-line contribution from selling
remanufactured products. The environmental planner hence optimize (4.8)
subject to supply constraint (4.6). Again, we develop the solution, provided
in Appendix C.1, to the environmental planner’s problem analogous to the
procedure followed in §4.3.
4.6.2 Global Planner
In this section, we analyze the problem faced by a global planner who car-
ries both social and environmental responsibilities. Here the global plan-
ner to an environmentally friendly firm is the same as social planner to a
profit-maximizing firm. The key difference is that global planner takes into
consideration of consumer welfare (Ω) in addition to firm’s profit (Π) and en-
vironmental impact (∆). The corresponding objective function for the global
planner (denoted by Θ) is Θ = Φ + Ω.
Analogous to (4.3), the global planner’s objective function, if the Tradi-
tional strategy is implemented (i.e., k = 0), is Θ(p, q) = (p−q2−eq)dn+ q−p2 dn,
where the first term (p−q2−eq)dn denotes the double-bottom-line contribu-
tion and the second term q−p
2
dn denotes the corresponding consumer welfare.
Next analogous to (4.8), the global planner’s objective function if a reman-
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ufacturable product is designed (i.e., k = 1) is
Θ(pn, pr, q) = dn(pn − gnq2 − eq) + dnfnq + fn(1− dn)q − 2pn
2
+ dr(pr − grq2) + dr fr(1− dn)q − pr
2
(4.9)
where the first two terms denote the triple-bottom-line contribution from
selling new products, and the second two terms denote the triple-bottom-
line contribution from selling remanufactured products. Following the same
solution procedure as in §4.3, we can again derive the optimal solution for
global planner, denoted with superscript ′′. Detailed solutions are listed in
Appendix C.1.
4.6.3 Discussion
Now, we compare the optimal decisions of the environmental (global) planner
to that of the firm. Then, we discussion the implications of these decisions
on environmental damage and consumer welfare.
Total Welfare
To answer the question on welfare, we compare the welfare associated with
the remanufacturing scenario (i.e., k = 1) with that associated with non-
remanufacturing scenario (i.e., k = 0) similar to our discussion for the firm in
§4.3. Let (q′, k′) denote the environmental (global) planner’s optimal design
decisions.
Proposition 4.6. Given that gn ≤ (fn−e)2(1−e)2 , then it is optimal for the envi-
ronmental (global) planner to remanufacture. Accordingly, the collection rate
affects the environmental (global) planner’s remanufacturing strategy such
that
i) If frgn
fn
(fn+2e)
(fn−e) ≤ gr ≤ 1, then it is optimal to design for remanufacturing
but not to remanufacture, and correspondingly q′ = qM ′ = fn−e
3gn
;
ii) If gr <
(fn+2e)frgn
fn(fn−e) , when γˆ
′ ≤ γ ≤ 1, then it is optimal to remanufacture
but not to exhaust all recycled units, and correspondingly q′ = qG′P ;
iii) when γ ≤ min(γˆ′, 1], then it is optimal not only to remanufacture but also
to completely remanufacture, and correspondingly q′ = qG′C =
(fn+γfr)−efr(1+γ)
3(gn+γgr)
.
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where γˆ′ and qG′P are defined in Appendix C.1.
Proposition 4.6 describes how the optimal strategy for environmental and
global planner changes in γ. Similar to Proposition 4.3, we find that col-
lection rate exhibits similar effects on the optimal remanufacturing strategy,
that is collection rate produces no effects on whether or not to remanufacture
but does affect how much to remanufacture. Note that γˆ′ → γˆ as e→ 0, that
is, the consideration of environmental damage in the decision making pro-
cess (i.e., for the environmental planner) does not fundamentally change the
structure of the optimal solution as opposed to not considering environmental
damage (i.e., for the firm).
However, changing the decision rules from single-bottom line to double- or
even triple-bottom line does make remanufacturing more likely. This effect
is demonstrated in three ways. First, it is more likely for an environmental
planner to design a remanufacturable product than it is for a firm (i.e., f 2n <
(fn−e)2
(1−e)2 ). Hence for given the same set of parameters, the environmental
planner is more likely to design for remanufacturing than is the firm. Second,
if the product is designed to be remanufacturable, then it is more likely for
an environmental planner to sell remanufactured products than it is for a
firm. Note here that the minimum remanufacturing cost above which the
decision maker will not remanufacture is higher for the environmental planner
than for the firm, i.e., (fn+2e)frgn
fn(fn−e) >
frgn
fn
. Finally, if selling remanufactured
products is attractive, then it is more likely for an environmental planner to
remanufacture all recycled units than it is for a firm. This is demonstrated
as g′rC(γ) > grC(γ) for given γ. In other words, the remanufacturing cost
threshold (minimum level of cost saving), below (above) which complete
remanufacturing is optimal, is higher (lower) for the environmental planner
than for the firm.
To better compare and contrast the impact of decision rules, Figure 4.7
establishes the optimal remanufacturing strategy space in γ and gr for dif-
ferent decision makers. The two letters in each parenthesis correspond to
the optimal strategy according to single bottom line or double-bottom line.
For instance, (P,C ′) corresponds to the case in which the firm does partial
remanufacturing while the environmental planner does complete remanufac-
turing. From Figure 4.7, we observe that the environmental planner always
implements “greener”, or at least no worse, strategic decisions than the firm
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Figure 4.7: Illustration of Optimal Remanufacturing Strategy for Different
Decision Rules
does, which is intuitive. Here, we mention two regions of interests. The first
region is (M,M ′) in which even the environmental planner designs for reman-
ufacturing but does not actually sell any remanufactured products. In this
case, the remanufacturing cost is too high (i.e., gr >
(fn+2e)frgn
fn(fn−e) ), thus it is not
worthwhile to sell remanufactured products. Notice that as consumers value
new products more (fn increases), this region expands to the left (
(fn+2e)frgn
fn(fn−e)
decreases), suggesting that the environmental planner is more likely to de-
sign but not to remanufacture. The other region is (P, P ′) in which even the
environmental planner implements partial remanufacturing. In this case, the
remanufacturing cost is moderate hence the decision makers are not willing
to implement complete remanufacturing due to the potential cannibalization.
Notice that as the environmental factor e increases, both γˆ′ and (fn+2e)frgn
fn(fn−e)
increase, or move to the right in Figure 4.7. This suggests that e, or more
specifically β, can be thought of as a possible policy lever, such as a tax
penalty for example, to push firms toward more environmentally friendly
decisions.
Comparing the optimal product design for an environmental planner and
a global planner, we have the following results on the optimal quality and
demand that maximize welfare.
Proposition 4.7. The global planner’s objective function value is always
twice that of the environmental planner, i.e., Θ(q) = 2Φ(q) for ∀q. Let q′
(q′′) and d′i (d
′′
i ) denote the optimal quality and demand for product i = n, r
that maximize the environmental (global) planner’s objective function Φ(Θ).
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Accordingly,
(i) q′ = q′′;
(ii) 2d′i = d
′′
i , i = n, r.
Proposition 4.7 characterizes the intrinsic relationship between the envi-
ronmental planner and global planner’s design for remanufacturing problem.
Most interestingly, considering consumer welfare in the decision-making pro-
cess yields no effect in the choice of optimal quality. However, the global
planner sells both products at lower prices such that the demand for each
product is doubled relative to that for the environmental planner. As a re-
sult, more consumers are enjoying surplus. In fact, the contribution from
the third bottom line, consumer welfare, equals to the contribution from the
double-bottom line, sum of profit and environmental damage, i.e., Ω(q′) =
Θ(q′)− Ω(q′).
Environmental Damage
Our previous discussion indicates that different decision rules do not fun-
damentally change the structure of the optimal solution to the design for
remanufacturing problem. Consequently, given a decision rule, higher collec-
tion rate should reduce, or at least not increase, environmental consequences
of remanufacturing. This results is exhibited in Figure 4.8 which depicts
the associated environmental damage for 1BL (∆(q∗)), 2BL (∆(q′)) and 3BL
(∆(q′′)) respectively, as compared to the environmental damage associated
with the non-remanufacturing solution (∆(qT )).
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Examining first the curve for each decision rule, we find that the environ-
mental damage first decreases and then remains constant regardless of the
decision rules. Take the environmental planner for example. If the collection
rate is low (i.e., γ ≤ γˆ′), then increases in collection rate translate to lower
environmental damage. In this case, the environmental planner remanufac-
tures all recycled units. Hence higher collection rate means more used units
are remanufactured in each period. As a result, fewer new products are sold,
and a stronger cannibalization leads to smaller environmental damage. If
the collection rate is relatively high (i.e., γ ≤ γˆ′), however, increases in col-
lection rate do not affect the environment. In this case, the environmental
planner remanufactures a fixed amount of recycled products to reduce can-
nibalization. Higher collection rate does not increase remanufacturing but
means more used units are discarded after being collected. As a result, the
environment cannot benefit from higher collection rate. Note that the set of
parameters in Figure 4.8 represents the scenario in which the environmental
factor e is not significant. Accordingly, both the firm and the environmental
planner find it optimal to implement partial remanufacturing when collection
rate is close to 100% (as region (P, P ′) in Figure 4.7).
Examining second the environmental damage for given collection rate, we
notice that 2BL always causes lower environmental damage than 1BL does.
Recall that environmental damage is a function of both quality and new
products sales volume. The environmental planner always sells a smaller
volume of products and generally designs lower quality than the firm does,
hence the associated environmental damage is lower. If a higher quality
is designed (which could occur when remanufacturing cost is moderate and
collection rate is high), then the environmental planner will sell much smaller
volume of new products. And this reducing effect from smaller new products
sales outweighs the increasing effect from high quality, thus again leading to
lower environmental damage.
However, we also observe that 3BL causes more environmental damage
than 1BL or 2BL. We know from Proposition 4.7 that the global planner
designs the same product quality as the environmental planner but sells twice
as much new products as well as remanufactured products. In this case, the
increasing effect from large volume dominates the potentially reducing effect
from lower quality. As a result, the environment is always worse-off when 3BL
is adopted as the decision rule. This again suggests that it is consumption
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rather than production that is the fundamental driver for more environmental
damage.
Consumer Welfare
Consumer welfare is defined as the difference between the utility and price
associated with purchasing a product. Accordingly, an individual consumer
derive smaller consumer welfare with lower product quality or higher price,
or both. Figure 4.9 (a) shows the consumer welfare for 1BL (Ω(q∗)), 2BL
(Ω(q′)), and 3BL (Ω(q′′)), respectively, relative to that for the Traditional
case (Ω(qT )). First, we find that as collection rate increases, consumer welfare
first decreases and then remains the same. We know from Proposition 4.4
that increases in collection rate mean higher quality, higher prices and lower
sales volumes. While the lower sales volumes mean that fewer consumers can
enjoy positive welfare, higher quality and prices mean that each consumer
can enjoy a lower consumer welfare. Hence the total consumer welfare for
the market decreases. When collection rate is higher enough, increases in
collection rate do not affect quality design nor remanufacturing decisions.
Hence, the total consumer welfare for the market remains the same.
Second, we find that 3BL leads to the highest amount of consumer welfare
followed by 1BL and 2BL. 3BL yields the highest amount of consumer wel-
fare, which is intuitive because the global planner considers consumer welfare
in the decision making process and sells products to much more consumers.
In contrast, 2BL yields the lowest amount of consumer welfare. Compared to
the global planner, the environmental planner sells products to much fewer
consumers and charges higher prices. Compared to the firm, the environ-
mental planner generally designs lower quality and sells to fewer consumers,
and both factors lead to lower consumer welfare.
Our discussion shows that higher sales volumes and the consequent higher
consumer welfare under 3BL perspective lead to higher environmental dam-
age. Then a natural follow-up question is how does 3BL perform when envi-
ronmental damage is normalized by consumer welfare. Accordingly, Figure
4.9 (b) illustrates the environmental damage associated with unit level of
surplus for 1BL (∆(q∗)/Ω(q∗)), 2BL (∆(q′)/Ω(q′)), and 3BL (∆(q′′)/Ω(q′′)),
respectively, normalized by that for the Traditional case (∆(qT )/Ω(qT )). We
notice that remanufacturing for all decision rules performs better than the
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Figure 4.9: Illustration of Consumer Welfare (θ = 0.1,α = .1; c1 = .1;
c2 = 0.2; and e = .03;)
non-remanufacturing. In particular, 2BL performs worse than 1BL when
collection rate is low and does better when collection rate is high. We know
from previous discussion that 2BL yields lower environmental damage as well
as lower consumer welfare. When collection rate is low, both the firm and the
environmental planner implement complete remanufacturing indicating the
same level of cannibalization. In addition, the environmental planner designs
a lower quality and sells smaller volume than the firm does. Consequently,
switching from 1BL to 2BL leads to a larger reduction in consumer welfare
than in environmental damage. When collection rate is high, however, the
environmental planner sells a larger volume of remanufactured products than
the firm does, which translates into stronger cannibalization. Consequently,
switching from 1BL to 2BL leads to a smaller reduction in consumer welfare
than in environmental damage. Moreover, 3BL causes the least amount of
environmental damage normalized by consumer welfare. This result is to be
expected because the global planner induces much larger consumer welfare
than the firm as well as the environmental planner.
These results have important implications for the policy makers. If the
policy makers care more about the environment, then they should minimize
the total environmental impact. This objective indicates lower product qual-
ity and lower sales volume. On the other hand, if the concern is on both the
consumers and the environment, then they should minimize the environmen-
tal damage per unit of consumer surplus. However, this objective leads to
bigger environmental impact and the environment is worse-off.
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Public Policy Instruments
From the public policy maker’s perspective, a profit-maximizing firm does
not serve the interests of the environment nor the consumers. To improve this
situation, various policy instruments can be employed. Here, we discuss two
common practices that are designed for the firm: 1) taxation on each unit
of environmental damage incurred, denoted by b, and 2) subsidy for each
used product remanufactured, denoted by s. Specifically, we study what
policy or combination of policies are necessary for the firm to behave as an
environmental planner or a global planner.
First, by setting b = β, taxation alone suffices for the firm to consider
environmental damage in its product design process. In essence, taxation
functions as additional cost to each unit of new products. This additional
cost makes the firm design lower quality and remanufacture more. However,
subsidy alone will not achieve the intended objective but drive the firm to-
wards the opposite direction. This is because subsidy, in effect, reduces the
remanufacturing cost and increases the cost saving from remanufacturing.
To a certain extent, high subsidy means smaller gr. In response, the firm
would increase the optimal quality and consequently cause more environ-
mental damage.
Second, for the firm to operate as a global planner, both taxation and
subsidy instruments are required. On one hand, imposing a tax of β on each
unit of environmental damage incurred will force the firm to behave as an
environmental planner as discussed above. On the other hand, the difference
in profit between the environmental planner and global planner, Π′(q′) −
Π′′(q′), must be compensated through subsidies. The following proposition
summarizes our discussion.
Proposition 4.8. Public policy instruments can provide incentives for a
profit-maximizing firm to behave as an environmental planner or even a global
planner. First, taxation, rather than subsidy, alone is effective to transform
the firm to an environmental planner. Second, both taxation and subsidy
are required to transform the firm to an environmental planner. Specifically,
impose a tax of b = β on each unit of environmental damage and provide a
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subsidy s for each remanufactured product, where
s =
{
(fn+frγ−e)(fn+frγ−4e)
18(gn+grγ)
, γ ≤ min[γˆ′, 1];
q′ (fn−fr−(gn−gr)q
′−e)(fn−fr−(gn−gr)q′−3e)+(fn−fr)(fr−grq′)2
2((frgn−fngr)q′+ef2) , γˆ
′ < γ ≤ 1.
where q′ is specified in Proposition 4.6.
4.7 Conclusion Remark
In this chapter, we first examine the applicability of the results in §3, and
then extend the model to study the impact of collection rate and different
decision rules on the design for remanufacturing problem.
In §4.1, we explore the value of educating consumers regarding their eval-
uations towards new and remanufactured products. We find that it is envi-
ronmentally friendly to reduce consumers’ evaluation for new products and
to improve their evaluation for remanufactured products. §§4.2-4.4 examine
the robustness of our results in §3 by relaxing our modeling assumptions
to represent a continuous remanufacturability k, a exogenous quality, and
a infinite-horizon model. The discussion suggests that our results in §3 are
quite robust. For example, if remanufacturability is continuous, then our
computational analysis demonstrates that the firm would still set the opti-
mal remanufacturability at either k∗ = 0 or k∗ = 1. If product quality is not
a decision, then the firm’s decision to design for remanufacture could still
hurt the environment when the level of remanufacturing does not bring out
strong enough cannibalization. And, if the planning horizon changes from
two periods to infinite, then the firm would slightly increases its product
quality, producing similar impact on the environment.
In §4.5, we explore the impact of collection rate to the firm’s design for
remanufacturing problem. In contrast with §3, we consider an exogenous
collection rate which introduces new tradeoffs to the problem. On the down
side, low collection rate creates a more stringent supply constraint. The cost
saving potential in used products that are not recycled cannot be realized. On
the up side, low collection rate would reduce cannibalization of new products
from remanufactured ones, which could potentially increase the profitability
of remanufacturing. Considering this new tradeoff, we use a infinite-horizon
model to study the impact of collection on the profitability and consequently
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the environmental impact of remanufacturing.
Our analysis show that collection rate does not affect whether or not to
remanufacture, but affects how much to remanufacture. As a result, when
remanufacturing is sufficiently cost efficient, increases in collection rate gen-
erally increase profitability and reduce environment consequences. Higher
collection rate translates to larger volume of remanufactured products hence
more cost savings; in the meantime, it also translates to stronger cannibaliza-
tion hence smaller volume of new products. Consequently, the environment
is better-off. However, this is not necessarily true. In particular, if remanu-
facturing cost is moderate, then there exists a threshold collection rate above
which changes in collection rate do not affect the corresponding design nor
remanufacturing decisions. This threshold provides another explanation why
it is not necessarily beneficial to invest in reverse logistics so as to improve
the collection rate.
In §4.6, we revisit the design for remanufacturing problem from the per-
spectives of different stakeholders by considering the cost of environment
damage and consumer welfare in the objective function. In doing so, we un-
derstand how the interest of one stakeholder may affect the interests of others.
Our results indicate that considering the interests of different stakeholders
does not change the structure of the optimal remanufacturing solutions but
can potentially lead to unintended outcomes. For example, considering the
environmental damage in the objective function in addition to profit will
benefit the environment due to lower quality and stronger cannibalization in
each period. Surprisingly but not unexpectedly, however, including consumer
welfare in the objective could hurt the environment even more. Although the
optimal quality design remains the same, considering consumer welfare would
double the volumes of both new and remanufactured products, thus doubling
the environmental damage. This result once again underscores our conclusion
that it is consumption rather than production that hurts the environment.
An interesting implication of our discussion on public instruments reveals
that imposing tax on each unit of environmental damage can force a decision
maker to design lower quality and to sell smaller volume of products. The
higher is this tax, the smaller is the associated environmental impact. How-
ever, subsidy may not function as effective in reducing environmental damage
as tax does. In fact, subsidy may cause the firm to design high quality which
could potentially lead to more environmental damage.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Summary and Results
In this dissertation, we study the interactions among three stakeholders—
a firm, market, and environment—in the context of product design as il-
lustrated in Figure 5.1. In the center of this triangular is the product(s)
characterized by quality, a single dimensional vertical measure. This prod-
uct offering (quality, price, and quantity) affects the interests of all three
stakeholders. The firm is characterized by its production technology, which
affects its cost structure such as variable cost (Moorthy 1984, Moorthy and
Png 1992), fixed cost (Krishnan and Zhu 2006), inventory cost (Netessine
and Taylor 2007), as well as operational constraints such as common com-
ponents (Kim and Chhajed 2000, Heese and Swaminathan 2006, Desai et al.
2001), flexibility (Shao 2007), and lead time (Chayet et al. 2011). Given this,
the firm decides product quality and price to maximize its profit, which is
denoted by the difference between revenue and cost.
The market is characterized by consumer differentiation, either horizontal
(e.g., taste of color) or vertical (r.e., valuation of quality) which in turn affects
the demand. Horizontal differentiation generally assumes exogenous quality
and studies search cost (e.g., Kuksov 2004), product positioning (e.g., Tyagi
2000), personalized pricing (e.g., Choudhary et al. 2005, Liu and Zhang 2006),
and customization (e.g., Dewan et al 2003, Syam et al 2005). In contrast,
vertical differentiation generally considers endogenous quality and studies
topics such as segmentation (e.g., Moorthy 1984, Moorthy and Png 1992,
Desai 2001), valuation change (e.g., Kim and Chhajed 2000). Given this
differentiation and product offering, consumers purchase the product which
maximizes their non-negative surplus, which is denoted by the difference
between utility and price.
Compared to the firm and the market, the environment makes no deci-
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Figure 5.1: Stakeholder Triangular
sions but suffers the potential consequences. In this dissertation, we charac-
terize the environment from two perspectives, resource extraction and waste
disposal, which both work against the environment. Given this, the envi-
ronment’s interest is to minimize the environmental consequences associated
with decisions made by the firm and consumers.
In the first essay (§2), we consider the interaction between the firm and
the market, and investigate the effect of back-end operational constraint such
as limited capacity on the firm’s optimal product line design decision. The
firm serves a segmented market characterized by two consumer segments that
differ in valuation and size. Its product line design affects both production
cost and capacity consumption. On the cost side, product quality quadrati-
cally increases variable cost indicating an increasing cost to quality, which is
consistent with existing literature (e.g., Moorthy and Png 1992, Desai 2001).
On the capacity side, the length of product line determines the fixed setup
capacity such that offering two products requires b more units of capacity to
setup than offering a single product does. Meanwhile, variable capacity con-
sumption linearly increases in product quality, indicating a constant capacity
to quality ratio.
Given this modeling context, we find that operational constraints such
as limited capacity can introduce cannibalization from the operations side.
This operations cannibalization, which increases as the corresponding re-
source decreases, is as opposed to the market cannibalization introduced by
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heterogeneity in consumer valuations. While both types of cannibalization
reduce the length of a product line (r.e., the number of product types), the
exact type of cannibalization exhibits quite different effects on the firm’s
product line design decisions. For example, market cannibalization distorts
the quality of the low-quality product, increasing the width of the product
line (r.e., the quality differentiation between two products). In contrast,
operations cannibalization reduces the quality of each product and, if two
products are offered, it does so by maintaining a constant width of product
line. Another result is that limited capacity can potentially make it optimal
to offer a standard product for the whole market. When capacity is limited,
how the firm consumes capacity matters. In particular, if a longer product
line requires larger setup capacity (higher cost of variety), then offering a
standard product results in lower unit capacity requirement due to economy
of scale. To a certain extent, operations constraints can be interpreted as ad-
ditional shadow costs to the objective function. If these factors bring about
economy of scale, then they would produce similar effects on the optimal
product line strategy, making standardization potentially optimal. As cases
in point, consider the inventory cost in Netessine and Taylor (2007) and the
fixed cost in Krishnan and Zhu (2006).
In the second essay (§3), we again explore the dynamics between the
firm and the market but focus on remanufacturing and its environmental
consequences in the context product design. Specifically, the firm’s design
choices—remanufacturability and quality—affect both the production costs
and the consumer valuations associated with each type of product. Given
this, we investigate the environmental consequences of remanufacturing by
measuring environmental damage as a function of both quality and quantity.
We find that consumer greenness and production cost efficiency generally
lead to a more profitable firm, which is consistent with the remanufacturing
literature (e.g., Debo et al. 2005). But, our results also indicate that higher
profitability does not necessarily translate into more environmentally friendli-
ness. Moreover, consumer preferences and production technology potentially
affect the environment differently than they do the profit.
In our model, we differentiate consumers’ valuations for remanufacturable
products from those for remanufactured ones. This differentiation enables
us to pinpoint the essential characteristics of what makes green consumers
“green”. Specifically, we find that if green consumers overvalue the idea
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that a product can be remanufactured relative to how much they value a
product that has been remanufactured, then the firm will not remanufacture
enough used products so as to achieve the required level of cannibalization
to benefit the environment. Consequently, under such circumstances, green
consumerism may even translate into increased damage on the environment.
In a related vein, we find that although production cost efficiencies translate
into healthier bottom lines, they also translate into higher quality products
that, in turn, translate into increased damage on the environment.
As an extension to the second essay, the third essay (§4) explores the effect
of an exogenous collection rate on the optimal design for remanufacturabil-
ity and its impact on the environment. We find that, only a fraction of used
products are collected at the end of each period, new challenges are imposed
on the design for remanufacturability problem. On the one hand, a low col-
lection rate means that the cost saving potential in used products that are
not collected cannot be realized, hence reducing the profitability of reman-
ufacturing. On the other hand, a low collection rate creates a more strin-
gent supply of used products, hence fewer products can be remanufactured.
This reduces the cannibalization of new products from remanufactured ones,
which could potentially increase the profitability of remanufacturing. Given
this trade-off, our results confirm that an increase in the collection rate gen-
erally benefits both the firm and the environment. A higher collection rate
translates into a larger sales volume of remanufactured products and, hence,
a higher profit; it also translates into stronger cannibalization thus reducing
the sales volume of new products, which, in turn, translates into lower envi-
ronmental damage. However, there exists a threshold above which increases
in collection rate produce no effects on either profit or environmental impact.
Also in §4, we compare and contrast the firm’s optimal design for remanu-
facturability results to those that would maximize social and environmental
welfare. We find that, when compared to the social and environmental plan-
ner’s optimum, the firm over produces in the sense that it increases both
product quality and sales volume.
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5.2 Future Research
Like any other modeling research, our results rely on the modeling assump-
tions we have made. The most essential assumption is that quality can be
defined as a single dimensional vertical measure that represents all more-is-
better attributes of a product. Other assumptions are important to derive
analytical results, but they are not critical to the insights. For example in
§2, we assume that the firm consumes capacity in both fixed and variable
ways. While the fixed capacity consumption is essential for offering a stan-
dard product to be optimal, it does not alter the overall effect of limited
capacity. Similarly, the implications of capacity remain fundamentally the
same as long as variable capacity consumption increases in quality faster
than it does in quantity. For another example, in §§3–4, we assume that en-
vironmental damage associated with a product increases linearly in quality.
Our discussions show that our results hold as long as environmental damage
is defined to be a non-decreasing function of quality.
However, considering some other factors in our model could potentially
change our results. Here, we discuss two major directions for future re-
search. First, this dissertation assumes that environmental damage is mainly
reflected by resource extraction and waste disposition. Consumption, how-
ever, may also be a major contributor to the environmental damage during
a product’s life cycle. Considering consumption could lead to two complica-
tions. On the one hand, higher quality could potentially decrease the associ-
ated environmental damage during consumption due to better technology or
higher efficiency (i.e., Subramanian et al. 2009). On the other hand, reman-
ufactured products will contribute to the environmental damage measure. If
such a during-use environmental effect were incorporated into our modeling
context, then an additional term would be required to represent the amount
of environmental damage incurred during use, which could potentially al-
ter the relationship between quality and environmental impact. Therefore,
exploration of such an effect constitutes a viable direction for future research.
Second, this dissertation explores the product design problem faced by a
monopoly firm, and provides a picture of how operational issues affect the
monopolist’s product design decisions and how these decisions interact with
the environment. Another interesting factor that we have not yet considered
is competition. Especially in the remanufacturing industry, a firm may face
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competition from a third-party remanufacturer who intercepts and reman-
ufactures a fraction of used products and sells remanufactured products to
the same market (e.g., Majumder and Groenevelt 2001). It may also face
competition from another manufacturer who competes with new rather than
remanufactured products (Atasu et al. 2008). In these cases, the firm may
want to thwart a competitor by designing a non-remanufacturable product
or, if the product is designed to be remanufacturable, by remanufacturing
more used products. Although related literature has studied competition in
various settings, the effect of endogenous quality has not yet been examined.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 2
Due to the similarities between single product models, we prove Lemma 2.1
and Proposition 2.1 for the Niche strategy.
Proof of Lemma 2.1. The lagrange function corresponding to (3.3) is
max
x,q
L = x(qvh − cq2) + λ(K − axq) + µ(nh − x) (A.1)
The KKT conditions are
∂L
∂q
= x(vh − aλ− 2cq)
∂L
∂x
= q(vh − aλ− cq)− µ
And the corresponding solutions are
q =
(vh − aλ)
2c
;
To prove Lemma 2.1, we first discuss the quantity condition. If µ > 0, then
complementary condition dictates x = nh. If µ = 0, then
∂L
∂q
= (vh−aλ)
2
4c
> 0.
Thus, the firm should product as much as possible, or x = nh.
Now we discuss the capacity condition. If λ > 0, then K = anhq =
anh(vh−aλ)
2c
< anhvh
2c
. If λ = 0, then K ≥ anhq = anhvh2c . Thus, the capacity
constraint is binding when K ≤ anhvh
2c
.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. From Lemma 2.1, we know that for the Niche
strategy, x∗ = nh. If K ≤ KN , then capacity constraint is binding. In other
words, q∗ = K
anh
. If K > KN , q∗ = vh
2c
. Similarly, for the Standard strategy,
x∗ = (nh + nl), q∗ = Ka(nh+nl) if K ≤ KS and q∗ =
vl
2c
if K > KS.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. To prove our results, we again use lagrangian method.
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The lagrange function corresponding to (2.14) is
L(xh, xl, qh, ql) = xh(qhvh − cq2h − ql(vh − vl)) + xl(vlql − cq2l ) (A.2)
+ λ(K − b− a(xhqh + xlql)) + µh(nh − xh) + µl(nh + nl − xh − xl)
where λ, µh and µl are lagrangian coefficients for conditions (2.13), (2.3),
and (2.6) respectively. The corresponding KKT conditions are
∂L
∂qh
= xh(vh − aλ− 2cqh) = 0
∂L
∂ql
= xl(vl − aλ− 2cql)− xh(vh − vl) = 0
∂L
∂xh
= qh(vh − aλ− cqh)− ql(vh − vl)− µh − µl = 0
∂L
∂xl
= ql(vl − aλ− cql)− µl = 0
From the KKT conditions, we have
qh =
(vh − aλ)
2c
; ql =
vl − aλ
2c
− xh(vh − vl)
2cxl
First, we prove that quantity condition (2.6) is always binding. We consider
two cases: If µl > 0, then this is true due to complementary slackness. If
µl = 0, then
∂L
∂xl
= 1
4c
((vl− aλ)2− x2h(vh− vl)2/x2l ) > 0 because the Product-
Line strategy dictates ql =
vl−aλ
2c
− xh(vh−vl)
2cxl
> 0. Thus, condition (2.6) is
always binding.
Now, we consider quantity condition (2.3). From previous proof, we know
that µl =
1
4c
((vl−aλ)2−x2h(vh−vl)2/x2l ) > 0. Hence, ∂L∂xh = (qh−ql)(
(vh−vl)
2
+
xh(vh−vl)
2xl
− µh. We again consider two cases: if µh > 0, then condition (2.3)
is binding due to complementary slackness. If µh = 0, then
∂L
∂xh
> 0, thus
condition (2.3) is binding.
Now we prove that capacity constraint (2.13) is binding. If λ > 0, then
K = b+ a(nh
(vh − aλ)
2c
+ nl(
vl − aλ
2c
− nh(vh − vl)
2cnl
))
= b+
a(nh + nl)
2c
(vl − aλ)
⇐⇒ 0 ≤ aλ = b+ a(nh + nl)vl
2c
−K
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Thus, (2.13) is binding if K < b+ a(nh+nl)vl
2c
.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. From Lemma 2.2, we know that at optimality
x∗h = nh, x
∗
l = nl, and λ = b/a +
(nh+nl)vl
2c
. Correspondingly, the optimal
qualities are
q∗h =
(K − b)
a(nh + nl)
+
(vh − vl)
2c
; q∗l =
(K − b)
a(nh + nl)
− nh(vh − vl)
2cnl
.
q∗l > 0 requires K > K
L = K¯ −KS(1−R).
Proof of Proposition 2.3. We prove this proposition by comparing the
profit associated with each strategy. First, we compare the profits of niche
and standard strategies. From Proposition 2.1, we know that profit function
ΠN(K) and ΠN(K) are both defined on two domains, and KN ≥ KS requires
vh ≥ (nh+nl)nh vl. Hence, we consider four cases based on the available capacity
K. Case 1: If K > max[KN , KS], then, ΠN(K)−ΠS(K) = nhv2h
4c
− (nh+nl)v2l
4c
≥
0 which requires vh ≥
√
(nh+nl)
nh
vl. Case 2: If K < min[K
N , KS], then
ΠN(K)− ΠS(K) = K(anhvh − cK)
a2nh
− K(a(nh + nl)vl − cK)
a2(nh + nl)
≥ 0
⇒ K ≥ 2RKS
For this case to be valid, we have vh ≤ vnsh = 2(nh+nl)vl(2nh+nl) . Case 3: If KN <
K ≤ KS, then ΠN(K) − ΠS(K) = nhv2h
4c
− K(a(nh+nl)vl−cK)
a2(nh+nl)
≥ 0 requires
K < KS(1 −
√
1− nhv2h
(nh+nl)v
2
l
). For this case to be valid, we again have
vnsh < vh ≤
√
(nh+nl)
nh
vl. Case 4: If K
S < K ≤ KN , then ΠN(K) ≥ ΠS(K) is
always true. Correspondingly, we define the isoprofit line Kns such that the
Standard strategy is more profitable when K > Kns.
Kns =
 2RK
S, vh ≤ vnsh ;
KS(1−
√
1− nhv2h
(nh+nl)v
2
l
), vnsh < vh <
√
(nh+nl)
nh
vl;
Second, we compare the profit of Product-Line strategy with that of the
Standard strategy. We consider two cases. Case 1: IfK < KS, then ΠL(K)−
ΠS(K) =
nhv
2
h
4c
+
nlv
2
l
4c
(1− R)− c(K¯−K)2
a2(nh+nl)
− K(a(nh+nl)vl−cK)
a2(nh+nl)
≥ 0 requires K ≥
K¯ − a2nh(nh+nl)2(vh−vl)2+4b2c2nl
8bc2nl
. For this case to be valid, we need vh > v
S
h =
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vl(1 +
b
√
nl
KS
√
nh
). Case 2: If KS < K < K¯, then ΠL(K) − ΠS(K) = nhv2h
4c
+
nlv
2
l
4c
(1−R)− c(K¯−K)2
a2(nh+nl)
− (nh+nl)v2l
4c
≥ 0 requires K ≥ K¯−KS (vh−vl)
√
nh
vl
√
nl
. For this
case to be valid, we need vh ≤ vSh . Correspondingly, we define the isoprofit
line Ksl such that the Product-Line is more profitable when K > Ksl.
Ksl =
 K¯ −
RKS
√
nl√
nh
, vh ≤ vl + 2bc
√
nl/nh
a(nh+nl)
;
K¯ − ( b
2
+ nl(RK
S)2
2bnh
), vl +
2bc
√
nl/nh
a(nh+nl)
< vh ≤ (nh+nl)vlnh ;
Third, we compare the profit of Product-Line strategy with that of the
Niche strategy. We again consider two cases. Case 1: If K < KN , then
ΠL(K) − ΠN(K) = nlv2l
4c
(1 − R) − c(K¯−K)2
a2(nh+nl)
+ c(K
N−K)2
a2nh
≥ 0 requires K ≥
RKS− bnh
nl
(1+
√
(nh+nl)
nh
+KS(1−R) 2nl
bnh
). Correspondingly, we require vh ≤
vNh =
(nh+nl)vl
nh
− 2bc(nl−
√
(nh+nl)nl)
an2h
. Case 2: If K > KN , then then ΠL(K) −
ΠN(K) =
nlv
2
l
4c
(1−R)− c(K¯−K)2
a2(nh+nl)
≥ 0 requires K ≥ K¯ −KS(1−R)
√
nl√
(nh+nl)
.
For this case to be valid, we need vNh < vh ≤ (nh+nl)vlnh . Corresponding, we
define the isoprofit line Knl such that the Product-Line is more profitable
when K > Knl.
Knl =
 K
SR− bnh
nl
(1 +
√
(nh+nl)
nh
+KS(1−R) 2nl
bnh
) vh ≤ vNh ;
K¯ −KS(1−R)
√
nl√
(nh+nl)
, vNh < vh ≤ (nh+nl)vlnh ;
Therefore, offering two products is optimal when K > maxKsl, Knl, offering
a niche product is optimal when K ≤ minKns, Knl, and offering a standard
is optimal when Kns < K < Ksl.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. To prove the first part, it suffices to show that
Kns < K < Ksl when vl ≤ vh < v̂h. From Proposition 2.3, we know
that Kns increases in vh and K
sl decreases in vh. Then it suffices to show
that Kns = Ksl at v̂h, which is true by definition. To identify v̂h, we first
show that vSh ≤ v̂h by contradiction. Assume vSh > v̂h. Then Kns(vSh ) <
Kns(v̂h) = K
ns(v̂h) <= K
nsvSh which is impossible. Therefore, v
S
h ≤ v̂h
is always true. For given setup capacity b, if v̂h ≤ vnsh , then Kns = Ksl
implies that v̂h = vl +
2bvl
KS
(−1 +
√
1 + nl
4nh
(1 + 2K
S
b
)). This requires b ≤
b̂ = KS
(
√
nl(nl+nh)−nl)
2nh+nl
. If v̂h > v
ns
h , then K
ns = Ksl implies that v̂h =
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vl +
bvl
KS
√
nl
(nh+nl)
(−1 +
√
nl
nh
(−1 + 2KS
b
√
(nh+nl)
nl
)). This requires that b > b̂.
To prove the second part, it suffices to show that max[Ksl, Knl] ≥ K̂.
From the proof for Proposition 2.3, we know that Ksl decreases in vh. Hence
for any vh ≤ v̂h, we have Ksl(vh) ≥ Ksl(v̂h) which equals to K̂ by definition.
Similarly, we know that Knl increases in vh. Hence for any v̂h < vh ≤ nh+nlnh vl,
we have Knl(vh) ≥ Ksl(v̂h) which equals to K̂ by definition.
Proof of Proposition 2.5. Now we prove that offering a standard product
strategy is optimal only when b ≥ β1. It suffice to show that for given
valuation vh, it satisfies vh ≤ v̂h when b ≥ β1. Consider two cases: If vh ≤ vnsh ,
then vh ≤ v̂h implies b ≥ β1 = KS(1− 2R)
(√
1 + nlR
2
nh(1−2R)2 − 1
)
. If If vh ≤
vnsh , then vh ≤ v̂h implies b ≥ β1 = KS
√
nl√
(nh+nl)
(
1−R−
√
1−R (vh+vl)
vl
)
.
Proof of Proposition 2.6. To prove that the firm idles capacity before
switching its optimal strategy, we show that the iso-profit capacity level Knl
and Kns are higher than KN , and that Ksl is higher than KS. We consider
three cases based on vh. First, assume
2(nh+nl)vl
(2nh+nl)
< vh <
√
(nh+nl)
nh
vl. If setup
capacity for offering two products b ≤ β1, then the optimal strategy is either
Niche or Product-Line. Idling capacity means Knl > KN , which implies
that b > β2 =
anlvl(
√
(nh+nl)/nl−1)
2c
(1 − R). If setup capacity for offering two
products b > β1, then the optimal strategy changes from Niche to Standard
and to Product-Line as capacity increases. For the firm to idle capacity
before switching from Niche to Standard strategy, we need Kns > KN which
is always true as vh >
2(nh+nl)vl
(2nh+nl)
. For the firm to idle before switching from
Standard to Product-Line, we need Ksl > KS which implies that b > β3.
Second, assume vh ≤ 2(nh+nl)vl(2nh+nl) . We have Kns ≤ KN which indicates no
capacity idling when the optimal strategy switches from Niche to Standard.
Capacity idling occurs only when the optimal strategy switches from Stan-
dard to Product-Line. This requires Ksl > KS which is true when setup
capacity is large enough, b > β3.
Third, assume vh ≥
√
(nh+nl)
nh
vl. Standard strategy is always dominated
by Niche strategy. Capacity idling occurs only when the optimal strategy
switches from Niche to Product-Line. This requires Knl > KN which is true
when b > β2.
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Proof of Proposition 2.7. When β2 < b ≤ β1 or b > β3, the firm idles
capacity before switching from offering a single product to offering a product
line. Given this, it is easy to verify that KN + b > Knl and KS + b > Ksl.
When b > β1, the firm idles capacity before switching from offering a niche
product to offering a standard product. Given this, it is easy to verify that
KN + b = KN + β1 > K
nl(β1) = K
ns.
Proof of Proposition 2.8. First, for the high segment. As of Propositions
2.1 and 2.2, q∗h ≤ vh2c = quh is always true. Next, for the low segment. q∗l > qul =
vl
2c
(1−R) can only be true when offering a standard product is optimal, which
means, as of Proposition 2.3, K < Ksl. In this case, q∗l =
K
a(nh+nl)
> vl
2c
(1−R)
requires K > KS(1−R). Thus, we conclude the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.9. First, for the high segment. As of Propositions
2.1 and 2.2, p∗h > q
u
h can only be true when offering a niche product is
optimal, which means, as of Proposition 2.3, K < max[Kns, Knl]. In this
case, p∗h =
vhK
anh
>
v2h
2c
− (vh − vl) vl2c(1 − R) = puh requires K > (nlKSR2 +
nhK
N) vl
nhvh
. Thus the high segment receives a higher price under limited
capacity if (nlK
SR2 + nhK
N) vl
nhvh
< K < max[Kns, Knl].
Next, for the low segment. p∗l > p
u
l is equivalent to q
∗
l > q
u
l which, from
Proposition 2.9, requires KS(1 − R) < K < Ksl. Thus, we conclude the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.10. CWh > CW
u
h is equivalent to q
∗
l > q
u
l which,
from Proposition 2.9, requires KS(1 − R) < K < Ksl. For this to be valid,
we need vh < vl +
2bc(
√
1+nl/nh−1)
a(nh+nl)
.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 3
As building blocks for proving Propositions 3.2–3.8, we first establish three
lemmas. The proofs of Lemmas B.1 and B.2 are combined and follow the
statement of Lemma B.2. The proof of Lemma B.3 directly follows its state-
ment. For Lemmas B.1–B.3, let pGij(q), d
G
ij(q) denote the optimal Green strat-
egy price and corresponding demand as a function of q for product i = n, r in
stage j = 1, 2, respectively. Moreover, let q1 =
fnfr(fn−fr)
f2n(gn−gr)−(fn−fr)2gn denote the
quality threshold above which dGr2(q) = d
G
n1(q), q2 =
(f2n−f2r )
fngn−frgr denote the qual-
ity threshold above which dGr2(q) = d
G
n1(q) and d
G
n2(q) = 0, and q3 =
(fn+fr)
(gn+gr)
denote the quality threshold above which dGr2(q) = d
G
n1(q) = d
G
n2(q) = 0.
Lemma B.1. If k = 1, then for given q < q3, dr2(q) > 0 if and only if
gr/fr < gn/fn.
Lemma B.2. If k = 1 and gr/fr < gn/fn, then q
G∗ < q3 and, for i = n, r
and j = 1, 2, pGij(q), d
G
ij(q) are as follows:
(i) for 0 < q < q1,
dGn1(q) =
fn − gnq
2fn
; dGn2(q) =
fn − fr − (gn − gr)q
2(fn − fr) ;
dGr2(q) =
(frgn − fngr)q
2fr(fn − fr) ;
pGn1(q) = p
G
n2(q) =
(fn + gnq)q
2
; pGr2(q) =
q(fr + grq)
2
; (B.1)
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(ii) for q1 ≤ q < q2,
dGn1(q) = d
G
r2(q) =
fn(fn − gnq) + (frgn − fngr)q
2(f 2n + fr(fn − fr))
;
dGn2(q) =
fn(fn − gnq)− fr(fr − grq)
2(f 2n + fr(fn − fr))
;
pGn1(q) =
(fn(fn + gnq) + 2fr(fn − fr)− (frgn − fngr)q)fnq
2(f 2n + fr(fn − fr))
;
pGn2(q) =
(fn + gnq)q
2
;
pGr2(q) =
(fn(fn + gnq)− (fn − fr)(fn − fr − (gn + gr)q))frq
2(f 2n + fr(fn − fr))
(B.2)
(iii) for q2 ≤ q < q3,
dGn1(q) = d
G
r2(q) =
fn + fr − (gn + gr)q
2(fn + fr)
; dGn2(q) = 0;
pGn1(q) =
fn
fr
pGr2(q) =
fnq(fn + fr + (gn + gr)q)
2(fn + fr)
; pGn2(q) = p
G
r2(q) + (fn − fr)q
(B.3)
Proof of Lemmas B.1–B.2: Here we prove our results using the lagrangian
method. The corresponding lagrangean of profit (3.6) for given q is
L(pn1, pn2, pr2) = (pn1 − gnq2 + λ)
(
1− pn1
fnq
)
+
(
1− pn2 − pr2
(fn − fr)q
)
(pn2 − gnq2 + µ)
+
(
pn2 − pr2
(fn − fr)q −
pr2
frq
)
(pr2 − grq2 − λ+ η)
where λ, µ and η are lagrangian coefficients for conditions dr2 ≤ dn1, dn2 ≥ 0,
and dr2 ≥ 0 respectively. The corresponding KKT conditions are
∂L
∂pn1
= 1− pn1
fnq
− (pn1 − gnq
2 − λ)
fnq
= 0
∂L
∂pn2
= 1− pn2 − pr2
(fn − fr)q −
(pn2 − gnq2 + µ)
(fn − fr)q +
(pr2 − grq2 − λ+ η)
(fn − fr)q = 0
∂L
∂pr2
=
(pn2 − gnq2 + µ)
(fn − fr)q +
pn2 − pr2
(fn − fr)q −
pr2
frq
− fn(pr2 − grq
2 − λ+ η)
fr(fn − fr)q = 0
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as well as the corresponding orthogonal conditions. The corresponding solu-
tions are
pn1(q) =
(fn + gnq)q − λ
2
; dn1(q) =
(fn − gnq)q + λ
2fnq
;
pn2(q) =
(fn + gnq)q − µ
2
; dn2(q) =
(fn − fr)q − (gn − gr)q2 + µ+ λ− η
2(fn − fr)q ;
pr2(q) =
(fr + grq)q + λ− η
2
; dr2(q) =
(frgn − fngr)q2 − fnλ− frµ+ fnη
2fr(fn − fr)q
To prove Lemma B.1, we first prove sufficient and then necessary condi-
tions. To that end, we first assume dr2(q) > 0 which implies η = 0. Thus
0 < dr2(q) =
(frgn − fngr)q2 − fnλ− frµ
2fr(fn − fr)q ⇒ frgn − fngr >
fnλ+ frµ
q2
≥ 0
which completes the sufficient condition.
Next, assume frgn > fngr, which implies q1 <
(fn−fr)
(gn−gr) < q2 <
fn
gn
< q3.
We consider four cases based on the multipliers λ and µ: (1) if λ = µ = 0,
then dr2(q) >
fnη
2fr(fn−fr)q ≥ 0; (2) λ = 0 and µ > 0, then dn2(q) = 0, which
implies dr2(q) ≥ (fr−grq)2fr >
(fn−gnq)
2fn
= dn1(q) ≥ 0; (3) if λ > 0 and µ = 0,
then dn1(q) = dr2(q), which implies η =
((frgn−fngr)fn+frgn(fn−fr))q
f2n
(q1 − q) +
λ(f2n+fn(fn−fr))
f2n
. Hence, dn2(q) ≥ 0 implies 0 < λ ≤ (fn − fr)(fn − gnq)q, or
(fn − gnq) > 0. Thus, dn1(q) = dr2(q) > (fn−gnq)2fn > 0; (4) if λ > 0 and µ > 0,
then
0 < λ =
(frgn − fngr)q2 + fnη
(fn + fr)
; 0 < µ =
q(fngn − frgr)(q − q2) + frη
(fn + fr)
and, consequently, dn1(q) = dr2(q) =
(gn+gr)q(q3−q)+η
2(fn+fr)
> 0, thereby completing
the proof of Lemma B.1.
To prove Lemma B.2, note that dr2(q) > 0 (by definition); thus, η = 0 and
frgn > fngr (by Lemma B.1). Accordingly,
0 ≤ dn1(q)− dr2(q) = q1 − q
2q1
+
(f 2n + fnfr − f 2r )λ
2fnfr(fn − fr)q +
µ
2(fn − fr)q (B.4)
Notice from (B.4) that dn1(q) − dr2(q) is decreasing in q. There are four
possibilities. Case I: If 0 < q < q1, then q <
fn−fr
gn−gr <
fn
gn
. Accordingly,
dn1(q) − dr2(q) > (f2n+fnfr−f2r )λ2fnfr(fn−fr)q +
µ
2(fn−fr)q ≥ 0, and dn2(q) >
µ+λ
2(fn−fr)q ≥ 0.
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These inequalities imply that λ = 0 and µ = 0, respectively. Thus, the KKT
conditions above directly imply (B.1).
Case II: If q1 ≤ q < q2, then
λ =
2fnfr(fn − fr)q
(f 2n + fr(fn − fr))
(dn1(q)− dr2(q) + q − q1
2q1
)− fnfrµ
f 2n + fr(fn − fr)
,
⇒ dn2(q) = fnfr(dn1(q)− dr2(q))
(f 2n + fr(fn − fr))
+
(fngn − frgr)(q2 − q)
2(f 2n + fr(fn − fr))
+
(fn + fr)µ
2(f 2n + fr(fn − fr))q
>
(fn + fr)µ
2(f 2n + fr(fn − fr))q
≥ 0
Thus, µ = 0 and correspondingly, λ = 2fnfr(fn−fr)q
(f2n+fr(fn−fr))(dn1(q) − dr2(q) +
q−q1
2q1
).
Notice that if dn1(q) > dr2(q), then λ > 0 which is a contradiction. There-
fore, dn1(q) = dr2(q) and λ =
2fnfr(fn−fr)q
(f2n+fr(fn−fr))
q−q1
2q1
. Correspondingly, the KKT
conditions above directly imply (B.2).
Case III: If q2 ≤ q < q3, then q > fn−frgn−gr . Assume λ = 0. If λ = 0, then on the
one hand, (B.4) becomes 0 ≤ dn1(q)−dr2(q) = q1−q2q1 +
µ
2(fn−fr)q , which implies
µ > 0. But if λ = 0, then on the other hand, dn2(q) =
(gn−gr)
2(fn−fr)
(
fn−fr
gn−gr − q
)
+
µ
2(fn−fr)q > 0 which, in turn, implies µ = 0, a contradiction. Thus λ > 0,
which implies dn1(q) = dr2(q). Correspondingly,
0 < λ =
fnfr(fn − fr)q
(f 2n + fr(fn − fr))
(q − q1)
q1
− fnfrµ
f 2n + fr(fn − fr)
µ =
2(f 2n + fr(fn − fr))qdn2(q) + (fngn − frgr)(q − q2)q
(fn + fr)
Notice that if dn2(q) > 0, then µ > 0, a contradiction. Therefore, dn2(q) = 0,
and thus, µ = (fngn−frgr)(q−q2)q
fn+fr
> 0. Correspondingly, the KKT conditions
above directly imply (B.3).
Case IV: If q ≥ q3, then q > fngn . Accordingly, 0 ≤ dn1(q) < λ2fnq . This
implies that λ > 0 and dn1(q) = dr2(q). Similar to Case III, we also have
µ > 0. Thus the KKT conditions again reduce to (B.3). But notice that,
given (B.3), q ≥ q3 implies that dn1(q) = dn2(q) = dr2(q) = 0. Thus,
qG∗ < q3.
Lemma B.3. If k = 1 and gr/fr < gn/fn, then Π
G(q) is unimodal in q over
q ∈ [0, q3).
Proof of Lemma B.3: From Lemma B.2 and equation (3.6), ΠG(q) re-
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duces to
ΠG(q) =

ΠP (q) =
2q(fn−gnq)2
4fn
+ (frgn−fngr)
2q3
4fnfr(fn−fr) q < q1
ΠC(q) =
(fn−gnq)2q
4fn
+ q(fn(fn−gnq)+(frgn−fngr)q)
2
4fn(f2n+fr(fn−fr)) q1 ≤ q < q2
ΠS(q) =
q(fn+fr−(gn+gr)q)2
4(fn+fr)
q2 ≤ q < q3
(B.5)
To prove Lemma B.3, we first establish that ΠG(q) is continuous and dif-
ferentiable over [0, q3). Then Π
G(q) is unimodal over q ∈ [0, q3) if Πi(q) for
i = P,C, S is such that ΠP (q) is unimodal over (0, q1), ΠC(q) is unimodal
over [q1, q2), and ΠS(q) is unimodal over [q2, q3).
Accordingly, first we prove continuity and differentiability.
lim
q→q−1
ΠG(q) = lim
q→q+1
ΠG(q) =
f 2nfr(frgn − fngr)2(2fn − fr)(f 2n − f 2r )
4(f 2n(gn − gr)− (fn − fr)2gn)3
lim
q→q−2
ΠG(q) = lim
q→q+2
ΠG(q) =
fn(fn − fr)(fn + fr)2(frgn − fngr)2
4(fngn − frgr)3
and
lim
q→q−1
∂ΠG(q)
∂q
= lim
q→q−1
∂ΠG(q)
∂q
=
3fnfr(fn − fr)(frgn − fngr)2
4(f 2n(gn − gr)− (fn − fr)2gn)2
+
f 2n(fngr(f
2
ngr − f 2r gn)− f 2r gn(fn(gn + gr)− 2frgn))
2(f 2n(gn − gr)− (fn − fr)2gn)2
lim
q→q−2
∂ΠG(q)
∂q
= lim
q→q+2
∂ΠG(q)
∂q
=
(fn + fr) (3(frgn − fngr)2 + 2gngr(fn − fr)2 − 2fnfr(gn − gr)2)
4(fngn − frgr)2
Next, we establish that ΠP (q) is unimodal over (0, q1). To that end, we
define the following notations:
γ =
fr
fn
; β =
gr
gn
; ai = i+
(γ − β)i
γ(1− γ) > i;⇒ a
′
i = −
i(γ − β)i−1
γ(1− γ) , i = 1, 2
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Accordingly, we have q1 =
fn
gn
γ(1−γ)
γ(1−γ)+γ−β , which implies
fn
gn
= a1q1.
ΠP (q) ∝ 2f
2
n
g2n
q − 4fn
gn
q2 + q3a2
⇒ ∂ΠP (q)
∂q
∝ 2f
2
n
g2n
− 8fn
gn
q + 3a2q
2 = 3a2(q − qˆ−)(q − qˆ+)
where qˆ± = a1(4±
√
16−6a2)
3a2
q1. Notice, if 3a2 ≥ 8, then ∂ΠP (q)∂q > 0 over [0, q1),
in which case ΠP (q) is unimodal. Thus, consider if 3a2 < 8. Let H =√
16− 6a2, and qˆ− = a1(4−H)3a2 q1 < qˆ+ =
a1(4+H)
3a2
q1. Then to show that ΠP (q)
is unimodal, it suffices to show that qˆ+ ≥ q1. To that end, if qˆ− ≥ q1, then
qˆ+ > qˆ− ≥ q1. Otherwise, if qˆ− < q1, then H > 4a1−3a2a1 , or β > γ
(3γ−1)(2−γ)
2+3γ(1−γ) .
In this case, we have qˆ+ ≥ q1 ⇐⇒ K(β) = a1a2 4+H3 ≥ 1. Thus, to complete
the proof that ΠP (q) is unimodal, it suffices to show that minK(β) ≥ 1.
We consider two cases. First, if 4a1 ≥ 3a2, then K(β) ≥ 4a13a2 ≥ 1. Next, if
4a1 < 3a2, then it suffices to show that (1) K(β) is unimodal in β, and (2)
min[K(βmax), K(βmin)] ≥ 1. To that end, we establish (2) first: K(βmax) =
K(γ) = 1; if γ ≥ 1/3, then K(βmin) = K(γ (3γ−1)(2−γ)2+3γ(1−γ) ) = 1; and if γ < 1/3,
then
K(βmin) = K(0) ≥ 1⇐⇒ lim
β→0
H2 ≥ lim
β→0
(
3a2
a1
− 4)2
⇐⇒ lim
β→0
8a1 − 2a21 − 3a2 ≥ 0⇐⇒ lim
β→0
a1(5− 2a1) = a11− 3γ
1− γ ≥ 0
Finally, we establish that K(β) is, indeed, unimodal in β, thereby com-
pleting the proof that ΠP (q) is unimodal over [0, q1). Let Z = K
a2
a1
. Hence,
Z ′ = Z(K
′
K
+X) and Z ′′ = (Z
′)2
Z
+ Z(K
′′
K
− (K′
K
)2 +X ′), where X = a
′
2
a2
− a′1
a1
.
Correspondingly, we have
3Z − 4 = H = √16− 6a2 > 0⇒ Z ′(3Z − 4) = −a′2 > 0
⇒Z ′′(3Z − 4) + 3(Z ′)2 = −a′′2
⇒ K
′′
K
∣∣∣∣
K′=0
= −a
′′
2 + Z(3Z − 4)X ′ + 2(3Z − 4) (Z
′)2
Z
Z(3Z − 4) < 0
where the inequality follows because a′′2 =
2
γ(1−γ) > 0 and X
′ = a
′′
2
a2
− (a′2
a2
+
a′1
a1
)X > 0 due to −(a′2
a2
+
a′1
a1
) > 0 and X|K′=0 > 0. This implies that K(β)
is unimodal, thereby completing the proof that ΠP (q) is unimodal in q over
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(0, q1).
Next, we follow a similar analysis to establish that ΠC(q) is unimodal in q
over [q1, q2). Let
bi = 1 +
(1− γ + β)i
1 + γ(1− γ) ; b
′
i =
i(1− γ + β)(i−1)
1 + γ(1− γ) i = 0, 1, 2
Note that b0 > b1 > b2. Accordingly, we have q2 =
fn
gn
1−γ2
1−βγ , which implies
fn
gn
= 1−βγ
1−γ2 q2.
ΠC(q) ∝ b0f
2
n
g2n
q − 2b1fn
gn
q2 + b2q
3
⇒ ∂ΠC(q)
∂q
∝ b0f
2
n
g2n
− 4b1fn
gn
q + 3b2q
2 = 3b2(q − qˆ−)(q − qˆ+)
where qˆ± ≡ 1−βγ
1−γ2
2b1−
√
4b21−3b0b2
3b2
q2. Notice that if 4b
2
1 ≤ 3b0b2, then ∂ΠC(q)∂q > 0
over [q1, q2), in which case ΠC(q) is unimodal. Thus, consider if 4b
2
1 > 3b0b2.
Let H =
√
4b21 − 3b0b2 > 0. Then, to show that ΠC(q) is unimodal, it suffices
to show that qˆ+ ≥ q2. To that end, if qˆ− ≥ q2, then qˆ+ > qˆ− ≥ q2. Otherwise,
if qˆ− < q2, then H > 2b1 − 3b2 (1−γ2)(1−βγ) , or β > 3γ−23−2γ . In this case, we have
qˆ+ ≥ q2 ⇐⇒ K(β) = 1−βγ1−γ2 b0(2b1−H) ≥ 1. Thus, to complete the proof that
ΠC(q) is unimodal, it suffices to show that minK(β) ≥ 1. We consider two
cases. First, if 2b1 ≥ 3b2 (1−γ2)(1−βγ) , then K(β) ≥ 1−βγ1−γ2 2b13b2 ≥ 1. Next, if 2b1 <
3b2
(1−γ2)
(1−βγ) , then it suffices to show that (1) K(β) is unimodal in β, and (2)
min[K(βmax), K(βmin)] ≥ 1. To that end, we establish (2) first: K(βmax) =
K(γ) = 1;if γ ≥ 2/3, then K(βmin) = K
(
3γ−2
3−2γ
)
= 1 + 2(4γ(1−γ)+(3γ−2))
10−17γ+8γ2 ≥ 1;
and if γ < 2/3, then
K(βmin) = K(0) ≥ 1⇐⇒ H2 ≥ (3b2(1− γ2)− 2b1)2
⇐⇒b0 ≤ (1− γ2)(4b1 − 3(1− γ2)b2)⇐⇒ γ(1 + γ)(3γ − 2) ≤ 0⇐⇒ γ ≤ 2/3
Finally, we establish that K(β) is unimodal in β, thereby completing the
proof that ΠC(q) is unimodal over [q1, q2). Let Z ≡ (1−γ2)K(1−βγ) . Hence Z
′
Z
=
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K′
K
+ γ
(1−βγ) . Correspondingly, we have
b2Z − 2b1 = H =
√
4b21 − 3b0b2 > 0
⇒Z
′
Z
=
2− (1− γ + β)Z
H
b′1 ⇒
K ′
K
=
2(1 + γ)− (1 + β)Z
(1− βγ)(b2Z − 2b1)
⇒ K
′′
K
∣∣∣∣
K′=0
= − (1 + γ)Z
(1− βγ)2(b2Z − 2b1) < 0
This implies that K(β) is unimodal, thereby completing the proof that ΠC(q)
is unimodal over [q1, q2).
Next, to complete the proof of Lemma B.2, we establish that ΠS(q) is
unimodal in q over [q2, q3). Accordingly, we have q3 =
fn
gn
(1+γ)
(1+β)
, which implies
fn
gn
= (1+β)
(1+γ)
q3.
ΠS(q) ∝ (1 + γ)f
2
n
g2n
q − 2(1 + β)fn
gn
q2 +
(1 + β)2
(1 + γ)
q3
⇒ ∂ΠS(q)
∂q
∝ (1 + γ)f
2
n
g2n
− 4(1 + β)fn
gn
q + 3
(1 + β)2
(1 + γ)
q2
= 3
(1 + β)2
(1 + γ)
(q3
3
− q
)
(q3 − q)
Thus ∂ΠS(q)
∂q
> 0 for q < q3
3
, and ∂ΠS(q)
∂q
< 0 for q3
3
< q < q3, which implies
that ΠS(q) is unimodal in q over [q2, q3), thereby completing the proof for
Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 3.2: From Lemma B.1, we know that frgn > fngr,
and from Lemma B.2, we know that prices and demands are defined over
three segments: (0, q1), [q1, q2), and [q2, q3). We first establish the continuity
of both price and demand, and then we analyze the impact of q for each
segment. For the prices, we have for j = 1, 2
lim
q→q−1
pGnj(q) = lim
q→q+1
pGnj(q) =
f 3nfr(fn − fr)((fn − fr)gn + fn(gn − gr))
2(f 2n(gn − gr)− (fn − fr)2gn)2
lim
q→q−2
pGr2(q) = lim
q→q+2
pGr2(q) =
fnf
2
r (fn − fr)(2fngn(fn − fr) + fr(frgn − fngr))
2(f 2n(gn − gr)− (fn − fr)2gn)2
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Accordingly, for the demand, we have
lim
q→q−1
dGn1(q) = lim
q→q+1
dGn1(q) =
fnfr(fn − fr)((fn − 2fr)(fn − fr)gn + f 2n(gn − gr))
2(f 2n(gn − gr)− (fn − fr)2gn)2
lim
q→q−1
dGn2(q) = lim
q→q+1
dGn2(q) =
fnfr(fn − fr)2((fn − fr)gn + fn(gn − gr))
2(f 2n(gn − gr)− (fn − fr)2gn)2
lim
q→q−2
dGr2(q) = lim
q→q+2
dGr2(q) =
fn(frgn − fngr)
2(f 2n(gn − gr)− (fn − fr)2gn)
Given the continuity of pGij(q) and d
G
ij(q), we discuss the impact of q for
each segment. First, for q < q1, we have
∂pGn2(q)
∂q
=
∂pGn1(q)
∂q
=
(fn + 2gnq)
2
>
∂pGr2(q)
∂q
=
(fr + 2grq)
2
> 0;
∂dGn2(q)
∂q
= − (gn − gr)
2(fn − fr) < −
gn
2fn
=
∂dGn1(q)
∂q
< 0;
∂dGr2(q)
∂q
=
(frgn − fngr)
2fn(fn − fr) > 0.
Secondly, for q1 ≤ q < q2, we have
∂pGn2(q)
∂q
=
(fn + 2gnq)
2
>
∂pGn1(q)
∂q
=
fn[fn(fn + 2gnq) + 2(fn − fr)fr − 2(frgn − fngr)q]
2(f 2n + fr(fn − fr))
> 0;
∂pGn2(q)
∂q
=
(fn + 2gnq)
2
>
∂pGr2(q)
∂q
=
fr[(fn − fr)(fr + 2(gn + gr)q) + fn(fr + 2gnq)]
2(f 2n + fr(fn − fr))
> 0;
∂dGn1(q)
∂q
=
∂dGr2(q)
∂q
= −((fn − fr)gn + fngr)
2(f 2n + fr(fn − fr))
< 0;
∂dGn2(q)
∂q
= − (fngn − frgr)
2(f 2n + fr(fn − fr))
< 0.
Finally, for q2 ≤ q < q3, we have
∂pGn2(q)
∂q
=
fr(fn − fr) + 2(f 2n + fr(gn + gr)q)
2(fn + fr)
>
∂pGn1(q)
∂q
=
fn
fr
∂pGr2(q)
∂q
=
fn((fn + fr) + 2(gn + gr)q)
2(fn + fr)
> 0
∂dGn1(q)
∂q
=
∂dGr2(q)
∂q
= − (gn + gr)
2(fn + fr)
< 0 =
∂dGn2(q)
∂q
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Proof of Proposition 3.3: Given Lemma B.3 and its proof, qG∗ = qGS ≡ q33
if and only if qGS ≥ q2, which is equivalent to gr ≤ grS. Similarly, qG∗ =
qGC ≡ 2b1−
√
4b21−3b0b2
3b2
fn
gn
if and only if q1 ≤ qGC < q2, which is equivalent to
grS < gr ≤ grC . Finally, qG∗ = qGP ≡ 4−
√
16−6a2
3a2
fn
gn
if and only if qGP < q1,
which is equivalent to grC < gr <
frgn
fn
.
Proof of Proposition 3.4: Assume that gr/fr < gn/fn < fn. Then, two
possibilities exist in an optimal solution: either d∗r2 = 0 or d
∗
r2 > 0. If d
∗
r2 = 0,
then k∗ = 1 by Proposition 3.1. If d∗r2 > 0, then k
∗ = 1 by definition. Thus,
k∗ = 1 is always true. Given this, Lemma B.1 implies d∗r2 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.5: As per the proof of Proposition 3.4, gn/fn < fn
implies k∗ = 1, and gr/fr < gn/fn implies d∗r2 > 0 by Lemma B.1. Given
this, Proposition 3.3 applies, which indicates that gr ≤ grC implies d∗r2 =
d∗n1 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.6: As per the proof of Proposition 3.4, gn/fn < fn
implies k∗ = 1. Moreover, by Lemma B.1, gr/fr ≥ gn/fn implies d∗r2 = 0.
Thus gn/fn < min[fn, gr/fr] implies that {k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = 0} is true. Next, to
establish that gn/fn ≥ min[fn, gr/fr] implies that {k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = 0} is not
true, consider two cases: If gn/fn > gr/fr, then either gn/fn < fn, in which
case d∗r2 6= 0 by Proposition 3.4, or gn/fn ≥ fn, in which case k∗ 6= 1 by
Proposition 3.1. Thus, gn/fn > gr/fr implies that {k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = 0} is not
true. Similarly, if gr/fr ≥ gn/fn ≥ fn, then either d∗r2 > 0 in which case
d∗r2 6= 0, or d∗r2 = 0, in which case k∗ = 0 by Proposition 3.1. Thus, again,
{k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = 0} is not true.
Proof of Proposition 3.7: Assume that gn/fn < min[1, gr/fr]. Then gn/fn <
min[fn, gr/fr], which implies k
∗ = 1 and d∗r2 = 0 by Proposition 3.6. Corre-
spondingly, from Proposition 3.1, fn/gn > 1 implies that ∆(q
∗) = ∆(qM) =
2(e1+e2)fn
9gn
> 2(e1+e2)
9
= ∆(qT ). Thus, gn/fn < min[1, gr/fr] implies ∆(q
∗) =
∆(qM) > ∆(qT ). Next, to establish that gn/fn ≥ min[1, gr/fr] implies
that ∆(q∗) = ∆(qM) > ∆(qT ) is not true, consider two cases: If gn/fn ≥
min[fn, gr/fr], then ∆(q
∗) 6= ∆(qM) by Proposition 3.6. If min[1, gr/fr] ≤
gn/fn < min[fn, gr/fr], then 1 ≤ gn/fn < gr/fr, which implies ∆(q∗) =
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∆(qM) = 2(e1+e2)fn
9gn
≤ 2(e1+e2)
9
= ∆(qT ). Thus, gn/fn ≥ min[1, gr/fr] implies
that ∆(q∗) = ∆(qM) > ∆(qT ) is not true.
Proof of Proposition 3.8: If gr ≤ grC < gnfr/fn and gn/fn <
1− f2r (3fn−fr)
(2fn−fr)(fn+fr)2 < fn, then d
∗
r2 = d
∗
n1 by Proposition 3.5. Thus, to complete
the proof, it suffices to show that (1) ∆(q∗|k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = d∗n1) decreases in
gr, in which case ∆(q
∗|k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = d∗n1) ≥ ∆(q∗|k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = d∗n1)|gr=grC ;
and (2) ∆(q∗|k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = d∗n1)|gr=grC > ∆(qT ). To prove (1), we establish
that d∆(q
∗)
dgr
= ∂∆(q
∗)
∂gr
+ ∂∆(q
∗)
∂q∗
dq∗
dgr
< 0 by demonstrating that ∂∆(q
∗)
∂gr
< 0 and
∂∆(q∗)
∂q∗
dq∗
dgr
< 0. First, to prove that ∂∆(q
∗)
∂gr
< 0, note that grS < gr ≤ grC ⇒
∂∆(q∗)
∂gr
= − (e1+e2)(fn−fr)q∗
2(f2n+fr(fn−fr)) < 0 and gr ≤ grS ⇒
∂∆(q∗)
∂gr
= − (e1+e2)q∗
2(fn+fr)
< 0. Next,
we prove that ∂∆(q
∗)
∂q∗
dq∗
dgr
< 0 by establishing that ∂∆(q
∗)
∂q∗ > 0 and
dq∗
dgr
< 0. If
gr ≤ grS, then ∂∆(q∗)∂q∗ = (e1 + e2)/6 > 0 and ∂q
∗
∂gr
= − fn+fr
3(gn+gr)2
< 0. If grS <
gr ≤ grC , then recall from the proof of Lemma B.3 that q∗ = qGC = fngn b02b1+H ,
where H =
√
4b21 − 3b0b2. Thus,
∂H
∂gr
=
(b0 − 1)(b1 + 3(γ − β))
gnH
> 0
⇒ sign
{
∂q∗
∂gr
}
= sign
{
−
(
2
db1
dgr
+
∂H
∂gr
)}
< 0
Moroever,
∂∆(q∗)
∂q∗
= (e1 + e2)
fn(fn − 2gnq∗) + (fn − fr)(fn + fr − 2(gn + gr)q∗)
2(f 2n + fr(fn − fr))
=
(e1 + e2)
2(1 + γ − γ2)
(2− γ2)H − 2γ(γ − β)
2b1 +H
≥ 0
where the inequality follows because gr > grS implies that β ≥
(
3γ−2
3−2γ
)+
,
which in turn implies that (2− γ2)H − 2γ(γ − β) ≥ 2((3γ−2)+γ2(1−γ)(4−γ))
(3−2γ)(1+γ−γ2) ≥ 0
if γ ≥ 2/3, and (2 − γ2)H − 2γ(γ − β) ≥ 2γ2(1−γ)
(1+γ−γ2) ≥ 0 if γ < 2/3. Thus,
we conclude that d∆(q
∗)
dgr
< 0 for gr ≤ grC , which implies ∆(q∗|k∗ = 1, d∗r2 =
d∗n1) ≥ ∆(q∗|k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = d∗n1)|gr=grC .
Finally, to complete the proof, we establish that ∆(q∗|k∗ = 1, d∗r2 =
d∗n1)|gr=grC > ∆(qT ) as follows. At gr = grC , gn/fn < 1 − f
2
r (3fn−fr)
(2fn−fr)(fn+fr)2
implies that ∆(q∗)|gr=grC = 2(e1+e2)f
2
n(2f
2
n+3fnfr−3f2r )
9(2fn−fr)(fn+fr)2gn >
2(e1+e2)
9
= ∆(qT ).
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 4
C.1 Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 4.1: To prove that ∆∗(q) = (e1+e2)q(dn1(q)+dn2(q)) >
(e1 + e2)q(1 − q) = ∆T (q), it suffices to show that dn1(q) + dn2(q) > 1 − q.
If gn/fn < 1, then, from (3.4), Π
NG(q, k = 1) = q(fn−gnq)
2
2fn
> q(1−q)
2
2
=
ΠNG(q, k = 0). Moreover, if, on the one hand, gr ≥ gnfr/fn > gnfr/fn −
2(fn − fr)(fn − gn)/fn, then ΠNG(q, k = 1) ≥ ΠG(q) by Lemma B.1. Thus,
in this case, the optimal remanufacturing strategy for given q is k(q) = 1
and dr2(q) = 0, and the corresponding optimal pricing strategy implies, from
(3.3), that dn1(q) + dn2(q) = 1 − gnq/fn > 1 − q which in turn implies that
∆∗(q) > ∆T (q). If, on the other hand, gnfr/fn > gr > gnfr/fn − 2(fn −
fr)(fn − gn)/fn, then ΠG(q) > ΠNG(q, k = 1) by Lemma B.1. Thus in
this case, the optimal remanufacturing strategy for a given q is k(q) = 1
and dr2(q) > 0, and the corresponding optimal pricing strategy implies,
from Lemma B.2, that dn1(q) + dn2(q) ≥ 1 − q which in turn implies that
∆∗(q) > ∆T (q).
Similar to the Appendix B, we first establish three lemmas as build-
ing blocks for proving Propositions 4.2–4.4. The proofs of Lemmas C.1
and C.2 are combined and follow the statement of Lemma C.2. The proof
of Lemma C.3 directly follows its statement. For Lemmas C.1–C.3, let
pGi (q), d
G
i (q) denote the optimal Green strategy price and corresponding de-
mand as a function of q for product i = n, r, respectively. Moreover, let
qγ =
γfr(fn−fr)
(frgn−fngr)+γfr(gn−gr) denote the quality threshold above which d
G
r (q) =
γdGn (q), and q¯ =
fn+γfr
gn+γgr
denote the quality threshold above which dGr (q) =
dGn (q) = 0.
Lemma C.1. Given that k = 1, then for given q < q¯, dr2 > 0 if and only if
gr/fr < gn/fn.
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Lemma C.2. If k = 1 and gr/fr < gn/fn, then q
G∗ < q¯. Then, for given
collection rate γ, a remanufacturing firm should
i) If 0 < q < qγ, remanufacture a proportion of recycled products and set
the demand, price as
dn(q) = d˜n − (frgn − fngr)q
2fn(fn − fr) ; dr(q) =
(frgn − fngr)q
2fr(fn − fr) ;
pn(q) =
(fn + gnq)q
2
; pr(q) =
(fr + grq)q
2
; (C.1)
and enjoys a profit of Π(q) = q(fn−gnq)
2
4fn
+ (frgn−fngr)
2q3
4fnfr(fn−fr) ;
ii) If qγ ≤ q < q¯, remanufacture all recycled products and set the demand,
price as,
dn(q) =
fn − gnq + γ(fr − grq)
2(fn + γfr(2 + γ))
; dr(q) = γd
F
n
pn(q) =
(fn + γfr)(fn + gnq + γ(fr + grq)) + 2γ
2fr(fn − fr)
2(fn + γfr(2 + γ))
;
pr(q) =
((1 + γ)(fn + gnq + γ(fr + grq))− 2γ(fn − fr))frq
2(fn + γfr(2 + γ))
; (C.2)
and enjoys a profit of Π(q) = q(fn−gnq+γ(fr−grq))
2
4(fn+γfr(2+γ))
.
iii) If q > min(1, q¯), produce nothing.
Proofs for Lemmas C.1–C.2. We prove our results using lagrangian method.
The corresponding lagrangean of profit (4.4) for given q is
max
pn,pr
L(q) =
(
1− pn − pr
(fn − fr)q
)
(pn − gnq2 + γλ)
+
(
pn − pr
(fn − fr)q −
pr
frq
)
(pr − grq2 − λ+ µ)
where λ and µ are the lagrange multipliers for conditions dr ≤ γdn and
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dr ≥ 0, respectively. Correspondingly the KKT conditions are
∂Π
∂pn
= 1− pn − pr
(fn − fr)q −
(pn − gnq2 + γλ)
(fn − fr)q +
(pr − grq2 − λ+ µ)
(fn − fr)q = 0
∂Π
∂pr
=
(pn − gnq2 + γλ)
(fn − fr)q +
pn − pr
(fn − fr)q −
pr
frq
− fn(pr − grq
2 − λ+ µ)
fr(fn − fr)q = 0
λ
(
γ
(
1− pn − pr2
(fn − fr)q
)
−
(
pn − pr
(fn − fr)q −
pr
frq
))
≥ 0
µ
(
pn − pr
(fn − fr)q −
pr
frq
)
≥ 0
The solution to this lagrange system is
pn =
fnq + gnq
2 − γλ
2
; pr =
frq + grq
2 + λ− µ
2
dn =
(fn − fr)q − gnq2 + grq2 + λ(1 + γ)− µ
2(fn − fr)q ;
dr =
(frgn − fngr)q2 − λ(fn + γfr) + µfn
2fr(fn − fr)q
To prove Lemma C.1, we first prove sufficient and then necessary conditions.
To that end, we first assume dr > 0 which implies µ = 0.
0 < dr =
(frgn − fngr)q2 − λ(fn + γfr) + µfn
2fr(fn − fr)q ⇒ frgn−fngr >
λ(fn + γfr)
q2
≥ 0
which completes the sufficient condition.
Next, we assume frgn > fngr, which implies. We consider four cases based
on the multipliers λ and µ: (1) if λ = µ = 0, then dr(q) =
(frgn−fngr)q2
2fr(fn−fr)q > 0;
(2) if λ = 0 and µ > 0, dr > 0 again holds; (3) If λ > 0 and µ = 0, then
λ = (frgn−fngr)q
2−frγ((fn−fr)−(gn−gr)q)q
(fn+frγ(2+γ))
. dr = γdn =
γ(fn−gnq+γ(fr−grq))
(fn+frγ(2+γ))
> 0 as
q < q¯; (4) if λ => 0 and µ > 0, then dr = γdn =
γ(fn−gnq+γ(fr−grq))
(fn+frγ(2+γ))
= 0,
which contradicts q < q¯. Thus, we complete our proof for Lemma C.1.
Second, we prove Lemma C.2. Note that dr(q) > 0 (by definition); thus
µ = 0 and frgn > fngr (by Lemma C.1). Accordingly,
γdn(q)− dr(q) = γ(qγ − q)
2qγ
+
λ(fn + frγ(2 + γ))
2fr(fn − fr)q
which decreases in q. Here we consider three possibilities.
Case 1. If 0 < q < qγ, then γdn(q)−dr(q) > λ(fn+frγ(2+γ))2fr(fn−fr)q ≥ 0 which implies
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that λ = 0. Thus, KKT conditions above directly imply (C.1).
Case 2. If qγ ≤ q < q¯, then 0 ≤ γdn(q) − dr(q) = γ(qγ−q)2qγ +
λ(fn+frγ(2+γ))
2fr(fn−fr)q .
Thus λ ≥ 0. If λ = 0, then γdn(q) − dr(q) = γ(qγ−q)2qγ < 0 which is
impossible. Therefore, λ = 2fr(fn−fr)q
(fn+frγ(2+γ))
γ(q−qγ)
2qγ
, and γdn(q)− dr(q) = 0.
Correspondingly, the KKT conditions above imply (C.2).
Case 3. If q ≥ q¯, then, similar to Case II, we again have λ > 0. Thus,
γdn(q) = dr(q) =
γ(fn−gnq+γ(fr−grq))
(fn+frγ(2+γ))
< 0 which is impossible. Thus,
qG∗ < q¯.
Lemma C.3. If gn/fn > gr/fr, then the profit function for remanufacturing
strategy ΠG(q) is unimodal in q over q ∈ [0, fn/gn].
Proof for Lemma C.3. From Lemma C.2, ΠG(q) reduces to
ΠG(q) =

ΠP (q) =
q(fn − gnq)2
4fn
+
(frgn − fngr)2q3
4fnfr(fn − fr) , q < qγ;
ΠC(q) =
q(fn − gnq + γ(fr − grq))2
4(fn + γfr(2 + γ))
, qγ ≤ q < q¯
To prove Lemma C.3, we first establish that ΠG(q) is continuous and differ-
entiable over [0, q¯]. Then ΠG(q) is unimodal over q ∈ [0, q¯] such that ΠP (q)
is unimodal over (0, qγ), and ΠC(q) is unimodal over [qγ, q¯).
Accordingly, we first prove the continuity and differentiability at quality
level qγ.
lim
q→q−γ
ΠG(q) = lim
q→q+γ
ΠG(q)
=
γ(fn − fr)fr(frgn − fngr)2(fn + γfr(2 + γ))
4((frgn − fngr) + γfr(gn − gr))3
lim
q→q−γ
∂ΠG(q)
∂q
= lim
q→q+γ
∂ΠG(q)
∂q
=
(frgn − fngr)((frgn − fngr)(fn + γfr(2 + γ))− 2γfr(fn − fr)(gr + γgr))
4(frgn − fngr + γfr(gn − gr))2
Second, we establish that ΠP (q) is unimodal over (0, qγ). To that end, we
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define the following notations:
f =
fr
fn
; g =
gr
gn
; a1 =
(f − g)
f(1− f)
1 + γ
γ
+
g
f
; a2 =
(f − g)2
f(1− f) + 1.
Accordingly,
a′1 = −
1 + γf
γf(1− f) < 0; a
′
2 = −
2(f − g)
f(1− f < 0.
We have qγ =
fn
gn
γf(1−f)
(f−g)+γf(1−g) , which implies
fn
gn
= a1qγ.
ΠG(q) ∝ f
2
n
g2n
q − 2fn
gn
q2 + a2q
3
∂ΠG(q)
∂q
∝ f
2
n
g2n
− 4fn
gn
q + 3a2q
2 = 3a2(q − qˆ−)(q − qˆ+)
where qˆ± = a1qγ(2±
√
4−3a2)
3a2
. Note if 3a2 ≥ 4, then ∂ΠG(q)∂q > 0 over [0, qγ], in
which case ΠG(q) is unimodal. Thus, consider if 3a2 < 4. Let H =
√
4− 3a2,
and qˆ− = a1qγ(2−H)
3a2
< qˆ+ = a1qγ(2+H)
3a2
. Then, to prove unimodality, it suffices
to show that qγ ≤ qˆ+. To that end, if qγ ≤ qˆ−, then qγ ≤ qˆ− < qˆ+ is true.
Otherwise, if qγ > qˆ
−, then H > 2a1−3a2
a1
, and f((1−f)(1−2γ)+f(1+γ)
2)
3γ2f(1−f)+(1+γf)2 < g < f .
In this case, to prove qγ ≤ qˆ+ we need to show K(g) = a1(2+H)3a2 ≥ 1. We
consider two cases. First, if 2a1 ≥ 3a2, then K(g) ≥ 2a13a2 ≥ 1. Second, if
2a1 < 3a2, then it suffices to show that (1) K(g) is unimodal in g, and (2)
min[K(gmax), K(gmin)] ≥ 1. To that end, we establish (2) first: K(gmax) =
K(f) = 1; if f ≥ 2γ−1
γ(4+γ)
, then K(gmin) = K(
f((1−f)(1−2γ)+f(1+γ)2)
3γ2f(1−f)+(1+γf)2 ) = 1; and if
f < 2γ−1
γ(4+γ)
, then
K(gmin) = K(0) ≥ 1⇐⇒ lim
g→0
H2 ≥ lim
g→0
(
2a1 − 3a2
a1
)2
⇐⇒ lim
g→0
a21 − 4a1 + 3a2 ≤ 0⇐⇒
(1− f)(1− 2γ) + f(1 + γ)2
γ2(1− f)2 ≤ 0
Finally, we establish that K(g) is unimodal in g. Let Z = K a2
a1
. Hence,
Z ′ = Z(K
′
K
+X) and Z ′′ = (Z
′)2
Z
+ Z(K
′′
K
− (K′
K
)2 +X ′), where X = a
′
2
a2
− a′1
a1
.
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Correspondingly, we have
3Z − 2 = H = √4− 3a2 > 0⇒ Z ′(3Z − 2) = −a′2/2 > 0
⇒Z ′′(3Z − 2) + 3(Z ′)2 = −a′′2/2
⇒ K
′′
K
∣∣∣∣
K′=0
= −a
′′
2/2 + Z(3Z − 2)X ′ + 2(3Z − 2) (Z
′)2
Z
Z(3Z − 2) < 0
where the inequality follows because a′′2 =
2
f(1−f) > 0 and X
′ = a
′′
2
a2
− (a′2
a2
+
a′1
a1
)X > 0 due to −(a′2
a2
+
a′1
a1
) > 0 and X|K′=0 > 0. This implies that K(β)
is unimodal, thereby completing the proof that ΠP (q) is unimodal in q over
(0, qγ).
Next, we follow a similar analysis to establish that ΠC(q) is unimodal in q
over [qγ, q¯]. Accordingly, we have q¯ =
fn
gn
(1+γf)
(1+γg)
, which implies fn
gn
= (1+γg)
(1+γf)
q¯.
ΠGC(q) ∝
(1 + γf)2
(1 + γf) + γf(1 + γ)
(
f 2n
g2n
q − 2 (1 + γg)
(1 + γf)
fn
gn
q2 +
(1 + γg)2
(1 + γf)2
q3
)
∂ΠGC(q)
∂q
∝ (1 + γf)
2
(1 + γf) + γf(1 + γ)
(
f 2n
g2n
− 4 (1 + γg)
(1 + γf)
fn
gn
q +
(1 + γg)2
(1 + γf)2
q2
)
∝ 3 (1 + γg)
2
(1 + γf)2
(q − q¯)(q − q¯
3
)
Thus,
∂ΠGC(q)
∂q
> 0 for q < q¯/3 and
∂ΠGC(q)
∂q
< 0 for q¯/3 < q < q¯, which implies
that ΠGC(q) is unimodal in q over [qγ, q¯]. We thereby complete the proof for
Lemma C.3.
Proof for Proposition 4.2. Given Lemma C.3 and its proof, qG∗ = qGC ≡ q¯3
if and only if qGC ≥ qγ, which is equivalent to gr ≤ grC . Similarly, qG∗ =
qGP ≡ 2−
√
4−3a2
3a2
fn
gn
if and only if qGC < qγ and
gr
fr
< gn
fn
, which is equivalent to
grC < gr ≤ frgnfn .
Proof for Proposition 4.3. To prove the first part, assume that gr/fr <
gn/fn < fn. Then, two possibilities exist in an optimal solution: either
d∗r2 = 0 or d
∗
r2 > 0. If d
∗
r2 = 0, then k
∗ = 1 by Lemma C.2. If d∗r2 > 0, then
k∗ = 1 by definition. Thus, k∗ = 1 is always true. Given this, Lemma C.2
implies d∗r2 > 0. In this case, we know from Proposition 4.2 that 0 < d
∗
r < γd
∗
n
requires gr > grC which translates to γ > γˆ.
To prove the second part, assume that gr/fr <
(1+γ)(fn+γfr)−3γ(fn−fr)
(fn+γfr)2+3frγ2(fn−fr) gn/fn.
As per the proof of Proposition 4.2, gr/fr < fn means k
∗ = 1, and gr < grC
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means d∗r = γd
∗
n > 0. This requires gr ≤ grC which translates to γ ≤ γˆ. And
γ ≤ 1 by definition.
Proof for Proposition 4.4. From Proposition 4.2, we know that k∗ = 1
when gn/fn < fn. If gr > grC , then 0 ≤ d∗r < γd∗n is true, which implies
that the collection rate has no effect on the optimal solution. If gr ≤ grC ,
we have q∗ = qGC =
fn+γfr
3(gn+γgr)
and, correspondingly, demands are γd∗n = d
∗
r =
γ(fn+γfr)
3(fn+γfr(2+γ))
. Hence,
∂q∗
∂γ
=
frgn − fngr
3(gn + γgr)2
> 0
∂d∗n
∂γ
= −fr(fn(1 + 2γ) + frγ
2)
3(fn + γfr(2 + γ))2
< 0
∂d∗r
∂γ
=
(fn + γfr)
2 − (fn − fr)frγ2)
3(fn + γfr(2 + γ))2
> 0
Proof for Proposition 4.5. From Proposition 4.2, we know that k∗ = 1
when gn/fn < fn. If gr > grC , then 0 ≤ d∗r < γd∗n is true, which implies
that the collection rate has no effect on the optimal solution. If gr ≤ grC ,
we have q∗ = qGC =
fn+γfr
3(gn+γgr)
and, correspondingly, demands are γd∗n = d
∗
r =
γ(fn+γfr)
3(fn+γfr(2+γ))
. Hence, the associated environmental damage ∆∗ = ed∗nq
∗ =
e(fn+γfr)2
9(gn+γgr)(fn+γfr(2+γ))
, and
∂∆∗
∂γ
= −e(fn + γfr)((fn + γfr)(fn + γ
2fr) + 2γfr)
9(gn + γgr)(fn + γfr(2 + γ))
· ((fn − fr)gn + fn(gn + γgr))
9(gn + γgr)(fn + γfr(2 + γ))
< 0.
To prove Propositions 4.6–4.7, we again first introduce and prove Lemma
C.4 for environmental planner. Let pG
′
i (q), d
G′
i (q) denote the optimal Green
strategy price and corresponding demand as a function of q for product i =
n, r, respectively. Moreover, let q′γ =
fr(γ(fn−fr)−e(1+γ))
(frgn−fngr)+γfr(gn−gr) denote the quality
threshold above which dG
′
r (q) = γd
G′
n (q), and q¯
′ = fn+γfr−e
gn+γgr
denote the quality
threshold above which dG
′
r (q) = d
G′
n (q) = 0.
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Lemma C.4. If k = 1 and gr/fr < gn/fn, then q
G′ < q¯′. Then, for given
collection rate γ, an environmental planner should
i) If 0 < q < q′γ, remanufacture a proportion of recycled products and set
the demand, price as
pG
′
n (q) = p
G
n (q) +
eq
2
; pG
′
n (q) = p
G
r (q)
dG
′
n (q) = d
G
n (q)−
e
2(fn − fr) ; d
G′
r (q) = d
G
r (q) +
e
2(fn − fr) (C.3)
and enjoys a profit of Φ(q) = ΠP (q)− eq(2((fn−fr)−(gn−gr)q)−e)4(fn−fr) ;
ii) If q′γ ≤ q < q¯′, remanufacture all recycled products and set the demand,
price as,
pG
′
n (q) = p
G
n (q) +
eq(fn + γfr)
2(fn + γfr(2 + γ)
;
pG
′
r (q) = p
G
r (q) +
eq(1 + γ)
2(fn + γfr(2 + γ)
;
dG
′
r (q) = γd
G′
n (q) = d
G
r (q)−
eγ
2(fn + γfr(2 + γ))
(C.4)
and enjoys a profit of Φ(q) = q(fn−gnq−e+γ(fr−grq))
2
4(fn+γfr(2+γ))
.
iii) If q > min(1, q¯′), produce nothing.
Proofs for Lemmas C.4. The proof is similar to that for Lemma C.2. We
prove our results using lagrangian method. The corresponding lagrange func-
tion for profit (4.8) is
max
pn,pr
Φ(q) =
(
1− pn − pr
(fn − fr)q
)
(pn − gnq2 − eq + γλ)
+
(
pn − pr
(fn − fr)q −
pr
frq
)
(pr − grq2 − λ+ µ)
where λ and µ are the lagrange multipliers corresponding to dr ≤ γdn and
dr ≥ 0, respectively. And the KKT conditions are
∂Φ
∂pn
= 1− pn − pr
(fn − fr)q −
(pn − gnq2 − eq + γλ)
(fn − fr)q +
(pr − grq2 − λ+ µ)
(fn − fr)q = 0
∂Φ
∂pr
=
(pn − gnq2 − eq + γλ)
(fn − fr)q +
pn − pr
(fn − fr)q −
pr
frq
− fn(pr − grq
2 − λ+ µ)
fr(fn − fr)q = 0
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and the corresponding orthogonal conditions. The solution to this lagrange
system is
p′n(q) =
fnq + gnq
2 + eq − γλ
2
; p′r(q) =
frq + grq
2 + λ− µ
2
d′n(q) =
(fn − fr − e)q − (gn − gr)q2 + λ(1 + γ)− µ
2(fn − fr)q ;
d′r(q) =
(frgn − fngr)q2 + freq − (fn + γfr)λ+ fnµ
2fr(fn − fr)q
We first prove that gr/fr < gn/fn
(fn+2e)
(fn−e) is sufficient for d
′
r(q) > 0 by con-
tradiction. Assume that d′r(q) = 0. Then the orthogonal conditions dic-
tate that λ = 0 and µ ≥ 0. From the lagrange solution, we know that
µ = −q (frgn−fngr)q+fre
fn
. If gr/fr ≤ gn/fn, then µ < 0 which implies a contra-
diction. Thus, gr/fr < gn/fn is a sufficient condition for d
′
r(q) > 0. Given
this, we have
γd′n(q)− d′r(q) =
γ(q′γ − q)
2qγ
+
λ(fn + frγ(2 + γ))
2fr(fn − fr)q
which again decreases in q. Here, we consider three cases.
Case 1. If 0 < q < q′γ, then γdn(q)−dr(q) > λ(fn+frγ(2+γ))2fr(fn−fr)q ≥ 0 which implies
that λ = 0. Thus, KKT conditions above directly imply (C.3).
Case 2. If q′γ ≤ q < q¯′, then 0 ≤ γdn(q) − dr(q) = γ(q
′
γ−q)
2qγ
+ λ(fn+frγ(2+γ))
2fr(fn−fr)q .
Thus λ ≥ 0. If λ = 0, then γdn(q) − dr(q) = γ(qγ−q)2qγ < 0 which
is impossible. Therefore, λ = 2fr(fn−fr)q
(fn+frγ(2+γ))
γ(q−q′γ)
2qγ
> 0, and γdn(q) −
dr(q) = 0. Correspondingly, the KKT conditions above imply (C.4).
Case 3. If q ≥ q¯′, then, similar to Case 2, we again have λ > 0. Thus,
γdn(q) = dr(q) =
γ(fn−gnq+γ(fr−grq))
(fn+frγ(2+γ))
< 0 which is impossible. Thus,
qG
′
< q¯.
Proof for Proposition 4.6. The proof is similar to that in Proposition 4.2.
First, we prove gn ≤ (fn−e)2(1−e)2 implies k′ = 1 by considering two scenarios. If
d′r = 0, then gn ≤ (fn−e)
2
(1−e)2 implies that Φ
M ≡ (fn−e)2
27gn
> ΦT ≡ (1−e)2
27
. If d′r = 0,
then k = 1 by definition.
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Second, given that gn ≤ (fn−e)2(1−e)2 , the optimal solution is one of the three
cases: (1) d′r = 0; (2) 0 < d
′
r < γd
′
n; and (3) 0 < d
′
r = γd
′
n.
(1) If d′r = 0, then q
′ = qM
′
. Accordingly, µ = q′ −(frgn−fngr)q
′−fre
fn
≥ 0 which
implies gr ≥ frgnfn
(fn+2e)
(fn−e) . Also gr ≤ 1 by definition.
(2) If 0 < d′r < γd
′
n, then q
′ = qG
′
P , µ = 0 and λ = 0. Accordingly, d
′
r =
(frgn−fngr)q′+fre
2fr(fn−fr) > 0 implies that gr <
frgn
fn
(fn+2e)
(fn−e) . Also, q
′ < q′γ translates
to γ > γˆ′.
(3) If 0 < d′r = γd
′
n, then q
′ = qG
′
C . In this case, q
′ ≥ q′γ translates to γ ≤ γˆ′.
Where,
γˆ′ =
−fr(2frgn − fn(gn + gr) + e(gn + 2gr))
fr(fr(gn + 2gr)− 3(fn − e)gr)(
1 +
√
fr − (frgn(fn + 2e)− fngr(fn − e))(fr(gn + 2gr)− 3(fn − e)gr)
(fr(2frgn − fn(gn + gr) + e(gn + 2gr))2
)
qG
′
P =
2((fn − fr)gn − e(gn − gr))
√
fr
3(frgn(gn − gr)− (frgn − fngr)gr)(√
fr −
√
1− 3(frgn(gn − gr)− (frgn − fngr)gr)(fr(fn − 2e)− (fn − e)
2)
4((fn − fr)gn − e(gn − gr))2
)
Proof for Proposition 4.7. We prove our results in two parts: d′r(q) = 0
and d′r(q) > 0. First when d
′
r(q) = 0, the global planner’s objective function
is Θ(p, q, k) = (p − gnq2 − eq)dn + fnq−p2 dn. Following the same solution
procedure as in §4.3.3, we have d′′n(q) = 2d′n(q) and Θ(q, k) = q(fn−e−gnq)
2
2fn
=
2Φ(q, k). Second when d′r(q) > 0, the global planner’s objective function
is (4.9). Following the same solution procedure as in §4.3.3, we again have
d′′n(q) = 2d
′
n(q) and d
′′
r(q) = 2d
′
r(q), and
Θ(q) = 2Φ(q) =

ΠP (q)− eq(2((fn − fr)− (gn − gr)q)− e)
4(fn − fr) , q < q
′
γ;
q(fn − gnq − e+ γ(fr − grq))2
4(fn + γfr(2 + γ))
, q′γ ≤ q < q¯′
Consequently, Θ(q) = 2Φ(q) implies the same optimal quality, or q′ = q′′,
and di(q
′′) = 2di(q′′) = 2di(q′). Thus, we conclude our proof.
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Proof for Proposition 4.8. First, the relationship between a firm’s profit
Π and an environmental planner’s objective Φ implies that taxation can
transform a firm to an environmental planner. Next, we focus on the second
part of proposition. For the firm to behave like a global planner, taxation is
required to reduce the product quality. Moreover, a global planner charges
lower prices, which means lower profit for the firm. Thus, subsidies must
compensate up to an amount of Π′ − Π′′, which represents the difference
in the firm’s profit under 2BL and under 3BL. Thus, the subsidy per unit
product remanufactured s = (Π′ − Π′′)/d′′r .
C.2 Derivation
Remanufacturability Model
We discuss the implications of continuous k ∈ [0, 1] for the Non-Green and
Green strategies, respectively. First, if the Non-Green strategy is imple-
mented, then the profit function (3.5) becomes ΠNG(k) = 2(1+θk)
2
27(1+c1k)
, which
implies that ∂
2ΠNG(k)
∂k2
= 4(c1−θ)
2
27(1+c1k)3
≥ 0. Therefore ΠNG(k) is convex in k,
which implies that argmaxΠNG(k) = 0 or 1. Thus, k
NG ∈ {0, 1}. Next, if
the Green strategy is implemented, then the profit function (3.6) becomes
ΠG(pn1, pn2, pr2, q, k) = dn1(pn1 − gn(k)q2)
+ dn2(pn2 − gn(k)q2) + dr2(pr2 − gr(k)q2) (C.5)
Following the same procedure as in §3.3, we find that Lemmas B.1-B.3 change
only in two regards: (1) k = 1 is replaced by k > 0, and (2) fi and gi
are replaced by fi(k) and gi(k), respectively, for i = n, r. Accordingly, for
given k, we solve for qG(k) and pGn1(k), p
G
n2(k), p
G
r2(k), the optimal design and
pricing decisions given that dr2 > 0, as per Proposition 3.3. Substituting
these decisions into (C.5) thus reduces the Green strategy profit to ΠG(k),
a function of the single variable k. Given ΠG(k), we then conducted a line
search to determine k∗ = argmax{ΠG(k),ΠNG(k = 1),ΠNG(k = 0)}. We
implemented this line search for an extensive array of input parameters such
that (θ, α, c1, c2) ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1.0}, and in every instance we found that
either k∗ = 1 or k∗ = 0.
125
Infinite-Horizon Model
We solve the infinite-horizon model by following the same solution procedure
as in §§3.3–3.4. If the Non-Green strategy is implemented (4.3), then the
solution is the same as in the two-stage model. If the Green strategy is
implemented (4.4), then for given q, let pIGi (q) and d
IG
i (q) denote the price
and demand for product i = n, r in the infinite-horizon problem. Accordingly,
for q < qI1 ≡ fr(fn−fr)(frgn−fngr)+fr(gn−gr) ,
pIGn (q) =
(fn + gnq)q
2
; pIGr (q) =
(fr + grq)q
2
;
dIGn (q) =
(fn − fr)− (gn − gr)q
2(fn − fr) ; and d
IG
r (q) =
(frgn − fngr)q
2fr(fn − fr) ;
And for q ≥ qI1 ,
pIGn (q) =
((fn + fr)(fn + gnq + (fr + grq)) + 2fr(fn − fr))q
2(fn + 3fr)
;
pIGr (q) =
(2fr + (gn + gr)q)frq
(fn + 3fr)
;
dIGn (q) = d
IG
r (q) =
(fn + fr − (gn + gr)q)
2(fn + 3fr)
Given this, Lemma B.1 and Proposition 3.1 in Chapter 3 still hold. There-
fore, similar to the two-stage model, we establish that ΠIG(q) is unimodal
in q over (0, q3) if the Green strategy is implemented. Correspondingly, we
determine the optimal qI∗ by analyzing first-order conditions to establish
qIG∗ = argmaxΠIG(q) and then comparing ΠIG(qIG∗) to ΠING(qING∗).
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